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    This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay (chapter 2) examines the correlations between 
bond markets, stock markets and currency forwards during the quantitative easing (QE) programs 
launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Using DCC-GARCH models, we document a spillover 
impact of QE on the international financial markets and find that these correlations differ by QE 
period across developed and emerging countries. Our findings provide new insights into the impact 
of unconventional monetary policy regimes on the relationships between various international 
financial asset markets. 
    The second essay (chapter 3) examines the effectiveness and performance (E&P) of hedging 
international portfolios of bonds from developed and emerging countries. The excess returns and 
the variances of these portfolios are significantly lower during the QE versus pre-QE period. 
During the QE period, excess return and variance sensitivities are positive and negative with the 
Fed’s MBS holdings and become less positive and less negative with the Fed’s holdings of 
Treasuries. Hedging E&P during the QEs depend on the chosen hedging strategy and level of 
economic development. Results are robust using other hedging E&P measures and excluding 
countries with their own QEs. 
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    The third essay (chapter 4) finds that the integration of international bond and stock markets in 
31 countries are affected significantly by U.S. quantitative easing (QE). After conceptually linking 
variations in the QE effects on bond and stock market integration to six transmission channels, we 
find that the actual effects depend upon the Fed holdings (MBS or Treasuries), channel considered, 
asset type (bond or stock), and the economic development categorization of the countries 
(developed or emerging). Cross-border banking flows as our proxy for the risk-taking channel 
significantly increase bond and stock market integration during each QE period for both developed 
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 In response to the recent financial crisis and to bring the U.S. economy out of the recent 
recession, the U.S. Fed implemented an unconventional monetary policy, Quantitative Easing or 
QE for short, in late November 2008. During this first QE round, the U.S. Fed completed the 
purchase of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, $175 billion in agency debt and $300 
billion in Treasury bonds in the open market to inject liquidity and credit into financial markets. 
During the second QE round (November 2010 to June 2011), the Fed bought about $600 billion 
of treasury securities to stimulate demand and to reduce the unemployment rate. A third QE round 
announced in September 2012 consisted of a new $40 billion per month, open-ended bond 
purchasing program of agency MBS (Mortgage Back Securities) designed to further bolster 
liquidity and economic prospects. This three-essay thesis examines the effect of these 
unconventional monetary policy implementations on the relationships between and among 
international bond and stock markets and currency forwards contracts, on the currency hedging 
effectiveness and performance of international bond portfolios; and on the financial market 
integration of international bond and stock markets.  
In essay 1, we examine the cross-market correlations between bond, stock and currency forward 
markets during each QE period. We document a spillover impact of the QEs in the U.S. on 
international financial markets and find that the correlations across 31 countries differ for the 
various QE periods. Our findings have considerable implications for asset pricing models and for 
managers investing internationally.  
In essay 2, we examine the effect of the Fed’s holdings of MBS and Treasuries during the QEs 
on the effectiveness and performance of unhedged and hedged international bond portfolios from 
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the perspective of U.S. investors. We measure the effectiveness and performance of currency 
hedging strategies by the percentage changes of their variances and the differences of their Sharpe 
ratios from those of an unhedged position, respectively, and their variance and excess return 
components for bond portfolios invested in developed and emerging countries.  
    We first run a univariate test to examine differences in hedging effectiveness, performance, and 
their excess return and variance components during the QE versus the pre-QE period. We find 
several pairs of significant differences for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios. We then use 
time-series regressions to investigate how the variations in hedging effectiveness and performance 
during the QE and pre-QE periods are affected by the time-series evolution of specific assets held 
by the Fed. We find that the effects of two security-type holdings of the Fed on relative hedging 
effectiveness or differenced hedging performance depend on the implemented hedging strategy 
and/or the development level of financial markets (DM for developed market or EM for emerging 
market). In contrast, larger security type holdings significantly reduce the variances of 
international bond portfolios. The negative elasticities at the mean during the QE period are larger 
in magnitude for Treasuries than MBS, and are higher for the bond portfolios invested in EM than 
that in the DM countries for the same hedging strategy and security-type holding. These elasticities 
at the mean for the QE period also decrease monotonically from the unhedged to the fully hedged 
to the optimally hedged portfolios for the same independent variable and country category. 
    In essay 3, we examine the influence of QEs on international bond and stock market integration 
for 31 markets (emerging and developed) based on the measure of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009).  
We find that average market integration significantly increases during QE1 and QE2 for the bond 
and stock markets of All, DM and EM countries, and significantly decreases during QE3 except 
for the significant increase for the bond markets of the EM countries. To explore the possible 
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channels and mechanisms through which QEs affect financial market integration, we examine the 
following six potential channels: confidence, default risk, inflation, liquidity, portfolio balance and 
risk-taking. We find that the differential inflation rate, cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities, 
differential GDP growth potential, differential interest rate and cross-border banking capital flows 
as channel proxies significantly affect the relationship between QEs and financial market 
integration. This evidence supports the arguments that QE effects on market integration are 
transmitted via the inflation, liquidity, portfolio-balance and risk-taking channels. We also use the 
Fed’s relative holdings of risk-free (Treasuries) and risky (MBS) securities to proxy for the effect 
on market integration from the decision of the Fed to target its purchases during a QE to a specific 
risk segment of the market (risky, risk-free or both). We find that the net purchase scale of the QEs 
significantly reinforces the impact of the QEs on market integration, and that the impact of the 
QEs on market integration depends upon the risk-appetite exhibited by Fed purchases, which lend 
more credence to our findings. Our findings also are robust to the use of an alternate measure of 
market integration; namely, the dynamic simple correlation (Billio, Donadelli, Paradiso, and 










Cross-financial-market Correlations and Quantitative Easing 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Fed launched three periods of quantitative easing (hereafter, QE) from the end of 2008. 
Although the impacts of the QEs on various macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth, 
employment and inflation (e.g., Thornton, 2010; Bernanke, 2012) and financial indicators (e.g., 
D’Amico and King, 2013; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014) have drawn considerable academic 
interest, little is known about if and how the cross-market correlations across developed and 
emerging countries changed under these unconventional monetary policy implementations. Since 
QE working through the international portfolio rebalancing channel changes the pattern of capital 
flows between countries by depreciating the domestic currency (US dollar), it seems reasonable to 
expect concurrent changes in asset and currency cross-correlations (Hau and Rey, 2006; Cho et al., 
2016). This can also be inferred from previous research which finds that the arrival of market 
information affects the cross-market correlations of currency futures (Darbar and Deb, 2002) and 
that the positive correlations of stocks with currency returns in emerging markets are sensitive to 
global market conditions (Cho et al., 2016). 
 In this essay, we examine the cross-market correlations between bond, stock and currency 
forward markets during each QE period. To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first 
to examine the cross-market correlations in periods with unconventional monetary undertakings. 
Kenourgios et al. (2015a, b) examine the effects of QE announcements by the European Central 
Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan on the foreign exchange rate dynamics and 
intraday volatility transmissions among EUR, GBP and JPY. We document a spillover impact of 
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QE in the U.S. on the international financial markets and find that the correlations across 31 
countries differ for the various QE periods. Our findings have considerable implications for asset 
pricing models and for managers investing internationally.  
2.2. HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
The investment effects of each QE worked primarily through the portfolio-rebalancing channel 
under somewhat different economic conditions. The portfolio-rebalancing effect channel argues 
that by reducing the supply of security type(s) to private investors, domestic-country large scaled 
asset purchases (hereafter, LSAPs) lead to an increase in demand for all substitute assets, including 
assets from non-domestic developed and emerging markets (Bernanke, 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011; 
Joyce et al., 2011; Neely, 2015). As a result, LSAPs are expected to raise asset prices, lower the 
yields of those securities, promote employment and stabilize a low inflation rate (Bernanke, 2010b). 
If, as expected, domestic investors rebalance their portfolios towards more foreign assets, the 
resulting capital outflows from the domestic country to other developed and emerging markets are 
expected to result in the appreciation of their foreign currencies, increase their asset prices and 
change asset and currency cross-correlations. Thus, we expect that the correlations between bonds 
or stocks and currency forwards and between foreign currency forwards are different for and 
between the three QE periods.  
     Our stock and bond indices are collected from those included in the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) index, the J.P. Morgan (JPM) Global Bond Broad Indices (GBI Broad) and 
the JPM Government Bond Index - Emerging Markets Broad (GBI-EM Broad) Indices.  After 
removing countries with missing observations, our sample covers 31 countries (All), including 19 
developed markets (DM) and 12 emerging markets (EM) based on the MSCI equity index 
classifications, over the time period from September 2003 to November 2014.  
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 The weekly total returns are denominated in local currencies for the stock and bond indices. 
The spot and forward currency prices on Friday are extracted from Datastream and Bloomberg. 
The WM Reuters Spot and one-month forward US dollar currency prices are computed by taking 
the arithmetic means of their closing bids and offers at 4 p.m. U.K. time. Missing forward rates 
are collected from Bloomberg. There are 20 different currency-denominated forward contracts 
since 11 of the countries use the European Euro.  
    Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for weekly returns (mean, median and standard deviation) 
for the bond, stock and forward contracts for the various countries over the full time period. Except 
for Greece, all of the other bond and equity indexes exhibit positive mean returns. Among the EM 
countries, the Brazilian bond index and the Colombian stock index have the highest mean returns 
of about 0.30% and 0.55%, respectively. The equal-weighted average of the bond and stock market 
standard deviations of returns for the DM countries of 1.48 and 3.46, respectively, are lower than 
their counterpart values of 2.05 and 4.27, respectively, for the EM countries. The last three columns 
report statistics for the long forward positions in the currency markets. The mean returns of forward 
positions are positive for the currencies of all DM countries and are positive for the EM countries 
other than the Indian Rupee, Mexican Peso, and South Africa Rand. 
[Please place Table 2.1 about here.] 
2.3. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
2.3.1. Methodology 
We obtain the correlations of interest using a model from the DCC-GARCH family with the 
largest negative Likelihood Ratio (LR) when the estimates of a plus b in equation (2.3) 
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subsequently specified are less than 1. Since the most commonly chosen model is the DCC-
GARCH(1,1), we confine our discussion to this model in this section of the essay.1  
Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) propose the use of the DCC-GARCH(1,1) for 
estimating dynamic correlations while directly considering heteroscedasticity. Cho et al. (2016) 
and Yu et al. (2010) use this methodology to estimate stock-currency market correlations and co-
movements of stock markets. The DCC-GARCH model is commonly used in the literature due to 
its many advantages.  Compared to the Pearson Correlations and other correlation models such as 
CCC-GARCH, the DCC-GARCH model directly accounts for heteroscedasticity and has no 
volatility bias by estimating the correlation coefficients of the standardized residuals (Chiang et 
al., 2007).2  
Using a two-step procedure, we first estimate a univariate GARCH(1,1) model for each bond, 
stock, or forward returns series for each country. Then, we use the standardized residuals obtained 
from the first step to calculate the dynamic conditional correlations between the country-level bond 
or stock indexes and currency forwards. The univariate GARCH (1, 1) model estimated in the first 
step is defined as:3 
tt ur  P , tu |It-1 ~ N(0, Ht) and 12 1   ttt HH KJHZ                                 (2.1) 
                                                 
1 The DCC-GARCH(1,1) is chosen for estimating at least 85% of the correlations between the indexes of bonds or 
stocks and currency forwards for each country. The other 15% of the pair-wise correlations are estimated based on the 
GJR/TARCH or EGARCH model in the first step and asymmetric DCC in the second step of the two-step estimation 
procedure detailed below. The pair-wise correlations are reported in detail in an appendix available from the authors. 
Unconditional correlations matrixes between bond or stock indexes and the currency forwards also are tabulated in a 
separate appendix which is available upon request. 
2 Among the many other estimation approaches, the DCC-GARCH (1, 1) is not model-free as is the case of a 
wavelet approach (Dajcman et al., 2012) nor does it have the ability of the Double Smooth Transition Conditional 
Correlation (DSTCC–GARCH) model to allow correlations to transition smoothly or sharply between a set of 
extreme states when the transition path is governed by time and/or key indicators of financial market conditions 
(Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013; Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta, 2015). 
3 We follow the notation of Cappiello et al. (2006). 
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In (2.1), tr  is the return of bonds, stocks, or forward contracts; Ht is the conditional covariance 
matrix and can be decomposed by Ht = Dt Rt Dt; Dt is a diagonal matrix of time-varying standard 
deviations from the univariate GARCH models with tiih ,  on the i-th diagonal; and Rt is the 
(possibly) time-varying correlation matrix of the standardized residuals tiititi hu ,,, / H . The 
model used in the second step, which maximizes the correlation component, Qt, conditional on the 
standardized residuals from the first step is given by:  
1
'
11)1(   tttt bQaQbaQ HH  and 1*1*  tttt QQQR  (2.2) 
where ][ 'ttEQ HH is the unconditional covariance matrix of tH , and a and b are scalar parameters 
satisfying (a+b) <1. 1*tQ is the inverted diagonal matrix containing the square root of the diagonal 




ii t jj t
q
q q
U   . 
The correlations of bonds or stocks with forward contracts can be examined using the following 
bivariate model:  
2
11, 12, 12, 11, 1 12, 11, 1 1, 1 2, 1
2
12, 22, 12, 12, 1 22, 11, 1 2, 1 2, 1
1
[ ] (1 a b)
1
t t t t tt t t
t t t t tt t t
q q q q q
a b
q q q q q
H H H
H H H
   
   
ª ºª º ª º    « »« » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¬ ¼
 (2.3) 
where tq ,11  and tq ,22 denote the variance of the standardized residuals obtained from the bond or 
stock returns based on the univariate GARCH(1,1).   
2.3.2. Correlations between bond or stock markets and currency markets  
Table 2.2 reports the average correlations between the bond or stock indexes and forward 
contracts based on the DCC model with the largest negative Likelihood Ratio (LR) when the 
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estimates of a plus b in equation (2.3) are less than 1. This was generally a GARCH(1,1) but was 
also a GJR/TARCH or EGARCH model in the first step and asymmetric DCC in the second step 
of the estimation. The correlation for each country is the average correlation between the returns 
of the bond or stock market index for each home country with the returns of the other 19 currency 
forward contracts in the spirit of Cho et al. (2016). These results indicate that developed markets 
have higher correlations on average than the correlations in emerging markets. The correlations 
for the Eurozone countries are much higher than those for the other developed markets mainly 
because these countries uniformly adopted the Euro as their currency or because their currency is 
pegged to the Euro (e.g., Denmark). The correlations of bonds with forward contracts exceed those 
between stocks and forward contracts for all but the six countries of Japan, U.K., U.S., Chile, India, 
and South Africa. This indicates that hedging the currency risk for bond portfolios may yield 
different hedging performance than for stock portfolios. The U.S. bond market exhibits very low 
DCC correlations with the forward contracts of other countries. Consistent with the findings of 
Cho et al. (2016),4 the correlations between the bond or stock indexes and currency forwards for 
the emerging markets are positive. The average correlation between the indexes of bonds or stocks 
and forward contracts for the DM sample is not lower than for the EM sample as in Cho et al. 
(2016).  
[Please place Table 2.2 about here.] 
 The summary statistics of the parameters for the DCC correlations between bond indexes or 
stock indexes and forward contracts, or among forward contracts are reported in Appendix 2.A1-
2.A3. Most parameters a and b are positive and significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
indicating that the DCC model is superior to the constant conditional correlation model. The 
                                                 
4 Cho et al. (2016) only examine correlations between exchange rates and stock returns. 
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estimates of the DCC parameter b typically reflect high persistence. For example, the mean 
(median) DCC parameter b for the Canadian bond market index is 0.805 (0.945). The last two 
columns report the minimum and maximum log likelihood ratio (LR) values. The LR values are 
used to determine whether the DCC-GARCH model should consider asymmetric effects in both 
steps of the DCC implementation. 
2.3.3. Correlations between currency forward contracts 
    Based on the argument of Darbar and Deb (2002) that the arrival of market information affects 
the cross-market correlations of currency futures, we expect that the unconditional monetary policy 
may similarly affect cross-market correlations in the currency forward market. Table 2.3 reports 
the average correlations based on the DCC-GARCH(1,1) model (with one exception) between the 
returns of the currency forwards of each home country with the returns of the other 19 currency 
forwards.5 We find that the mean correlations for the currency forwards for the developed or 
emerging countries in the European Union (EU) are usually higher than those for the countries in 
the other continents. For example, the mean DCC correlations of the currency forward contracts 
in the Eurozone and Sweden are 0.547 and 0.534, respectively.  Similarly, the mean correlations 
of the currency forward contracts for the European emerging countries (such as Hungary and 
Poland) with the other 19 currency forward contracts are also higher. Since the British Pound is 
rather independent from the Euro, its mean correlation is lower than that for countries in the EU. 
The average correlation of the forward contracts for Japan with the other countries is the lowest at 
0.113. Overall, the mean correlations of the currency forwards for the DM countries are higher 
than those for the EM countries.   
                                                 
5 This is for the returns of the currency forward contract of Australia with that of Singapore where the chosen model 
is an asymmetric DCC-EGARCH model. 
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[Please place Table 2.3 about here.] 
2.3.4. The differences in the correlations during the three QE periods 
    As QE1 and QE2 are implemented after the financial crisis when the U.S. financial market was 
still turbulent and QE3 took place in a more tranquil environment, we now examine whether the 
correlations between the bonds or stocks and forwards are different during the various QE periods 
using the follow regression: 
              0 1 2 3 41 2 3t t tcorr QE QE QE ControlVarE E E E E H       (2.4) 
The three time dummy variables, QE1, QE2 and QE3, are equal to one during the corresponding 
QE period and zero otherwise. A wide range of control variables are used to control for the 
influence of other important variables that reflect the status of the U.S. economy. Specifically, we 
include the three Fama-French risk factors (Ex_Mkt, SMB and HML) and a liquidity risk factor 
(LIQ) to reflect the information from the stock market; the term and credit spread to reflect the 
information from the bond market; and inflation rate, M2, GDP and the policy uncertainty index 
as indicators of the state of the U.S. macro economy.6
 
    Based on Panel A of Table 2.4, the means of the correlations of bonds and of stocks with forward 
contracts during the QE2 period compared to the non-QE period (i.e., all such periods together) 
are significantly higher for the All, DM, and EM country samples. In contrast, the means of the 
correlations of bonds with the forward contracts compared to the non-QE period are significantly 
lower during the QE1 and QE3 periods for the DM country sample and significantly higher during 
                                                 
6 The detailed definition and sources of these control variables are provided in a separate appendix which is 
available if requested. Brief description is found in Table 2.4. 
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the QE3 period for the EM country sample. The means of the correlations of stock indexes with 
forward contracts compared to the non-QE period are significantly lower during the QE3 period 
across the All, DM, and EM country samples.  
[Please place Table 2.4 about here.] 
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports the differences of the mean correlations between bonds or stocks 
and forward contracts during each pair of QE periods. The means of the correlations of forward 
contracts with bond indexes or with stock indexes are significantly different between QE1 and 
QE2 and between QE2 and QE3 across the All, DM, and EM country samples. In particular, the 
differences of the means of the correlations of forward contracts with the stock indexes between 
the QE2 and QE3 periods is around 3.5 times than that for the bond indexes across the All, DM, 
and EM samples. The correlation patterns between bonds or stocks with the forward contracts 
suggest a number of important economic implications with respect to international portfolio 
management, especially for hedging currency risk for bond or stock portfolios across the DM and 
EM countries. These results also have implications for international asset pricing models. 
The means of the correlations among forward contracts during the three QE periods for the All, 
DM and EM country samples and tests of the differences in means are also presented in Panels A 
and B of Table 2.4, respectively. Based on Panel A, the means of the correlations of forward 
contracts during the QE2 period compared to the non-QE period are significantly higher across the 
All and EM countries. In contrast, the means of the forward correlations are significantly lower 
during the QE1 and QE3 periods for the DM sample compared to those during the non-QE period. 
As shown in Panel B of Table 2.4, the means of the correlations between the forward contracts are 
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significantly different between QE1 and QE2 and between QE2 and QE3 across the All, DM, and 
EM countries, and between QE1 and QE3 across the EM countries.  
2.4. Conclusion  
We investigate the cross-market correlations across 31 countries during the three QE periods in 
the U.S. We find that the means of the correlations between stocks (bonds) and forward contracts, 
and between forward contracts differ by QE period. These results suggest that cross-market 
correlations and their effects on international financial asset returns differ considerably between 
the conventional and unconventional monetary policy regimes and between various 
unconventional monetary policy regimes. Our findings have implications for portfolio managers 
making investment decisions overseas and regulators when considering the unintended 







Currency Hedging of International Bond Portfolios: Effects of 
Unconventional Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
    The U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) initiated an unconventional monetary policy (UMP), so-called 
quantitative easing (hereafter, QE), starting from November 2008 by purchasing long-term 
government bonds, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency debts. The objective was to 
stimulate the economy by injecting needed credit and liquidity into the financial markets to reduce 
short-term interest rates to nearly zero and to further stimulate the economy when short-term 
interest rates were about as low as they could get (Bernanke, 2010a). According to Rodnyansky 
and Darmouni (2017), the Fed had accumulated $1.75 trillion in MBS, or about 30% of the issued 
MBS by the end of the third QE round.7 Figure 3.1 captures the net effect of long-term fixed-
income transactions by the Fed on its holdings during the three QE rounds.8  
[Please Insert Figure 3.1 about Here] 
Such unprecedented large scale purchases of fixed-income securities (specifically mortgage-
backed securities and Treasuries) by the Fed had a major impact on both domestic and international 
bond markets. Domestically, the QE significantly reduced U.S. long-term government bond yields 
(e.g., Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico and King, 2013), mortgage rates (Hancock and Passmore, 
2011) and bond yields for U.S. non-financial firms (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2015). With regard 
to global bond markets, large scaled purchases of MBS and Treasuries by the Fed significantly 
increased global corporate bond issuances across developed and emerging countries (Duca, 
Nicoletti, and Martinez, 2016), and significantly reduced long-term government bond yields in the 
developed countries (Neely, 2015). This differed from the negligible overall effect of the 
unconventional monetary policies of the European Central Bank on the international sovereign 
                                                 
7 Appendix 3.A provides a summary of some aspects of the three U.S. QEs. 
8 We use the terms fixed-income and bonds interchangeably. 
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bond yields for advanced economies and emerging markets (Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub, 
2016). 
 According to Yellen (2011), “… central bank purchases of longer-term securities work through 
a portfolio balance channel to depress term premiums and longer-term interest rates” based on the 
premise that “long-term yields are associated with the outstanding quantity of longer-term assets 
in the hands of the public”.  The international portfolio balance channel argues that asset purchases 
can be transmitted to asset prices across market segments and countries (e.g., Bernanke, 2012; 
Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub; 2016). Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2016) aptly state this as 
follows: “As investors are crowded out from some market segments by central bank purchases, 
they move to close substitute assets, leading to portfolio rebalancing and to a chain of price effects. 
More broadly, unconventional monetary policy actions by affecting risk premiums and yields of 
key benchmark assets (in particular, government bonds) induce investors to rebalance their 
portfolios, ultimately having additional price effects on a broad range of assets.”   
 Furthermore, according to the preferred-habitat model (e.g., Vayanos and Vila, 2009; 
Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010), investors have preferences for specific maturities. Since the 
interest rate for a given maturity is determined by the demand of investors with those preferences 
and the supply of bonds with that maturity, an increase in demand for long-term bonds raises long-
term bond prices and reduces their yields. If the preferred habitat model works together with the 
international portfolio rebalancing channel, we may expect that the yields of long-term government 
bonds across countries are reduced. Since government treasury yields are one of the key 
determinants of the yields for various types of bonds (such as sovereign debts and corporate bonds), 
the large scale of purchases during a QE should inevitably affect the effectiveness and performance 
of the risk management strategies adopted by investors for their international bond portfolios.   
    Purchases of risky MBS are expected to push domestic investors into emerging markets through 
the risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu, 2012) which is a variation of the risk-shifting channel. 
Ayala, Nedeljkovic, and Saborowski (2017) find that financial institutions in emerging countries 
created a more conducive environment for the growth of local markets during the post-crisis period. 
As foreign investors sought higher yielding assets, the bond markets became the main conduit for 
the flow of capital to emerging countries. Miyajima, Mohanty, and Chan (2015) find that from 
2009 to 2013 foreign investors preferred local currency government bond markets in emerging 
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economies, as cumulative net inflows to mutual funds dedicated to EM bonds in local currency 
debts increased by more than 75%. With improved macroeconomic fundamentals and greater 
depth of their local currency bond markets (e.g., GDP growth and fiscal balance), the 
diversification benefits of EM local currency bonds for foreign investors increased while yields 
decreased and global risk aversion increased (IMF, 2012).   
    The U.S. QE is not only associated with a depreciation of the U.S. dollar against various foreign 
currencies, such as the Euro, Australian dollar, Pound Sterling, Brazilian real, and the Indian rupee 
(see Figure 3.2) but it also is expected to have an impact on the currency risk exposure, expected 
returns and covariances of international bond portfolios through the portfolio rebalancing and risk-
shifting (or risk-taking) channels, as discussed earlier. Thus, the objective of this essay is to 
empirically examine the spillover effects of the evolution of the holdings of the Fed prior to and 
during the QEs on the effectiveness and performance of unhedged and hedged international bond 
portfolios from the perspective of U.S. investors.9 
[Please Insert Figure 3.2 about Here] 
    We measure the hedging effectiveness and hedging performance of currency hedging strategies 
by the percentage changes of their variances and the differences of their Sharpe ratios from those 
of an unhedged position, respectively, and their variance and excess return components for bond 
portfolios invested in developed and emerging countries. We employ currency forwards to hedge 
the currency risk by adopting two hedging strategies that are commonly used in the currency risk 
management of investment portfolios: 10  (1) a unitary hedge ratio (i.e., naïvely or fully hedged); 
and (2) a hedge ratio designed to minimize the portfolio variance based on historical information 
(i.e., optimally hedged). 
                                                 
9 Our choice to examine the effect of the U.S. QEs on the hedging effectiveness and performance of bond instead of 
equity portfolios is based on the size of international fixed-income markets, especially bond markets in emerging 
countries, and on the fact that the QEs are implemented by changes in the fixed income holdings of the Fed and by 
the observation that international equity and bond funds differ in their currency hedging policies (e.g., Lauricella, 
2015). While international equity mutual funds tend not to hedge their FX risk based on the belief that the long-term 
effects of currency moves on returns are neutral and do not compensate for hedging costs, international bond mutual 
funds are more likely to hedge their FX risk based on the belief that bond returns are much more sensitive to currency 
swings than equity returns. 
10 Deli, Hanouna, Stahel, Tang, and Yost (2015) report differences in derivative usage by fund type with currency 
forwards being the most commonly used derivative for a random sample of N-SAR fund filings for 2014. 
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    We first run a univariate test to examine differences in hedging effectiveness, performance, and 
their excess return and variance components during the QE versus the pre-QE period. We find 
several pairs of significant differences for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios. We then use 
time-series regressions to investigate how the variations in hedging effectiveness and performance 
during the QE and pre-QE periods are affected by the time-series evolution of specific assets held 
by the Fed. We find that the effects of two security-type holdings (MBSF and TREASF)11 by the 
Fed on relative hedging effectiveness or differenced hedging performance depend on the 
implemented hedging strategy and/or the development level of financial markets (DM for 
developed market or EM for emerging market). In contrast, larger security type holdings 
significantly reduce the variances of international bond portfolios. The negative elasticities at the 
mean during the QE period are larger in magnitude for TREASF than MBSF, and are higher for 
the bond portfolios invested in EM than that in DM countries for the same hedging strategy and 
security-type holding. These elasticities at the mean for the QE period also decrease monotonically 
from the unhedged to the fully hedged to the optimally hedged portfolios for the same independent 
variable and country category. 
Since the return distributions deviate from normality with or without hedging (especially for 
the emerging market bond portfolios), we check the robustness of our findings using two measures 
that account for skewness and kurtosis; namely, abnormal value at risk (AVaR) for hedging 
effectiveness and the adjusted Sharpe ratio (ASharpeR) for hedging performance. We find that 
capturing the effects of any non-normality in returns does not materially affect our previous 
inferences for hedging performance and effectiveness that were based on the first two return 
moments.   
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, this study provides the first empirical 
evidence about the spillover effect of QE on the unhedged and hedged international bond portfolios 
in the DM and EM countries. Closely related studies include Neely (2015) and Glick and Leduc 
(2012) who examine the spillover effects of central bank announcements on the international bond 
markets of developed countries. In contrast to our study that examines the excess returns and 
variances of unhedged and hedged international bond portfolios over a 10-year period covering 
the pre-QE and QE periods, they only examine the long-term government bond yields over short 
                                                 
11 The suffix ‘F’ is added to indicate holdings by the Fed. 
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time periods. Our research is also related to Steeley and Matyushkin (2015) who only examine the 
volatility of single-issuer domestic bonds during the U.K. QE. In contrast, we focus on the spill-
over effect of the U.S. QE for a sample consisting of the most prominent developed and emerging 
countries around the world. 
Second, our study expands the understanding of the real (spill-over) impact of the security type 
holdings of the Fed during a QE on international fixed-income portfolios. This adds to the findings 
of previous studies which document the impact of the security type holdings on the behavior of 
market participants. Specifically, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) find that the MBSF and 
TREASF holdings of the Fed significantly stimulate bank lending. Carpenter, Demiralp, Ihrig, and 
Klee (2015) examine from whom the Fed buys and how these investors rebalance their portfolios. 
Instead, we provide evidence about the impact of security type holdings on the return, risk and 
return-to-risk profiles of hedged and unhedged international bond portfolios.   
Last, our research also highlights the heterogeneity of the QEs’ impacts on international bond 
portfolios which differ by the chosen hedging strategies and the selection of bonds from DM or 
EM countries. We show that the QEs’ effects on both hedging effectiveness and hedging 
performance are contingent on the hedging strategy implemented and the economic categories of 
countries upon which the bond portfolios are based. These findings have important implications 
for fixed-income portfolio managers when selecting hedging strategies in the face of 
unconventional monetary policy regimes. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the measures of hedging 
effectiveness and performance. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
develops the hypotheses. Section 5 reports and discusses the relative hedging effectiveness and 
differenced hedging performances between the QE and pre-QE periods. Section 6 analyzes the 
relation between hedging effectiveness/performance and the Fed’s asset holdings. Section 7 
presents tests of robustness. Section 8 concludes. 
3.2. MEASURING HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE  
    We use various metrics to quantify hedging effectiveness and performance. Our first measure 
of differenced hedging excess-return performance is given by: 
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 ܦ݂݅ܪ݀݃ܧݔܴݐݎ݊ ൌ ൫ܧݔܴݐ݊௛ௗ௚ െ ܧݔܴݐ݊௨௡௛ௗ௚൯, (3.1) 
where ExRtn is the excess return or തܴ௧ െ ݎ௙௧ for either the hedged or unhedged portfolio of DM or 
EM countries; തܴ௧ is the mean of the realized weekly returns of each of these portfolios during the 
forward window [t+1: t+24]; and ݎ௙ is the risk-free rate. 
 We measure relative hedging effectiveness as the difference between the variances (Var) of the 
optimally (fully) hedged portfolio and its corresponding unhedged counterpart, scaled by the 
variance of its unhedged counterpart, which is given by (e.g., Caporin, Jimenez-Martin and 
Gonzalez-Serrano; 2014; Cotter and Hanly, 2006; Ederington 1979): 
  ܴ݈݁ܪ݀݃ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ ൌ ൫ܸܽݎ௨௡௛ௗ௚ െ ܸܽݎ௛ௗ௚൯ ܸܽݎ௨௡௛ௗ௚ൗ .  (3.2) 
    Consistent with the practice in the literature for comparing Sharpe ratios (e.g., Glen and Jorion, 
1993; Campbell, Serfaty-de Medeiros and Viciera, 2010) and given that Sharpe ratios can have 
negative values, we measure differenced hedging performance by: 
 ܦ݂݅ܪ݀݃ܲ݁ݎ݂ ൌ ൫ܴܵ௛ௗ௚ െ ܴܵ௨௡௛ௗ௚൯.  (3.3) 
    The Sharpe ratios are formed at time t based on weekly returns for the forward window [t+1: 
t+24]. A Sharpe ratio is given by ܴܵ௧ ൌ ൫ തܴ௧ െ ݎ௙௧൯ ܸܽݎ௧଴ǤହΤ  where ܸܽݎ௧଴Ǥହdenotes the standard 
deviation of the realized weekly returns of each of these portfolios during the forward window 
[t+1: t+24]; and all the other terms are as previously defined.  
3.3. SAMPLE AND HEDGING STRATEGIES 
3.3.1. Sample Construction 
    The bond indices denominated in local currencies and T-bill rates are collected on every Friday 
from Datastream. 12 The indices are the J.P. Morgan (JPM) Global Bond Broad Indices (GBI Broad) 
and the JPM Government Bond Index - Emerging Markets Broad (GBI-EM Broad) Indices. After 
removing missing observations, our sample covers 31 countries, including 19 developed markets 
                                                 
12 The choice of a weekly frequency is based on several factors, including the need to have a sufficient number of 
observations to adequately determine the optimal hedge ratio using more current data and to test both hedging 
effectiveness and performance. 
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(DM) and 12 emerging markets (EM),13 over the time period from September 12, 2003 to April 
17, 2015. Since 24 weeks are used to form and to evaluate the portfolios,14 the first and last 
portfolios are formed on February 27, 2004 and October 31, 2014 (i.e., the end of QE3). 
    According to JPM (2013), the GBI Broad index includes bonds from 27 countries with 
maturities of 3 to 5 years, while the GBI-EM Broad index includes government bonds from 17 
emerging countries with maturities of at least 13 months. There are four countries, Hungary, 
Poland, South Africa and Mexico, which are included in both bond indices. We use the JPM GBI 
Broad index for Hungary, Poland, and South Africa, and the JPM GBI-EM Broad index for Mexico 
to maximize the time spans of the data available for analysis. 
 The spot and forward currency prices on Friday are extracted from Datastream and 
Bloomberg.15 The U.S. nominal T-bill rates at a weekly frequency on Friday are obtained from 
French’s data library.16 The WM Reuters Spot and one-month forward U.S. dollar currency prices 
are computed by taking the arithmetic means of their closing bids and offers at 4 p.m. U.K. time 
that are provided by the WM Company. Missing forward rates are collected from Bloomberg. 
Since our sample includes 11 countries using the euro, there are only 20 different currency-
denominated forward contracts.  
3.3.2. Fully and unconditional variance-minimizing hedging strategies 
    There are a number of hedging strategies, either simple minimum variance hedging (Ederington, 
1979; Malliaris and Urrutia, 1991; Benet, 1992), hedging taking into account higher moments 
information (Brooks, Černý and Miffre, 2012), or hedging using time-series econometric models 
such as GARCH (Zanotti, Gabbi and Geranio, 2010; Caporin, Jimenez-Martin and Gonzalez-
Serrano; 2014). A large strand of the literature suggests that simple minimum variance hedging 
outperforms the sophisticated econometric models. For example, Brooks, Černý and Miffre (2012) 
find that higher moments do not matter for hedging decisions and even traditional OLS hedging 
                                                 
13 The classification of countries as being developed or emerging is based on the categorization used for the IMF 
country categories.  
14 To identify the postQE1not period, which is defined in appendix 3.B, we use a window width of 24 weeks. However, 
our results are robust to other window widths such as 36 weeks. These results are available upon request.  
15 We choose forwards contracts because they are not expensive and are more flexible than futures; for example, any 
desired size can be delivered. Forwards are the more popular choice for hedging in the literature. Examples include 
Glen and Jorion (1993) and De Roon, Nijman and Werker (2003). 
16 We thank Kenneth R. French for making the data available on his website.  
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outperforms hedging with higher moments. Other studies report that sophisticated econometric 
models provide negligible economic benefits for minimum-variance hedging and that the OLS 
hedge ratio is superior (Alexander and Barbosa, 2007; Lence, 1995). Since our main purpose is to 
examine and interpret the effects of UMP on the effectiveness and performance of currency 
hedging rather than discussing sophisticated hedging strategies based on different econometric 
models, we focus on the minimum-variance hedging and fully hedging, which are popular currency 
risk-management strategies for investment portfolios.17 
We follow Gagnon, Lypny, and McCurdy (1998) and use the portfolio hedging approach with 
multiple currency forwards contracts so that the variance-minimizing hedge takes into account not 
only its own correlation with the underlying assets but also the correlations with the other forwards 
contracts. Otherwise, each hedge ratio would tend to end up being over-insuring. The assumption 
in the classic hedging model is that the investor holds one unit of each spot asset; that is, the weight 
of each underlying bond is one.18 Then we use N currency forwards contracts to hedge an N-asset 
portfolio.  









ˈ where 2pV  is 
the variance of the spot portfolio return, ff¦  is an n×n covariance matrix of changes in forwards 
returns, and pf¦  is an 1×n vector of covariances between the underlying portfolio return and the 
forwards returns. The unconditional optimal minimum-variance hedge ratio is measured as  E
1¦ ff pf¦ . 
We use a “rolling-sample”, similar to DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2010) and Cotter and 
Hanly (2006). The estimated hedge ratio conditions on recent information and uses a rolling-
window estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. As Cotter and Hanly (2006) point out, the 
                                                 
17 Using the results of a worldwide survey of 563 institutional investors conducted by Mellon/Russell (Harris, 2004), 
Michenaud and Solnik (2008) report that 39% of the respondents do not hedge, 34% adopt a 50% hedging strategy, 
14% adopt a 100% hedging strategy and 13% use another hedge ratio. Deli, Hanouna, Stahel, Tang, and Yost (2015) 
report that the most commonly used  derivatives for a random sample of 10% of the funds with N-SAR filings for 
2014 are currency  forwards (13% of funds), followed by equity  futures (12%) and interest rate futures (11%). 
18 The measurement of the minimum-variance hedge ratio is irrelevant to the weights of the underlying assets and in 
the classical hedging model it is assumed that the investor holds one unit of each spot asset; that is, the weight of each 
underlying bond is 1. This means, for example, one Canadian bond, one Brazilian bond, and so on. 
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rolling-window with updating information leads to more efficient estimates of the hedge ratio and 
also considers the time variation in the return distributions. We set the estimation window width 
W = 24 weeks without a loss of generality and move forward one week in every step by adding a 
new weekly observation and dropping the most distant week until the end of the third QE period 
is reached. We employ an optimally and fully hedging strategy, as described in the previous 
sections of this essay. To ensure that the examinations of the hedging performance and 
effectiveness of these portfolios are realistic, we use a rolling out-of-sample evaluation window 
with the same width (W) as that used for portfolio formation. We also find in untabulated results 
that our reported findings are robust to the choice of W. 
3.3.3. Summary Statistics 
We assume the perspective of an U.S. investor. The return on a security is expressed as ܴ௜ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ
௉೔ǡ೟శభௌ೔ǡ೟శభ
௉೔ǡ೟ௌ೔ǡ೟ െ ͳ, where ௜ܵǡ௧ denotes the spot price of foreign currency i at time t, denominated by the 
number of U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency, and ௜ܲǡ௧represents the market value of the 
security denominated by the foreign currency. The return on forward contracts is denoted by 
௜݂ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ൫ܨ௜ǡ௧ାଵ െ ܨ௜ǡ௧൯ ܨ௜ǡ௧ൗ , where ܨ௜ǡ௧ାଵ  is the forward price of currency i at time t+1, 
denominated by the number of U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency.  Therefore, the return on 
a hedged portfolio consisting of the underlying assets and corresponding forward contracts is 
calculated by ܴ௧ାଵ௛ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ ൅ ݄௧ ௜݂ǡ௧ାଵ, where h is the weight of currency forwards or the hedge 
ratio.  We set hedge ratios to 0 and 1 for the unhedged and fully (i.e., naively) hedged portfolios, 
respectively.  In a portfolio containing multiple assets, ܴ௧ାଵ denotes the n-vector of random returns, 
each multiplied by its corresponding weight; and ݄௧ ή ௧݂ାଵ represents the dot product of the n-
vector of hedge ratios with the corresponding vector of forward currency payoffs. 
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics (means and standard deviations) for exchange rates, 
forwards rates, and unhedged, fully-hedged, and optimally-hedged portfolios of bonds across 31 
countries during the period from September 2003 to October 2014. As shown in the first column, 
the average weekly percentage changes of the spot currency rates vary widely in both sign and 
magnitude. In particular, we note that, on average, the India rupee, Mexican peso, and South 
African rand depreciated, while the others appreciated from as little as 0.01 percent (British pound, 
Hungarian forint, and Japanese yen) to 0.07 percent (Australian dollar and New Zealand dollar). 
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The weekly volatilities of the spot exchange rates calculated at a weekly frequency also vary 
drastically across currencies from 0.71 percent for the Singapore dollar to 2.35 percent for the 
South Africa Rand. As the exchange rates of the currencies for the emerging markets are more 
volatile than those for the developed markets, it foreshadows the possible benefits for hedging 
when the international portfolio holdings of a U.S investor include securities from emerging 
countries. As expected, the volatilities of forward prices closely match their corresponding spot 
prices.  
[Please place Table 3.1 about here] 
We observe that the cross-sectional average of the mean weekly returns fall, sometimes 
dramatically, with a cross-sectional average decline of 0.82% and 0.21% for the fully- and 
optimally-hedged portfolios of international bonds compared to their corresponding unhedged 
counterparts. Similarly, the cross-sectional average of the standard deviations decline by 1.60% 
and 1.83% for the fully- and optimally-hedged portfolios of international bonds, respectively, 
compared to their unhedged counterparts. The substantially lower risks and returns for the fully-
hedged portfolios of bonds are consistent with the findings of Glen and Jorion (1993). 
 Figure 3.3 provides a comparison of the Sharpe ratios of the unhedged and fully-hedged 
portfolios where plots above the line indicate Sharpe ratio superiority for the fully-hedged portfolio. 
Fully hedging improves the Sharpe ratios for the bond portfolios for all the countries except Japan, 
Greece and Singapore. Some examples of extreme improvements in the Sharpe ratios are more 
than four times for the Brazilian bond portfolio, and almost three times for the South African and 
Colombian bond portfolios.  
[Please place Figure 3.3 about here] 
3.3.4. Proxies for Various Dimensions of the Evolution of the Fed’s Asset Holdings 
    We capture various dimensions of the Fed’s asset holdings over time using various independent 
variables. Our first variable is designed to capture the total asset holdings of the Fed relative to the 
dollar value of domestic economic activity. As in Meaning and Zhu (2012), we use TAF/GDP, 
which measures the Fed’s total asset (TAF) holdings relative to the level of domestic GDP, to 
examine its effect on hedging effectiveness and performance. Our next two variables are designed 
to capture the relative time-series evolution of two major domestic debt security holdings through 
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which the Fed implemented its QE activities; namely, risk-free Treasury bonds (TREASF) and 
risky mortgage-backed securities (MBSF). As in Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), we use 
TREASF/TAF and MBSF/TAF where the Fed’s Treasury bond holdings (TREASF) and mortgage-
backed securities (MBSF) are scaled by the Fed’s total assets (TAF) to examine their effect on 
hedging effectiveness and performance.  Using these metrics, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) 
find that bank lending is affected by the bank’s exposure to unconventional monetary policy 
shocks caused by large-scale asset purchases. We would expect that this would have an impact on 
the international returns and covariances of country bond indices. 
    Our final set of variables is designed to capture the relative time-series evolution of the Fed’s 
relative holdings of Treasury bonds and MBS with longer maturities, and their impact on hedging 
effectiveness and performance. This choice of variables is based on the observation that the U.S. 
Federal Reserve bought large amounts of long-term securities, including mortgage-backed 
securities, corporate bonds, and long-term Treasury bonds during the QE period to reduce long-
term interest rates in order to stimulate economic activity (Bernanke, 2012). Based on the preferred 
habitat model, Carpenter, Demiralp, Ihrig, and Klee (2015) argue that buying longer-term 
securities can affect longer-term yields because investors are less willing to switch into other assets. 
Since what is long-term could be contentious, we use TREASFmatur/TAF and MBSFmatur/TAF with 
maturity (matur) equal to over five years and then to over ten years to ensure that our findings are 
robust to our choice of what maturities are deemed to be long term. 
3.3.5. Control Variables  
 We expect that differences in hedging effectiveness and performance between optimally (fully) 
hedged and unhedged portfolios of bonds are affected by various financial market and macro 
variables. To control for these effects in the multivariate analyses, we use various control variables 
that are described in Appendix 3.B.   
 The control variables for the U.S. capture aspects of domestic economic policy and bond 
markets. The trade-weighted broad exchange rate index (TWEXB) is used to measure the change 
of the U.S. dollar exchange rate. The term spread (Term), which is the difference between the 
yields of a 10-year and a three-month Treasury-bill, and the credit spread (Credit), which is the 
difference between yields on Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields, capture the term 
structure and credit quality of the U.S. bond markets, respectively. Using security-level data to 
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estimate the local flow and stock effects of the Federal Reserve’s 2009 purchase of $300 billion of 
treasury bonds, D’Amico and King (2013) find that fluctuations in the supply of government debt 
affected Treasury yields. In turn, this led to a persistent downward shift in yields of about 30 basis 
points. In addition, the economic policy uncertainty index (PUI), which reflects newspaper 
coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty and disagreement among economic forecasts, is 
used as proxy for policy uncertainty.19  
Following Aslanidis and Christiansen (2012), the quarterly or monthly data for some of these 
control variables are converted to a weekly frequency by using the values until updated.  
3.4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
    The U.S. Fed launched three rounds of QE by purchasing long-term government securities and 
mortgage-backed securities to keep the short-term interest rate close to zero and stimulate the 
economy by adding needed liquidity. Various papers examine the effect of QE on the U.S. or 
international bond markets. One strand of research focuses on the impact of QE on government 
bond rates using event studies. Within a short time period, the U.S. QE reduced 10-year 
government bond yields by around 100 basis points (Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; 
Glick and Leduc, 2012; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011) and about 80 and 85 basis 
points for 10- and 5-year bond yields, respectively (Meaning and Zhu, 2012).  Other studies find 
that the QE led to smaller and more diverse reductions in the yields of government bonds, 
especially bonds with 10- to 15-year maturities. D’Amico and King (2013) find bigger and 
significant bond yield reductions for bonds with longer maturities. Szczerbowicz (2011) finds that 
the reduction of yields for maturities of ten years are slightly different for the purchases of 
government bonds, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency backed securities.20  
    The QEs not only reduced government bond yields in the U.S. and U.K., but also affected bond 
yields in other countries. Neely (2015) finds that the U.S. QE reduced the 10-year government 
bond yield in the U.K., Australia, Canada, Germany, and Japan. Glick and Leduc (2012) report 
that the long-term government bond yield decreased in the DM markets. The findings of these 
                                                 
19 We only use the PUI instead of the unemployment rate because an increase in the PUI forecasts a decline in 
economic growth and employment in the following months, and the PUI may capture the effect of changes in the 
unemployment rate given their correlation of at least 0.78.  
20 Martin and Milas (2012) conduct an extensive survey on the effect of a QE.  
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studies are consistent with the expectation based on the portfolio balancing channel (Tobin 1965, 
1969; Bernanke, 2012; Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and 
Tong, 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Neely, 2015). Specifically, the U.S. Fed’s purchases of long-
term treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities from the open market reduced the supply of 
these securities to investors and consequently caused them to shift into riskier financial assets, 
including financial assets in other developed and emerging markets. Thus, we conjecture that:  
H1: The unhedged and hedged international bond portfolios for the DM or EM countries exhibit 
lower excess returns during the QE versus pre-QE period.  
    The signaling channel argues that large scaled asset purchases by central banks may signal 
information about current or future economic conditions or monetary policy to investors (Bernanke, 
2012; Bauer and Neely, 2014; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011). A QE can moderate market turbulence after its inception by sending a strong 
signal to all the countries and thereby reduce heterogeneous beliefs in bond markets (Steeley and 
Matyushkin, 2015). Consistent with this argument, Steeley and Matyushkin (2015) provide 
evidence that the U.K. QE dramatically reduced the volatility of long-term government bonds in 
the U.K.  Thus, our second hypothesis is:   
H2: The unhedged and hedged international bond portfolios for the DM or EM countries have a 
lower variance in the QE compared to the pre-QE period.  
    Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) argue that the type of assets purchased during an 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) is central to its effect. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2013) find 
that the average reductions in longer-term yields and mortgage backed securities are about 20 and 
25 basis points, respectively, and statistically significant at the 5% level. Lo Duca, Nicoletti, and 
Martinez (2016) find that the purchases and holdings of MBS and Treasuries by the Fed lead to 
stronger corporate bond issuance in developed and emerging countries and that the MBS holdings 
appear to be a main driver of QE effects through a portfolio balancing channel. The portfolio 
balancing channel is based on the notion that various types of assets are not perfect substitutes so 
that the Fed’s purchases of long-term government bonds or MBS may motivate domestic investors 
to invest in non-domestic bond markets  (Neely, 2015). Thus, our third hypothesis is:  
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 H3: The change in the excess return (and variance) for an international bond portfolio from a 
change in the Fed's holdings of MBS and Treasuries will differ during the QE period and will 
differ from the pre-QE to QE period for the same security-type holding.  
    Other QE effects can only be determined empirically because no a priori expectations are 
possible. To illustrate, a QE’s net effect can result in the Sharpe ratio increasing, decreasing or 
remaining unchanged since the expected effects of the QEs on excess returns (and variances) of 
the unhedged bond portfolios are in the same direction, and those for the hedged portfolios are 
further comingled with the efficacy of the chosen hedging strategy.  
3.5. COMPARISON OF RELATIVE HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS AND DIFFERENCED 
HEDGING PERFORMANCE BETWEEN THE QE AND PRE-QE PERIODS 
 In this section, we identify significant differences in hedging effectiveness and performance 
and their individual components between the QE and pre-QE period using t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests) of the null hypotheses that their means (medians) are zero. We begin with a test of the 
individual means and medians of excess returns (ExRtn) used to compute the differenced hedging 
excess-return performances given by eq. (3.1) and DifHdgExRtn itself. Based on Panel A of Table 
3.2, we observe significantly lower excess returns for the unhedged and fully hedged portfolios 
during the QE period, consistent with H1. In contrast, the excess returns are insignificantly lower 
and significantly higher for the optimally hedged portfolios of EM and DM countries, respectively. 
Based on Panel A of Table 3.3, we observe that the differenced hedging excess-return 
performances (DifHdgExRtn) of the QE versus pre-QE period are consistently positive and 
significant, consistent with H1. Thus, while the excess returns of the hedged portfolios when not 
benchmarked to an unhedged position are not consistently higher during the QE versus pre-QE 
period; the excess returns are higher during the QE versus pre-QE period for the hedged portfolios 
when they are benchmarked to an unhedged position. 
[Please Insert Tables 3.2 and 3.3 about Here] 
  We then conduct a similar examination for the individual variance (Var) components of 
DifHdgEffect given by eq. (3.2) and DifHdgEffect itself. Based on Panel B of Table 3.2, our 
inferences for Var depend upon whether we examine the means or medians between the QE and 
pre-QE period. A comparison of the means indicates generally lower (two insignificant) Var 
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during the QE period, while a comparison of the medians indicates that all comparisons of Var are 
significant but with four higher and two lower during the QE period. Concentrating on the tests of 
equality for the means and medians of individual Var that provide significant and consistent 
inferences, we find during the QE versus pre-QE period that both the mean and median individual 
Var: (i) are lower for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios of DM countries, and (ii) are higher 
for the optimally hedged portfolios of EM countries. Based on Panel B of Table 3.3, we observe 
mixed results for DifHdgEffect. We observe that their means and medians are significantly 
different only for the fully hedged portfolios; higher for the portfolios of DM countries and lower 
for the portfolios of EM countries. 
 We conclude with a similar examination of the individual Sharpe ratio (SharpeR) components 
of DifHdgPerf given by eq. (3.3) and DifHdgPerf itself.  Concentrating on the tests of equality for 
the means and medians that provide significant and consistent inferences reported in Panel C of 
Table 3.2, we find that both the means and medians of the individual Sharpe ratios: (i) are lower 
during the QE versus pre-QE period for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios for both the DM 
and EM countries, and (ii) are higher for the optimally hedged portfolios for the DM countries.  
Based on Panel C of Table 3.3, we find that the tests of the equalities of both the means and 
medians of DifHdgPerf for the QE versus the pre-QE period are significant and indicate higher 
values for the QE period for the hedged portfolios of DM countries. Only the mean differences are 
significant (and positive) for the hedged portfolios of EM countries. Furthermore, all of the mean 
and median DifHdgPerf are positive during both the QE and pre-QE period, and are materially 
large in magnitude for the optimally hedged portfolios and particularly so during the QE period. 
 We also test and find that both hedging strategies improve the means and medians of out-of-
sample Sharpe ratios for the bond portfolios for the DM and EM countries compared to their 
unhedged counterparts when assessed over the complete time period. These benefits are small in 
magnitude for the fully hedged and much larger for the optimally hedged bond portfolios. 21 These 
results are consistent with Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders (2017) who report a carry-trade 
Sharpe ratio of 0.91 for a mean-variance optimized portfolio of foreign currency versus 0.15 for a 
                                                 
21 The untabulated results show that all the means of the differences of the Sharpe ratios for the optimally and fully 
hedged portfolios versus their unhedged counterparts are significant (p-value <0.001) for the DM and EM countries. 
These means are respectively 0.436 and 0.009 for the DM countries and 0.786 and 0.008 for the EM countries. Results 
are consistent for Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for median equality. 
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naïvely (equally weighted) diversified portfolio. The inference from these results differs from the 
conclusion of DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) that a naively diversified portfolio is superior 
to one optimized using mean-variance analysis because of estimation error. 
3.6. RELATION BETWEEN HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS/PERFORMANCE AND THE 
FED’S ASSET HOLDINGS 
     In this section, we continue with tests of the time-series relationship between either relative 
hedging effectiveness or differenced hedging performance as the dependent variable and various 
characteristics of the asset holdings of the U.S. Fed while controlling for various other economic 
and market characteristics that could influence these dependent variables. Definitions and data 
sources for all the variables in each of the regression formulations are provided in Appendix 3.B. 
3.6.1. Relative Hedging Effectiveness 
 We begin by estimating the following regression to examine the effect over the studied period 
of changes in the Fed’s total asset (TAF) holdings relative to the level of domestic GDP (also used 
in a different context by Meaning and Zhu, 2012):  
 ܴ݈݁ܪ݀݃ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐఛ݋ݎܦ݂݅ܪ݀݃ܲ݁ݎ ఛ݂ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܳܧ ൅ ߛଶܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ൅ߛଷܶܣܨȀ̈́ܩܦ ఛܲ ൅
ߛସܶܣܨȀ̈́ܩܦ ఛܲ כ ܳܧ ൅ߛହܶܣܨȀ̈́ܩܦ ఛܲ כ ܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅ ߮ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ ൅ ߳ఛ (3.4) 
where the period dummies (QE and postQE1not), which take a value of one for each date that falls 
into a week during their respective periods and zero otherwise, are used to identify two periods 
from the beginning of the first QE (QE1); and all other variables are as previously defined. 
 This regression specification considers the effects on relative hedging effectiveness 
(RelHdgEffectτ) or differenced hedging performance (DifHdgPerfτ) over an out-of-sample future 
evaluation period τ consisting of weeks τ = t+1 to t+24 of a portfolio formed at time t.22 All the 
considered controls are known at portfolio formation (i.e., prior to the beginning of the evaluation 
period). As argued in previous studies (e.g. Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza, 2013), this lagged 
modeling specification should alleviate somewhat the concerns associated with endogeneity biases 
                                                 
22 This is an out-of-sample evaluation period using a moving (rolling) window with a width equal to 24 weeks since 




given the difficulty if not impossibility of finding exogenous instruments to reduce endogeneity 
concerns.23 Furthermore, we could not find any plausible argument for the why the asset holdings 
of the Fed would depend upon the hedging effectiveness or performance of international bond 
portfolios.  
 The specification models (1) - (4) in Table 3.4 report the results of regression (4). We observe 
that the coefficient estimates for TAF/$GDP are significant for specifications (1) - (3). We also 
observe numerous changes in the signs and/or significances of the relations between relative 
hedging effectiveness and TAF/$GDP from the pre-QE to the postQE1not period. For example, 
while the relation is significantly positive for the optimally hedged portfolios of DM countries in 
the pre-QE period, it becomes insignificantly negative during the QE period and significantly 
negative during the postQE1not period. Similarly, while this relation is significantly negative for 
the fully hedged portfolios of DM countries in the pre-QE and QE periods, it becomes significantly 
positive during the postQE1not period. This is to be expected since TAF/$GDP cannot capture all 
aspects of the Fed’s asset transaction behavior and it is unlikely that our regression (3.4) contains 
all the determinants of relative hedging performance, particularly for international bond portfolios. 
We find that average relative hedging effectiveness after controlling for the independent variables 
in regression (3.4) is still significant (and positive) for the three sub-periods for all four 
specifications.   
[Please Insert Table 3.4 about Here] 
 We continue with the estimation of the following regression model that examines the effect on 
relative hedging effectiveness (RelHdgEffect) of the time-series evolution of the Fed’s relative 
holdings of two types of domestic debt securities:  
 ܴ݈݁ܪ݀݃ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐఛ݋ݎܦ݂݅ܪ݀݃ܲ݁ݎ ఛ݂ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳܧ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅ߚଷ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ ܶܣΤ ܨఛ ൅
ߚସ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ ܶܣΤ ܨఛ כ ܳܧ ൅ ߚହ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅ ߚ଺ܯܤܵܨ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ
ܳܧ ൅ߚ଻ ܯܤܵܨ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅߮ᇱܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ ൅ ߝఛ (3.5) 
                                                 
23 A similar argument is used in the corporate governance literature for the use of lagged independent variables to deal 




where TREASF/TAF and MBSF/TAF are the holdings of risk-free treasury bonds and risky 
mortgage-backed securities by the Fed scaled by the total asset holdings of the Fed;24 and all the 
other variables are as previously defined. This regression provides for an examination of the effect 
of changes in the Fed’s risk-preference purchases on relative hedging effectiveness. 
   The results for specifications (5) through (8) for regression (3.5) are reported in Table 3.4. The 
relation between relative hedging effectiveness and the Treasury bond holdings by the Fed for the 
pre-QE period reported in Table 3.4 is negative when significant. The relation between these two 
variables becomes more negative (generally significantly) for the hedged portfolios of DM 
countries during the QE period. In contrast, this relation does not change significantly for the 
hedged portfolios of EM countries during the QE period which nevertheless is negative. The 
relation between relative hedging effectiveness and MBS holdings by the Fed is only significant 
(negatively) for the optimally hedged portfolios during the QE period. Thus, with some exceptions, 
hedging effectiveness tends to be negatively but not always significantly related to the Fed’s 
holdings of both of these domestic asset types during the three periods examined. As expected, we 
again find that average relative hedging effectiveness after controlling for the independent 
variables in regression (3.4) is still significant (and positive) for the three sub-periods for all four 
specifications.   
 We end with an examination of the effect on relative hedging effectiveness (RelHdgEffect) of 
the time-series evolution of the Fed’s relative holdings of long-term Treasuries and MBS. As can 
be seen in Figure 3.1, the representation of these two security types in the Fed’s asset holdings 
fluctuated considerably after the initiation of QE1. To more formally examine their effects, we 
estimate the following regression: 
 ܴ݈݁ܪ݀݃ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐఛ݋ݎܦ݂݅ܪ݀݃ܲ݁ݎ ఛ݂ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵܳܧ ൅ ߜଶܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅
ߜଷ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ ൅ ߜସ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܳܧ ൅
ߜହ ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅ ߜ଺ ܯܤܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܳܧ ൅
ߜ଻ ܯܤܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ כ ܲ݋ݏݐܳܧͳ݊݋ݐ ൅߮ᇱᇱܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௧ ൅ ఛߴǢ  
(3.6) 
Where ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF and ܯܤܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF are the Fed’s proportional holdings of Treasury 
bonds and mortgage-backed securities with maturities of over five (matur = 5) and over ten (matur 
                                                 
24 ܯܤܵܨ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ is not included because it is equal to zero before the beginning of the first QE. 
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= 10) years; and ܯܤܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ ఛ is not included because it is equal to zero before the beginning 
of the first QE.  
 The summary results for regression (3.6) for the categories with maturities >5 years and >10 
years are summarized in panels A and B of Table 3.5, respectively. Not only are the results 
relatively weak,  but there are many cross-period changes in the sensitivities of relative hedging 
effectiveness and their significances to the Fed’s relative holdings of each maturity category of 
Treasuries. To illustrate, the relation as reported in col. (6) is insignificantly negative in the pre-
QE period, significantly positive in the QE period, and once again insignificantly negative in the 
postQE1not period. We find similar mixed results for the sensitivities of hedging effectiveness and 
their significances to the Fed’s relative holding of each maturity category of MBS. Consistent with 
previous results, we find that average relative hedging effectiveness after controlling for the 
independent variables in regression (3.6) is significant (and positive) for the three sub-periods and 
four specifications, with the exception of specification (5) for the postQE1not period. 
[Please Insert Table 3.5 about Here] 
 Since the effect of the Fed’s QE holdings may have different effects on the two variances 
included in our measure of relative hedging effectiveness, we rerun regression equation (3.5) when 
the dependent variable is the optimally hedged Var, fully hedged Var, and unhedged Var for the 
portfolios of DM and EM countries. The results are reported in Table 3.6 for the six regressions 
for each dependent variable (i.e., for the three hedging strategies for each of the two categories of 
country portfolios). The six sensitivities of the individual variances to the Fed’s Treasury bond 
holdings (TREASF/TAF) for the pre-QE period are significant and negative but substantially larger 
in magnitude for the portfolios of EM countries. The six estimated sensitivities become 
significantly less negative for the QE and postQE1not periods with the magnitudes of the 
reductions being substantially larger for the portfolios of EM countries with the exception of the 
optimally hedged portfolios. While the six estimated sensitivities remain significantly negative for 
the QE period, they become positive for the postQE1not period but only significantly so for the 
three regressions for the portfolios of DM countries. The preceding discussion also applies to the 
estimated sensitivities of the individual variances to the Fed’s MBS holdings (MBSF/TA). We find 
that the negative effect on the individual variances of the unhedged and hedged portfolios based 
on elasticities at the mean during the QE period is different for the two types of Fed holdings, 
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consistent with hypothesis H3.25 These elasticities are with one exception higher for TREASF than 
MBSF and higher for the portfolios of EM countries than DM countries. To Illustrate, the 
elasticities at the mean for TREASF and MBSF for the unhedged portfolios of EM countries [see 
col. (8) in Table 3.6] are -1.135 and -0.376, which represent the percentage change in Var from a 
one percent change in each of these variables from their means. Similarly, the elasticities at the 
mean for TREASF and MBSF for the unhedged portfolios of DM countries [see col. (7) in Table 
3.6] are -0.213 and -0.126. The elasticities from the mean also decrease monotonically from the 
unhedged to the fully hedged to the optimally hedged portfolios for the same independent variable 
and country category. The only control variable with a consistently significant (negative) effect on 
the individual variances is the credit spread. Consistent with previous results, we find that average 
individual variances after controlling for the independent variables in regression (3.6) are 
significant and positive for the pre-QE period, and become significantly less positive but remain 
significantly positive during the QE periods. 
[Please Insert Table 3.6 about Here] 
 Thus, the findings reported in Table 3.6 help to explain our findings for the impact of the 
evolution of the Fed’s asset holdings pre-to-post QE on relative hedging effectiveness. While the 
directional impacts of the Fed’s holdings on the individual variances are the same during the QE 
period, their magnitudes differ substantially across the different hedging strategies for the same 
portfolios of countries and even more so for the same hedging strategy across the two portfolios 
of each of the two types of market development. 
3.6.2. Differenced Hedging Performance 
 The results for equation (3.4) that investigates the effect on differenced hedging performance 
(DifHdgPerf) of the Fed’s total asset (TAF) holdings relative to domestic $GDP are reported in 
Table 3.7. While hedging performance is positively but insignificantly related to TAF/$GDP 
during the pre-QE period, it is positively and significantly related to TAF/GDP during the QE 
period and with one exception [(specification (3)] in the postQE1not period. In contrast to the 
results presented earlier in Table 3.4 for hedging effectiveness, we find that the positive and 
                                                 
25 The elasticity at the sample mean for a level variable is given by ሺ݀ݕ ݕΤ ሻ ሺ݀ݔ ݔΤ ሻΤ  = ߚ ൈ ሺݔҧ ݕതΤ ሻ , where ݔҧ is the 
sample mean of the independent variable x, ߚ is the estimated coefficient for x, and ݕത is the sample mean of the 
dependent variable y. 
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generally significant average differenced hedging performance after controlling for the 
independent variables in regression (3.5) are significantly or in one case insignificantly positive 
during the QE and postQE1not periods. 
[Please Insert Table 3.7 about Here] 
 The results from the estimations of equation (3.5) that examine the effect on differenced 
hedging performance (DifHdgPerf) of the time-series evolution of the Fed’s relative holdings of 
the two domestic debt security types, risk-free Treasuries and risky MBS, also are reported in Table 
3.7. The negative (and generally significant) sensitivities of differenced hedging performance to 
TREASF/TAF during the pre-QE period tends to become less (more) negative during the QE 
(postQE1not) period. While only one of these sensitivities is significant during the QE period, all 
are negative with three being significant during the postQE1not period. We observe that the 
sensitivities of differenced hedging performance to MBSF/TAF is negative and significant during 
the QE and postQE1not period, except for the insignificant negative estimate for specification (8) 
in the QE period. We find that the average differenced hedging performance is positive and 
generally significant after controlling for the independent variables in regression (5). 
The results from the estimations of equation (3.6) that examine the effect on differenced hedging 
performance of the Fed’s relative holdings of Treasuries and MBS for two long-term maturity 
categories are reported in Table 3.8. Concentrating on specifications (5) – (8) for Treasuries with 
maturities greater than 10 years, this variable’s sensitivities are not significant during the pre-QE 
period and generally significant and positive during the QE and postQE1not periods. Similarly, 
the sensitivities for MBS with maturities greater than 10 years are generally not significant for the 
QE period and generally negative and significant during the postQE1not period. We find that the 
average differenced hedging performance after controlling for the independent variables in 
regression (3.6) are generally mixed in terms of sign and whether they are significant. 
[Please Insert Table 3.8 about Here] 
 Since the effect of the Fed’s QE holdings may have different effects on the two Sharpe ratios 
included in our measure of differenced hedging performance, we rerun regression equation (3.5) 
when the dependent variable is the optimally hedged Sharpe ratio, fully hedged Sharpe ratio, and 
unhedged Sharpe ratio for the portfolios of DM and EM countries. These summary results are 
35 
 
reported in Table 3.9. The relation between the individual Sharpe ratios and the Treasury bond 
holdings by the Fed is significantly positive for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios during 
the pre-QE period. These relations remain positive during the QE period but are only significant 
for the portfolios of EM countries. They become insignificantly negative during the postQE1not 
period. The significantly negative relation between the individual Sharpe ratios and the Treasury 
bond holdings by the Fed for the optimally hedged portfolios of DM countries during the pre-QE 
period becomes insignificantly negative during the QE period and significantly negative during 
the postQE1not period. The significantly positive sensitivities of MBSF/TAF during the QE period 
for the fully and unhedged portfolios are insignificant during the postQE1not period. We find that 
the individual Sharpe ratios after controlling for the independent variables in regression (3.6) that 
are generally significant in the pre-QE and QE periods become generally insignificant in the 
postQE1not period. 
[Please Insert Table 3.9 about Here] 
    The results from estimating the effect of security type holdings of the Fed on the individual 
excess returns included in the Sharpe ratios used to compute the differenced hedging performances 
are reported in Table 3.10. The sensitivities of the excess returns to TREASF/TAF are significantly 
positive for the fully hedged and not hedged portfolios and significantly negative for the optimally 
hedged portfolios during the pre-QE period. These sensitivities change sign during the QE period 
in that they become significantly negative for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios and 
significantly positive for the optimally hedged portfolios. The sensitivities of the excess returns to 
MBSF/TAF are also significantly positive for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios and 
significantly negative for the optimally hedged portfolios during the QE period. While it remains 
significantly negative for the optimally hedged portfolios during the postQE1not period, the 
remaining sensitivities are not significant during the postQE1not period. We find that the 
individual excess returns after controlling for the independent variables in regression (3.6) are 
generally significant and positive in all three subperiods for the optimally hedged portfolios. In 
contrast for the fully hedged and unhedged portfolios, they are significant and negative in the pre-
QE and QE periods and insignificant in the postQE1not period. 
    [Please Insert Table 3.10 about Here] 
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 We deal with an important caveat before proceeding to our further tests of robustness. We 
caution the reader that our implementations of both hedging strategies do not reflect hedging costs 
due to data unavailability. Based on previous findings reported in the literature, we can only 
surmise about the effects of including hedging costs on these two strategies. We surmise that the 
performance benefits of the optimally hedged bond portfolios of DM countries could survive as 
Perold and Schulman (1988) report that hedging costs captured by quoted spreads for the major 
currencies are generally between 8 and 16 bps, averaging around 12 bps. All hedging costs reported 
by Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders (2017) for ten DM countries during 2009 are below 10 bps 
which highlights not only the decline in hedging costs over time but that they were low even during 
the financial crisis. However, while the cost of each hedging change is low, the use of rolling 
window hedging increases transaction costs (performance drag) due to its time-varying hedge ratio 
and frequent portfolio rebalancing (Cotter and Hanly, 2006). In contrast, we surmise that the 
positive but smaller in magnitude hedging performance benefits for the optimally hedged bond 
portfolios for the EM countries would most likely not survive given the substantially higher 
hedging costs for emerging countries (Atwill, 2015). 26  However, transaction costs can be 
minimized by carefully selecting from among the many well-developed derivatives with low 
transaction costs available in currency markets (Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders, 2017). 
3.7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
3.7.1. Removal of Non-U.S. QE Implementers 
 Our previous findings include confounding events caused by the Bank of Japan, Bank of 
England, and the European Central Bank implementing their own UMPs to stimulate their own 
economies during our sample period. After eliminating these three jurisdictions, we examine the 
determinants of relative hedging performance [eq. (3.4)] and differential hedging effectiveness [eq. 
                                                 
26 Non-deliverable currency forwards (NDFs), which trade in relatively liquid OTC markets depending upon tenor, 
are used for currencies with no “regular” forward markets. NDFs are used for five of the twelve countries in our EM 
sample with one month pips (or equivalently one basis point for most currency pairs) in 2012 in parentheses: Brazil 
(5), Chile (20), Colombia (3), India (2), and S. Korea (50). Unlike forward contracts, NDF counterparties use a 
compensating payment to settle the difference between the contracted price or rate and the prevailing spot price or 
rate on an agreed notional amount.  Most of the NDFs are traded against the U.S. dollar which adds another forward 
contract for non-U.S. investors. For greater details on hedging instruments, see: HSBC’s Emerging Markets Currency 
Guide 2012, Global Research, December 2011. 
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(3.5)] for the remaining six DM and eleven EM countries.27 By comparing the summary findings 
reported in Table 3.11  with those in Tables 3.4 and 3.7, we find that the estimated coefficients for 
TREASF/TAF*QE and for MBSF/TAF*QE  become marginally more (less) consistent in sign 
and/or significance. To illustrate, all the estimated coefficients for TREASF/TAF*QE in regression 
formulations (1) to (4) in Table 3.11 are negative and three are significant at conventional levels. 
In contrast, only three of their counterparts in Table 3.4 are negative and only two are significant. 
Thus, we conclude that our previous inferences are not compromised by them being based on a 
sample that included non-U.S. QE implementers. 
[Please place Table 3.11 about here] 
3.7.2. Tests Using Other Hedging Effectiveness / Performance Measures 
 In this section, we use an alternative measure for hedging effectiveness and for hedging 
performance and conclude based on the results reported in Online Tables 3.A1, 3.A2 and 3.A3 that 
our previous inferences are not materially affected although there are some changes in the 
estimated coefficients. Both of the alternate measures attempt to capture the effect of non-
normality in returns that prior studies, for example, find for emerging-market bond portfolios 
(Burger and Warnock, 2007). Thus, our inferences are robust to return normality although the null 
hypothesis of normality is rejected at conventional significance levels for all the return series 
examined herein using the Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test. We now briefly describe both of these 
alternative measures. While we previously measured risk as fluctuations around the mean (μ) using 
the standard deviation (σ), an alternate measure of risk, Value-at-Risk (VaR), is based on deviations 
below a critical value. Replacing VaR (i.e., Value-at-Risk) by AVaR (i.e., Abnormal VaR) in the 
relative hedging effectiveness measure of Cotter and Hanly (2006) for normally distributed returns 
becomes: HE = ͳ െ ൣܣܸܴܽଽଽΨு௘ௗ௚௘ௗ ܣܸܴܽଽଽΨே௢௧ு௘ௗ௚௘ௗΤ ൧. AVaR is given by Bali, Gokcan and 
Liang (2007) as:  
 ܣܸܴܽ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߗሺߙሻߪ, and (3.7) 
                                                 
27 After excluding 10 Eurozone countries, Japan, U.K. and U.S., the DM sample consists of Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, and Sweden. After excluding Greece, the EM sample consists of Brazil, Chile, 









1)()( SzzKzzSzz DDDDDDD  :  (3.8) 
Where )(D:  is the critical value based on the loss probability level, S and K of the portfolios; z(α) 
is the critical value from the normal distribution for probability (1-α); and all the other terms are 
as previously defined.  
 To account for any skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) of returns at the expense of implicitly 
assuming constant absolute risk aversion, we use the following Adjusted-Sharpe ratio (ASharpeR) 
(Pézier and White, 2008; Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders, 2017):28 
 ܣ݄ܵܽݎ݌ܴ݁ ൌ ݄ܵܽݎ݌ܴ݁ ቂͳ ൅ ቀௌ଺ቁ ݄ܵܽݎ݌ܴ݁ െ ቀ
௄ିଷ
ଶସ ቁ ݄ܵܽݎ݌ܴ݁ଶቃ (3.9)      
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
    To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the spillover effects on the 
international portfolios of bonds from the DM and EM countries from the perspective of U.S. 
investors or asset managers that includes a period of quantitative easing (QE) launched by the U.S. 
after the sub-prime financial crisis. We find that the excess returns and the variances of unhedged 
international bond portfolios are significantly reduced during the QE versus the pre-QE periods. 
The effect of the QE on the hedging effectiveness and hedging performance of international bond 
portfolios depends on the choice of hedging strategy and the development level of the country in 
which a financial market is situated.  
    Our findings have important implications for the currency-hedging decisions of U.S. investors 
who invest in foreign financial markets, especially during periods with unconventional monetary 
policy actions by the central monetary authority. Our study also highlights the signaling role of the 
security holdings of the Fed since changes in holdings by security type during the QE have a 
significant effect on the returns, risk and return-to-risk profiles of hedged and unhedged portfolios 
of bonds from developed and emerging markets.   
                                                 




DOES QUANTITATIVE EASING AFFECT FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION? 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 In response to the recent financial crisis and to bring the U.S. economy out of the most recent 
recession, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) implemented an unconventional monetary policy, 
Quantitative Easing (or QE for short hereafter), in late November 2008. During the first QE round, 
the U.S. Fed completed the purchase of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), $175 
billion in agency debt and $300 billion in Treasury bonds (Treasuries) in the open market to inject 
liquidity and credit into financial markets. Although these actions alleviated the impact of the 
subprime crisis on the banking sector, they did not boost economic growth because the banks did 
not re-inject this additional credit and liquidity into other economic sectors (Benmelech and 
Bergman, 2012). During the second QE round (November 2010 to June 2011), the Fed bought 
about $600 billion of treasury securities to stimulate demand and to reduce the unemployment rate. 
A third QE round announced in September 2012 consisted of a new $40 billion per month, open-
ended bond purchasing program of agency MBS designed to further bolster liquidity and economic 
prospects in the U.S..29 
 While these purchases were confined to U.S. financial securities, recent studies show that the 
QEs also generated profound impacts on non-U.S. economies through a portfolio-balancing 
channel (Bernanke, 2012; Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, 
and Tong, 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Neely, 2015), signaling channel (Bernanke, 2012; Bauer 
                                                 






and Neely, 2014; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011), liquidity premium channel 
(Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2011); and confidence channel (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 
2011). The larger monetary base in the U.S. during the QE periods also significantly affected 
international capital flows (Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub, 2012; Lim and Mohapatra, 2016) and 
foreign exchange risk (Kryzanowski, Zhang and Zhong, 2017). An important question that remains 
unanswered is: What effect (if any) did these spillover effects of the U.S. QEs on international 
economies have on international financial market integration? Of similar importance is the 
identification of the channels through which the effects of the various QE implementations are 
transmitted to changes in financial market integration. 
 In this essay, we examine the influence of QEs on international market integration for 31 
countries, including both emerging markets (henceforth, EM) and developed markets (henceforth, 
DM) during the 2003-2014 period. We use the approach of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) to 
measure market integration and three indicators (QE1, QE2 and QE3) to identify the QE periods. 
We find that average market integration significantly increases during QE1 and QE2 for the bond 
and stock markets of All, DM and EM countries, and significantly decreases during QE3 except 
for the significant increase for the bond markets of the EM countries.30 The percentage changes 
based on the elasticities at the mean are considerably higher during QE1 and QE2 for the EM 
countries (about 12.81% and 16.84%) versus the DM countries (2.53% and 3.80%).31  
                                                 
30 This integration measure is also used by Berger, Pukthuanthong, and Yang (2011), Berger and Pukthuanthong 
(2012), Christiansen (2014), and Lehkonen (2015). 
31 The average of the integration levels in bond (stock) markets in DM and EM countries are 79% and 57% (74% and 
62%), respectively, in Panel B of Table 4.3. The incremental percentage is equal to the estimated coefficient of a QE 
dummy divided by the corresponding mean of the integration level. For example, it is equal to 16.84% (i.e., 7.3%/57%) 
for the EM bond markets during QE1. 
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 To explore the possible channels and mechanisms through which QEs affect financial market 
integration, we examine the following six potential channels for the transmission of QE effects on 
market integration: confidence, default risk, inflation, liquidity, portfolio balance and risk-taking. 
Following the closely related literature and economic intuition, we use the VIX index to proxy for 
the confidence channel; credit spreads to proxy for the default risk channel; differential inflation 
rate to proxy for the inflation channel; cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities, money supply (M2) 
and 3-month treasury bills to proxy for the liquidity channel; differential GDP growth potential, 
differential interest rates and portfolio flows to proxy for the portfolio balance channel; and cross-
border banking and capital flows to proxy for the risk-taking channel. We find that the differential 
inflation rate, cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities, differential GDP growth potential, differential 
interest rate and cross-border banking capital flows significantly affect the relationship between 
QEs and financial market integration. This evidence supports the arguments that QE effects on 
market integration are transmitted via the inflation, liquidity, portfolio-balance and risk-taking 
channels. Further, we use the Fed’s relative holdings of risk-free (Treasuries) and risky (MBS) 
securities to proxy for the effect on market integration from the decision of the Fed to target its 
purchases during a QE to a specific risk segment of the market (risky, risk-free or both). We find 
that the net purchase scale of the QEs significantly reinforces the impact of the QEs on market 
integration, and that the impact of the QEs on market integration depends upon the risk-appetite 
exhibited by Fed purchases, which lend more credence to our findings. Our findings also are robust 
to the use of an alternate measure of market integration.     
 To the best of our knowledge, this essay is the first one to examine the influence of an 
unconventional monetary policy on the evolution of international bond and stock market 
integration in both the developed and emerging markets. As such, it contributes to the literature on 
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international market integration or its reversed measure, segmentation.32 For example, Koutoulas 
and Kryzanowski (1994) derive pure (bi-) national determinants for explaining the level of 
integration (alternatively segmentation) between the U.S. and Canadian stock markets using 
various macro-variables and their inter-country differences. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 
Siegel (2011) consider six categories of variables for the segmentation of the global equity market: 
de facto openness, political risk and institutions, financial development, risk appetite and business 
cycles, information variables, and growth determinants. Several papers investigate the impact of 
big economic events on stock market integration, such as Frijns, Tourani and RadIndriawan (2012).  
 We also contribute to the line of research dealing with bond market integration which only 
consists of a small number of papers primarily for sovereign bond markets. This includes Chaieb, 
Errunza and Gibson (2017) who report that credit quality, political stability, and inflation risk are 
important determinants of the time-varying integration of developed and emerging sovereign bond 
markets and that illiquidity becomes important during crisis periods.   
    The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the related theory and 
develops testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 reports the empirical 
results. Section 4.5 investigates the possible channels and mechanisms. Section 4.6 examines the 
robustness of our results. Section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
    International financial markets tend to be more correlated in bear than bull markets (Longin and 
Solnik, 2001) and to be highly integrated in volatile (especially down) markets (Pukthuanthong 
and Roll, 2009). The U.S. stock market is the center of the international volatility spillover network 
                                                 
32 Please see the online appendix for a brief but more comprehensive review of this literature.  
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(Yang and Zhou, 2017). The U.S. QEs alone explain 40% to 55% of intensifying spillover from 
the U.S. and are the primary drivers of the intensifying volatility spillover from the U.S. to the rest 
of world from 2008 (Yang and Zhou, 2017). Rajan (2015) argues that unconventional monetary 
policies (UMPs) launched by central banks actually cause higher financial risks in the emerging 
markets as aggregate world demand weakens after a financial crisis.  
    Empirical research finds that the spillover effects of the U.S. QEs on various economic and 
market factors that have been found to be the determinants of market integration differ across the 
various QE periods.33 Compared to the non-QE period, Kryzanowski, Zhang, and Zhong (2017) 
find that the means of the cross-financial-market correlations of bonds and of stocks with forwards 
contracts are significantly higher during QE2 and that the mean of the correlations of bonds with 
the forward contracts are significantly lower during QE1 and QE3 for the DM country sample and 
significantly higher during the QE3 period for the EM country sample. Furthermore, they find that 
the mean correlations of country stock indexes with forward contracts are significantly lower 
during the QE3 period compared to the non-QE period for the All, DM, and EM country samples. 
Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) find that QE1 has a significant but smaller impact on bank 
lending than QE3, while QE2 has no significant impact on bank lending. QE1 has a bigger impact 
on capital flows than QE2 and QE3 (Cho and Rhee, 2014; Park, Ramayandi, and Shin, 2014; 
Moore, Nam, Suh, and Tepper, 2013). Global portfolio flows differed across economic regions 
and QE rounds with capital inflows into the U.S. during QE1 and outflows from the U.S. during 
QE2 and QE3 (Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub, 2016). The emerging countries experienced strong 
                                                 
33 Various papers examine the domestic impact of U.S. QEs on various macro-variables, such as the long-term interest 
rate (e.g., Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011), Treasury supply 
and bond yields (e.g., Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Wright, 2012; D’Amico and King, 2013; Greenwood and Vayanos, 
2014), and market liquidity (Christensen and Gillan, 2014). 
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currency appreciations, generally higher inflation rates and quite mixed changes in their output 
growths during QE1 and QE2 (Chen, Filardo, He and Zhu, 2014). The asset purchases of the Fed 
differed in terms of riskiness for each of the three periods; a mixture of risky MBs and risk-free 
Treasuries in QE1, risk-free Treasuries in QE2, and risky MBS in QE3. Furthermore, only the QE1 
period included a bear market, the global financial crisis and a U.S. recession. Given this diversity 
in the riskiness of the Fed’s asset purchases during the QEs, the troubled state of the global 
financial markets and the U.S. economic performance, and the effects of the QEs on the various 
market and economic factors (essentially flow-through channels) that affect market integration for 
various individual countries and those grouped by level of development status, we can only 
determine their net effects on the changes in bond and stock market integration for and between 
the three QE periods compared to the non-QE period empirically. Thus, the alternative hypothesis 
to be tested in this essay is: 
ܪ஺ଵǣ The integration levels of international bond (stock) markets in the DM (EM) countries are 
significantly different for and between each QE period and compared to that during the non-
QE period.  
    We identify six channels through which the effects of unconventional monetary policy are likely 
to be transmitted to financial securities and markets. We present our second alternative hypothesis 
before discussing the expectations for each of these six channels: 
ܪ஺ଶǣ The QE effects on the integration levels of international bond (stock) markets for the DM 
(EM) countries transmitted through each channel are significantly different for and between 
each QE period and compared to that in the non-QE period. 
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 Confidence channel.  Large-scaled asset purchases (LSAP) have broader confidence effects and 
are expected to lead to better economic prospects which may directly boost consumer confidence 
and the willingness of consumers to spend (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011). VIX has been widely 
used to capture the global market investment sentiment and global market uncertainty during non-
QE and QE periods (Panchenko and Wu, 2009; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad, and Siegel, 2011; 
Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza, 2013; Lim and Mohapatra, 2016). Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza 
(2013) argue that VIX could act as a “push” factor and be related to integration at the market level 
if it is associated with a flight to quality. It follows from this line of thought that VIX would be 
expected to increase bond and stock market integration during a QE. 
 Default risk channel. QEs affect the magnitude of the default spread and the price of default 
risk. To the extent that the QEs may succeed in stimulating the U.S. economy, corporate default 
risk and the Baa rate may fall (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). However, using an 
event-study with relatively narrow announcement windows, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) find that the default risk channel is only significant for QE1 but not for QE2. Yu 
(2016) argues that the use of short windows makes it difficult to establish long-term effects. Even 
when yields on long-term assets are very low, investors may allocate to high risk assets and market 
volatility may increase. Volatility spillovers increase with high default spreads during the QEs, 
indicating worse business conditions in the future (Yang and Zhou, 2017). As financial market 
volatility increases during the QEs, financial market integration tends to be more volatile. If such 
is the case, the default credit spread is expected to be associated with a high level of market 
integration. 
    Inflation channel. As an expansionary monetary policy, QEs can increase tail risk surrounding 
inflation. When investors are uncertain about the monetary policy effects on inflation, a policy 
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action may lead to greater inflation uncertainty (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Yu 
(2016) states that QE is positively associated with GDP growth and inflation but the effects 
fluctuate widely. For instance, increases in U.S. GDP over the three QEs average 2% and range 
between 0.1% and 8%.  To seek economic growth and greater certainty, investors may shift their 
investments to other developed or emerging countries. As with the default risk premium, greater 
financial market uncertainty caused by greater inflation rate uncertainty is expected to increase 
financial market integration.  
    Liquidity channel. A key transmission channel identified for QEs is the liquidity channel 
(Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack, 2011; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2011). LSAPs by the Federal Reserve greatly increased 
liquidity and decreased the liquidity risk of holding the securities purchased under LSAP, which 
in turn increased the credibility of previously liquidity-constrained banks. Such purchases reduce 
borrowing costs for investors and increase overall bank lending, including direct and indirect 
lending to developing countries. Cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities and three-month Treasury 
bills are used in previous studies (Bruno and Shin, 2015; Lim and Mohapatra, 2016) to measure 
liquidity channel effects as they are closely related to borrowing costs. As a result, we expect that 
higher cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities and three-month Treasury bill rates are associated with 
financial market integration. In addition, money supply has been used to capture global liquidity 
(Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel; 2011; Lim and Mohapatra, 2016). Thus, a higher grow rate 
of the money supply during a QE period compared to the non-QE period is expected to be related 
to an increase in financial market integration. 
     Portfolio Balance Channel. The portfolio balance channel argues that by reducing the supply 
of security type(s) to private investors, the U.S. QEs lead to an increase in demand for all substitute 
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assets, including assets from non-domestic developed and emerging markets (Bernanke, 2012; 
Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong, 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Neely, 
2015). As a result, QEs are expected to raise asset prices, lower the yields of those securities, 
promote employment and stabilize a low inflation rate (Bernanke, 2010b). Differential growth 
potentials, differential interest rates, portfolio flows, and term structure spreads have been used in 
measuring the effects on market integration through the portfolio balance channel. 34  These 
variables, which act as push factors in driving capital flows (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel, 
2011), are expected to be associated with financial market integration.  
Risk-taking channel. During the recent periods of U.S. monetary expansion, lower funding costs 
had spillover effects on global financial conditions because they increased cross-border liabilities 
and stimulated the economies of recipient countries by encouraging banks to make more loans. 
Therefore, regional banks in the U.S. could borrow more in U.S. dollars from global banks to lend 
to local corporate borrowers (Bruno and Shin, 2015). This risk-taking channel through the banking 
sector influences financial conditions and real economic decisions, which can lead to banking 
capital flows from the U.S. to other countries (particularly the emerging countries).  Lee (2011) 
and Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) find that the countries with large cross-border portfolio holdings 
attract more global investors. As banking flows are one type of capital flow, greater banking flows 
working through the risk-taking channel during QEs are expected to be associated with greater 
financial market integration.  
                                                 
34 Lim and Mohapatra, 2016; Frankel, 1992; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel; 2011; Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and 
Straub, 2016; Panchenko and Wu, 2009; Frijns, Tourani and RadIndriawan, 2012; Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Carrieri, 
Chaieb and Errunza, 2013; De Santis and Gerard, 1997; Frijns, Tourani, and RadIndriawan, 2012; Bekaert and Harvey, 
1995; Carrieri, Chaieb and Errunza, 2013. 
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4.3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
    The bond and stock indices are collected from those included in the J.P. Morgan (JPM) Global 
Bond Broad Indices (GBI Broad), the JPM Government Bond Index - Emerging Markets Broad 
(GBI-EM Broad) Indices, and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index. We match 
all countries from the JPM GBI Broad and GBI-EM Broad Indices with those from the MSCI 
Equity Indices. After removing the countries with missing observations, our sample covers 19 
developed markets (DM) and 12 emerging markets (EM) over the time period from September 
2003 to December 2014.35 The country or regional categories are defined in Appendix 4.A. 
 We use weekly total returns denominated in local currencies for all bond and stock indices.36 
The bond indices for the DM and EM countries are those included in the GBI Broad index and the 
GBI-EM Broad index, respectively.37 For the countries included in both bond indices, we use the 
JPM GBI Broad index for Hungary, Poland, and South Africa, and the JPM GBI-EM Broad index 
for Mexico to maximize the time coverage available for analysis. 
 We obtain the spot currency prices on Friday from Datastream and Bloomberg. The WM 
Reuters spot currency prices are the arithmetic means of their closing bids and offers at 4 p.m. U.K. 
time provided by the WM Company. Three time dummies, QE1, QE2 and QE3, are used to identify 
each QE round. They are equal to one if the date falls into their respective time periods and zero 
                                                 
35 In order to calculate integration at an annual frequency, the sample includes all of 2014.  
36 Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) find that weekly observations show a very similar pattern of integration as daily 
observations and that the weekly data lead to the same general conclusions about integration. They also argue that in 
estimating integration the cautious approach is to rely on long-term trends over short-term variation. Christiansen 
(2014) also finds that the integration results are robust to the use of weekly returns. Billio, Donadelli, Paradiso, and 
Riedel (2017) argue that monthly data rather than daily data can avoid high-frequency data problems including the 
presence of zero returns, non-synchronicity and excess noise.  
37 The former includes bonds with maturities of 3-5 years (JPM, 2013) and the latter includes government bonds with 
maturities of at least 13 months. 
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otherwise. The definitions and data sources for all the other control variables are provided in 
Appendix 4.B.  
4.4. MEASURING INTEGRATION 
Following Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) and Christiansen (2014) and using the latter’s 
notation,38 we measure integration as the adjusted R-square obtained from the following OLS 
regression: 
                     titKitKititiiti PFPFr ,,,,,,,,,1,,,1,,0,,,, ... WWWWWWW HEEE    (4.1) 
where tir ,,W  is the bond or stock return for week t for country i in year τ and tkiPF ,,,W is the return for 
a country-level bond or stock index k (k = 1…K) based on the K main principal components. 1*, WiR  
is defined as the weekly return matrix for all countries other than country i for year , and its 
principal components have factor loadings of 1*, WD i . The bond or stock index returns excluding the 
country under estimation represented by i* are given by tKiPF ,,,W = W*,iR * 1,*, WD ki , where W*,iR are 
the returns in the current year and 1,*, WD ki  are the factor loadings from the previous year.  
 The local total return indexes for bonds and stocks in a country are converted into U.S. dollars 
to mitigate exchange rate noise (Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009). To account for at least 80% of 
                                                 
38 Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) argue that simple correlations not only fail theoretically but they also provide an 




the cumulative eigenvalues, we extract the first six principal components for bond indexes and 
eight for stock indexes.39  
4.4.1. Integration Time Trend 
As in Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) and Christiansen (2014), we report the level of integration 
(adjusted R-squares) on an annual basis based on equation (4.1) for the country-level bond and 
stock indexes (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively). For example, the integration levels for 2005 are 
0.75 and 0.40 for the Australian bond and stock markets, respectively.  We find that most of the 
EU bond markets are highly integrated at the beginning and end of the years examined herein and 
are lower in 2010 and 2012. The integration values for the EU bond markets are similar to those 
reported by Christiansen (2014) and are much higher than those for the DM countries in Asia or 
North America. The emerging bond markets exhibit greater cross-sectional and time-series 
variations. The changes in integration levels are more similar for the EM versus the DM countries. 
On average, the integration levels increase and then decrease over the time period studied. Also 
the emerging bond markets in the EU show higher levels of integration than those in Asia, South 
Africa, and South America.  Based on a comparison of Table 4.2 with Table 4.1, we observe that 
the average integration level of stock markets is lower than that of bond markets, especially for 
the European countries.  In Table 4.2, the integration levels are higher for the EU stock markets 
compared to those for the other developed countries. The integration levels for the emerging stock 
markets are more dispersed than those for the developed stock markets.  
[Please place Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here.] 
                                                 
39 Although the choice of 80% is arbitrary, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) use 90% and Christiansen (2014) uses 




    To rigorously examine the trends of the integration levels around and during the QE periods, we 
run rolling window regressions of equation (4.1) with a 52-week window. We extract the first 
matrix of principal components from an initial 52-week period and then extract the subsequent 
matrices of principal components by advancing the window by a week by adding the new week 
and dropping the most distant week until the end of the time-series observations is reached. We 
calculate the adjusted R-squares using the two matrices of principal components based on equation 
(4.1) to obtain a series of weekly integration estimates. This not only provides for a robustness test 
for the yearly integration results but also meets the requirement of a sufficiently large sample size 
for the principal component analysis.   
 Panel A of Table 4.3 reports the integration level estimates for the various country-level bond 
and stock markets based on the regressions of the adjusted R-square values on a constant and a 
time trend. Of the 31 country-level bond markets, 27 show a strong time trend. The integration 
levels have significantly decreased (increased) for most of the bond markets in the DM (EM) 
countries. Significant downward trends occur for the developed country-level bond markets in the 
EU countries (Italy and Portugal) and significant upward trends occur in North America (e.g., 
Canada and the U.S.).40 Consistent with the findings of Christiansen (2014), the slope of the trend 
in integration levels for the emerging bond markets in the EU is mixed, significantly upward in 
the Czech Republic and Greece but significantly downward in Hungary and Poland. The emerging 
markets in Asia, South America and South Africa (with the exception of Thailand) show a 
significant increase in the integration level of their bond markets.    
[Please place Table 4.3 about here.] 
                                                 
40 The trend in the EU country bond markets may be due to increasing frictions embodied in legal or technical barriers, 
differential tax treatments, or different investment habits (Wessel, 2003).   
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The time trends of the integration levels differ for the stock markets. The integration levels for 
most of the DM countries significantly increase. For example, the stock markets in the EU 
countries become more integrated, consistent with the findings of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). 
The stock markets in the EM countries show mixed evidence with about an equal proportion of 
countries showing increases and decreases in the integration levels of their stock markets.   
We also construct equally- and GDP-weighted integration indexes (Looi, Nicita, and Olarreaga, 
2009; Wolf, 2000) using the integration estimates for each country in each sample (i.e., All, DM, 
and EM countries) for the bond and stock markets, respectively. Panels A and B of Figure 4.1 plot 
these indexes for the bond and stock markets for the All, DM, and EM countries, respectively. The 
weekly time trends for the DM and EM countries are similar to those reported in Berger, 
Pukthuanthong, and Yang (2011).  We observe from Figure 4.1 that both the bond and the stock 
markets are highly integrated during the QE1 and QE2 periods and are less so during the QE3 
period. Since QE1 and QE2 were launched after much of the financial turmoil and QE3 was 
implemented during a rather stable economic environment, this finding may indicate that market 
integration increased, on average, during volatile markets and decreased during stable markets, 
consistent with the findings of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009).  
[Please place Figure 4.1 about here.] 
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the summary statistics for All, DM, and EM countries. The mean 
(median) equal-weighted R2 for the bond markets are in general greater than the corresponding 
values for their GDP-weighted counterparts. The equally- (GDP-) weighted integration index for 
the bond (stock) market in the DM countries is higher than its counterpart for the EM countries. 
Since the results for equally-weighed integration and GDP-weighted integration are similar, we 
focus on the equally-weighted integration in the following sections.  
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4.4.2. Formal Test of the Financial Market Integration Level During and Around the QEs 
To investigate the level of bond and stock country-level market integration during the three 
rounds of QE, we run the following regressions where equation (4.3) tests previous findings that 
financial markets tend to be more highly integrated during bear than bull markets (e.g., Longin 
and Solnik, 2001):  
ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳܧͳ ൅ ߚଶܳܧʹ ൅ ߚଷܳܧ͵ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧                                         (4.2) 
ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳܧͳ ൅ ߚଶܳܧʹ ൅ ߚଷܳܧ͵ ൅ ߚହܤ݁ܽݎܰ݋݊ܳܧ ൅ ߚ଺ܤ݁ܽݎܳܧͳ ൅
ߚ଻ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௧                                                                                                                  (4.3) 
where ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧  is the weekly integration level for each country based on the methodology of 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009); ܳܧͳǡ ܳܧʹǡ ܽ݊݀ܳܧ͵are the dummy variables set to one in the 
weeks falling into each of the three rounds of QE and zero otherwise;  ܤ݁ܽݎܰ݋݊ܳܧ is equal to 
one if the market is bear during the non-QE period and zero otherwise; and  ܤ݁ܽݎܳܧͳ is equal to 
one if the market is bear during QE1 and zero otherwise. 41 All the variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.B.  
[Please place Table 4.4 about here.] 
Based on Panel A of Table 4.4, we find that the integration level of the bond markets during 
QE2 are significantly higher for the All, DM and EM countries and the integration levels of the 
stock markets during QE1 (QE3) significantly increase (decrease) for the All, DM, and EM 
countries. Based on Panel B of Table 4.4, we find that after controlling for the effect of bear 
markets on market integration, the results for the integration of the bond and stock markets are 
consistent with those reported in Panel A during each QE round. Interestingly, the estimated 
                                                 
41 For the period examined herein, bear market periods fall exclusively in the non-QE and QE1 periods. 
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coefficients for bearNonQE are significantly lower for the integration of stock markets but for 
bearQE1 are significantly higher for the All, DM, and EM countries.  
4.5. FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND POTENTIAL QE TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS  
4.5.1. Methodology 
 Our panel regression specification is motivated by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad, and Siegel (2011), 




















where ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧ is the level of integration for country i; ܺ௜௞௧ are the various explanatory variables 
that provide channels for transmitting the QE effects to financial security market integration (six 
channels with their proxies are summarized in Table 4.5); and ܳܧଵ௧ , ܳܧଶ௧ , and ܳܧଷ௧  are the 
dummy variables that capture the dynamics of the three quantitative easing operations by the Fed, 
and ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋ ௝݈௜௧  are the control variables that are related to financial market openness and 
development and the political risk and institutional environment, categorized by Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundlad and Siegel (2011) and defined in Appendix 4.B. The dynamics of the QE operations are 
captured by either using QE dummies or alternatively by the Fed’s total assets holdings in U.S. 
Treasury securities, agency securities, and mortgage-backed securities or relative holdings of 
Treasuries or MBS (MacDonald, 2017; Yang and Zhou, 2017).  
[Please place Table 4.5 about here.] 
 We choose the specific macro-variables in ܺ௜௞௧  in regression (4.4) that represent various 
channels for transmitting the first-order effects of (non)conventional monetary policy on the 
macro-variables to their effects on market integration including those identified in the literature. 
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Bond and stock integrations are estimated using rolling windows of 52 weeks, and the variables 
linked with QE channels and the control variables, whose definitions and data sources are provided 
in Appendix 4.B, are estimated at the beginning of each 52-week rolling window. The use of 
lagged variables helps in reducing any endogeneity problems due to omitted variables or 
unobserved effects (Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza, 2013). Following Aslanidis and Christiansen 
(2012), the quarterly or monthly data are converted to a weekly frequency by using the values 
unchanged until updated. As most of the variables are measured at a quarterly frequency, we also 
provide a robustness test reflecting this in section 4.6.  
4.5.2. Empirical Results  
    In this section, we discuss the effects of the QEs on international bond and stock market 
integration. We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate regression (4.4), as in Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel (2011) and Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza (2013). The standard errors 
are robust to clustering by two-dimensional country and time effects (Petersen, 2009). To 
investigate the role of UMP launched by the U.S. Fed on international bond or stock market 
integration for various economic regions, we estimate regression (4.4) for the samples of All, DM, 
and EM countries, as well as for the regions of Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America, and NAFTA 
countries.  
4.5.2.1. Results for financial market integration across All, DM, and EM countries using QE 
dummy variables 
We begin by examining the summary statistics reported in Table 4.6 for all the independent 
variables linked with the QE channels. The means for all the variables during the non-QE period 
are positive except for portfolio (bond or equity) flows. When we compare the mean for each 
variable in a QE period to its value in the non-QE period, we find significantly positive differences 
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for BankLiabGDP, TermSpread, and BankingFlow for all three QEs, for CreditSpread and difINFL 
for QE1, for difGDP for QE1 and QE2 but not QE3 where the difference is significantly negative, 
and for difINT during QE2 and QE3 but not QE1 where the difference is significantly negative. In 
contrast, we find significantly negative differences for US3MTbill for all three QEs, for 
CreditSpread during QE3, for BondFlow during QE1 and QE2, for EquityFlow during QE2 but 
not QE1 where the difference is significant and positive. We find no significant differences for 
M2. Thus, we observe significant differences for all but one independent variable linked with a 
QE channel in a QE versus non-QE period.  
 [Please place Table 4.6 about here.] 
Table 4.7 reports the results for the determinants of bond or stock market integration considering 
the channels which potentially transmit the effects associated with the QEs.42 As expected in 
comparison to the non-QE period, the average level of integration for the bond market is 
significantly higher during QE1 and QE2 for All and DM countries. It is also significantly higher 
during QE3 for All, DM and EM countries. The level of stock market integration compared to the 
non-QE period exhibits significantly higher average integration for the DM countries during QE1 
and QE2, and for the All countries during QE2. In contrast, the level of stock market integration 
is significantly lower for the EM countries during QE1 and QE2 and for the All countries during 
QE1 and QE3. 
[Please place Table 4.7 about here.] 
                                                 
42 The independent variables include bond or equity flows. Since the bond flow data are not available for Singapore 
and India and the equity flow data are not available for Singapore, Colombia, and Mexico, we run the regressions 
excluding bond or equity flows and the results are qualitatively similar when these countries are included. The variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for assessing multicollinearity between the independent variables for the All-country sample 
are all below 10.   
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We now discuss the estimated coefficients for the channel proxies starting with the confidence 
channel. While all but one of the estimated coefficients for VIX are significantly positive during 
the non-QE period, they are not significantly different for any of the QE periods compared to the 
non-QE period as was the case for the mean VIX itself. Nevertheless, the total effect of VIX (e.g., 
VIX + VIX*QE1) on the level of market integration during each of the three QEs is no longer 
significant. Thus, the expected positive effect of VIX on market integration due to VIX’s effect on 
global and local risk aversion and co-variance risk (Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza, 2013) was 
neutralized during each QE period.  
Stock market integration changes significantly (decreases) only in the EM countries with an 
increase in credit spreads during the non-QE period. The total effect of CreditSpread on market 
integration is significantly negative during QE1 for the All, DM, and EM countries for the bond 
and stock portfolios and significant (positive) only during QE3 for the bond portfolios of the EM 
countries. Thus, credit spreads play a vital role in explaining bond and stock market integration 
primarily during the first QE period.  
We observe a significantly positive relation between the differential inflation rate (our proxy for 
the inflation channel) and equity market integration during the non-QE period in the All, DM and 
EM countries. Even with many significant changes in the estimated coefficients for differential 
inflation during the QE versus non-QE periods, the estimated coefficients remain significantly 
positive for equity market integration with the exception of the significantly negative and 
insignificant positive estimates during QE1 and QE2 for the DM countries. In contrast, the relation 
between differential inflation and bond market integration is insignificant for all countries since it 
is significantly positive for the DM countries and significantly negative for the EM countries. The 
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corresponding estimated coefficients become significantly negative for the DM countries during 
all three QEs and only remain significantly negative for the EM countries during QE2.   
 Our proxies for the liquidity channel are the ratio of cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities to 
GDP, broad money supply, and US 3-month T-bill rate. The estimated coefficients for the ratios 
of cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities to GDP are significantly positive for the EM countries 
during the non-QE period, and only remain significantly positive during QE2 and QE3. The 
estimated coefficients for this ratio are significantly negative for the All countries and the DM 
countries (for equity market integration only) during the non-QE period. While they remain 
significantly negative for the All and DM countries during the QEs for equity market integration, 
they generally become insignificant for bond market integration during the QEs. While average 
bank-to-bank liabilities to GDP are significantly higher during each QE period compared to the 
non-QE period for the All sample (Table 4.6), untabulated results reveal a different behavior for 
the EM countries where the average ratio compared to the non-QE period did not change 
significantly in QE1, significantly decreased in QE2 and significantly increased in QE3.  
Our second proxy for the liquidity channel, the US 3-month T-bill rate, is significantly and 
negatively related to bond and stock market integration during the non-QE period. A significantly 
negative coefficient for this variable only remains during QE3 for bond market integration for the 
EM countries. This is expected as this rate was near zero during the QEs. Our third proxy for the 
liquidity channel, the broad money supply M2, has no effect on the bond and stock market 
integration during any of the examined periods. This is not unexpected during the QEs since the 
broad money supply did not change significantly and the QEs were implemented to increase the 
asset holdings of the U.S. Fed due to the failure of conventional monetary policy to stimulate the 
U.S. economy.  
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We now examine four proxies for the portfolio balance channel: differential growth potential 
(GDP), differential interest rate, portfolio flows, and term structure spread. We find that 
differential GDP has a significantly positive (negative) effect on the bond (stock) market 
integration only for the EM countries during the non-QE period. There is a significant difference 
in the estimated coefficient between each QE period and the non-QE period for all but one of the 
bond portfolios, and for all of the stock portfolios for the EM countries. As a result, the total effect 
of differential GDP for the All, DM, and EM countries is significantly negative on bond market 
integration during QE2 and significantly positive on stock market integration during QE3. 
Our second proxy for the portfolio balance channel, differential interest rate, has a negative 
(generally significant) effect on bond and stock market integration during the non-QE period, 
which for the EM countries becomes significantly positive during QE1 for both bond and stock 
market integration and during QE3 for stock market integration.  
Our third proxy for the portfolio balance channel, portfolio flows, has a significantly negative 
(positive) effect on bond (stock) market integration during the non-QE period for the DM countries 
and a significantly positive (negative) effect on the bond (stock) market integration during the non-
QE period for the EM countries. The total effect of portfolio flows on bond market integration is 
only significant (negatively) during QE1 for the EM countries while the total effect of portfolio 
flows on stock market integration becomes insignificant during QE1, becomes significantly 
negative during QE2, and remains significantly positive during QE3 for the DM countries.  
Our fourth and final proxy for the portfolio balance channel, term spread, has a significantly 
negative effect on bond and stock market integration during the non-QE period. The estimated 
coefficients for this variable compared to the non-QE period are significantly higher in QE2 and 
significantly lower during QE3 with the exception of stock market integration for the All and DM 
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countries. The total effect of the term spread is significantly negative with bond and stock market 
integration during QE3 and with equity market integration during QE1.  
Our proxy for the risk-taking channel, cross-border banking flows, has a significant effect on 
bond and stock market integration during all four periods examined herein. Consistent with our 
expectation for the risk-taking channel, this finding indicates that greater borrowing capacity 
provided by global banks to regional banks, as shown in Table 4.6 for cross-border banking flows, 
significantly increases bond (and stock) market integration. It is evident that the banking sectors 
are important determinants of financial market integration in both DM and EM countries, although 
most of the previous literature pays little or no attention to the role of cross-border banking flows 
on financial market integration. An exception is Lucey and Zhang (2011) who examine the 
borrowing ability at the firm level during the financial integration process. 
Overall, bond and stock market integration depend on different channels for the transmission of 
QE effects and on the economic development categories of countries (DM or EM). Cross-border 
banking flows significantly increase the bond and stock market integration during each of the three 
QEs for the DM and EM countries. Given that the U.S. Fed did not significantly increase the broad 
money supply as conventionally measured during the QE versus non-QE periods, market 
integration was not significantly impacted by changes in the broad money supply during the QE 
periods. Instead, unconventional monetary actions taken by the U.S. Fed during the QE periods 
that significantly changed the Fed’s asset holdings but not magnitude of the conventionally 
measured money supply had significant impacts on market integration. 
Consistent with the existing evidence that financial market openness and development is related 
to stock market integration (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel; 2011; Bakert and Harvey, 1995), 
its proxies, market capitalization to GDP, market openness, total value of stock traded to GDP, 
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and trade openness, have significantly positive effects on bond market integration for the All, DM, 
and EM countries. In contrast, the proxies for financial market openness and development have 
mixed effects on stock market integration, as in Carrieri, Chaieb and Errunza (2013). The 
coefficient of market capitalization to GDP is significantly positive but market openness is 
significantly negative for the DM and EM countries.  The total value of stock traded to GDP has a 
significantly negative (positive) effect on the DM (EM) countries and trade openness has a 
significantly positive (negative) effect on the DM (EM) countries.  
Our proxies for political risk and institutions show that higher economic freedom and private 
credit indicate lower integration levels for the All and DM countries.  Higher legal rights are 
associated with higher integration levels for the bond portfolios of the All and DM countries but 
lower integration levels for the stock portfolios. The estimated coefficient for our last control 
variable, business cycle variation, is negative and significant, indicating that countries with more 
volatile business cycles are less integrated with the world market (Bekaert, 1995).  
We observe that the adjusted R-squares for the regressions for bond market integration are 
79.3%, 82.3% and 76.5% for the All, DM, and EM countries, respectively. These values are 
consistently higher than their stock market counterparts of 0.745, 0.771, and 0.733. Nevertheless, 
all the estimations fit the data well. 
4.5.2.2. Effect of Fed’s specific security holdings on financial market integration  
We now investigate whether the U.S. Fed purchases of two types of securities affected bond and 
stock market integration using the following regression specification: 
ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳܧଵ ൅ ߚଶܳܧଶ ൅ ߚଷܳܧଷ ൅ ߚସܴܶܧܣܵܨȀܶܣܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହ σ ܴܶܧܣܵܨȀܶܣܨ௜ǡ௧ כଷ௜ୀଵ
ܳܧ௜ ൅ߚ଺ܯܤܵܨȀܶܣܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ σ ܯܤܵܨȀܶܣܨ௜ǡ௧ כ ܳܧ௜ଷ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧   (4.5) 
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where TREASF, MBSF, and TAF are the U.S. Fed’s treasury bond holdings, mortgage-backed 
securities, and total asset holdings, respectively. The QE dummies and control variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.B. Based on the results of Table 4.8, we find that the estimated coefficients 
for treasury bond holdings (TREASF/TA) become significantly positive for bond and stock market 
integration during QE1 (i.e., TREASF/TAF+TREASF/TAF*QE1), insignificant during QE2, and 
significant during QE3 (positive for bond market integration and negative for stock market 
integration). The estimated coefficients for the mortgage-backed securities holdings (MBSF/TA) 
become significantly negative for the bond and stock market integration during QE1, insignificant 
for QE2, and significant during QE3 (positive for bond market integration and negative for stock 
market integration). In summary, the Fed holdings of Treasury bond securities and mortgage-
backed securities significantly affect the integrations of bond and of stock markets during QE1 
and QE3 (periods of Fed’s MBS purchases and some Treasuries in QE1) but not during QE2 
(period of Fed’s Treasury purchases), and their directional effects during QE1 differ.  
[Please place Table 4.8 about here.] 
4.5.2.3. Results for financial market integration for regional economies 
    To investigate financial market integration for regional economies, we classify the 31 countries 
into four regions: Asia-Pacific, Euro, Latin American, and North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).43 Untabulated results show that compared to the non-QE period,44 the average level of 
integration for the bond market measured by the U.S. QE dummy variables or the scale of QE 
purchases by the U.S. Fed is significantly higher for the European region during the three QEs, for 
the European and Latin regions during QE1, and for the Asian, European, and Latin regions during 
                                                 
43 The regional categories, which are based on the IMF and World Bank, are reported in Appendix 4.A.  
44 Please see the Online Appendix Tables 4.A3 and 4.A4. 
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QE3. In general, the estimated coefficients for the variables linked with the QEs for the Asian, 
European, and Latin American regions are consistent with those reported in Table 4.7. 
    We further examine how the integration results change when we examine integration for each 
region differentiated by its DM and EM countries. In general, average bond and stock market 
integration compared to the non-QE period is significantly higher during QE1 and QE2 for the 
European DM countries and during QE1 for the European EM countries. Average bond market 
integration compared to the non-QE period is significantly higher during QE3 for the Asian DM 
and EM countries and average stock market integration is higher during QE3 for the Asian DM 
and EM countries. Overall, the results for the Asian and European DM and EM countries are 
generally consistent with their results non-differentiated by the security-type holdings of the Fed.  
4.6. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS 
4.6.1. Alternative Measure of Integration 
Among the alternative measures of financial market integration, the simple correlation is the 
most widely used measure (Billio, Donadelli, Paradiso, and Riedel, 2017; Kearney and Lucey, 
2004). Billio, Donadelli, Paradiso, and Riedel (2017) find that all the measures of integration yield 
a very similar integration pattern but that the dynamic simple correlation explains diversification 
benefits as well as or better than more sophisticated measures of integration. Thus, we choose the 
dynamic simple correlation metric to test the robustness of our previously reported results for bond 
and stock market integration. The dynamic simple correlation is computed between one country 
and all the other countries and is estimated using a rolling window of 52 weeks to be consistent 
with our implementation of the measure of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). We find that bond or 
stock market integration based on the cross-country average dynamic simple correlations displays 
a trend very similar to the measure of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) and that, on average, the 
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market integration levels (especially for stock market integration) are higher during QE1 compared 
to the non-QE period, and that the stock market integration, on average, is lower during QE3 
compared to the non-QE period.45 Consistent with the findings of Panels A and B in Table 4.4, the 
integration of the bond markets during QE2 are significantly higher for the All, DM and EM 
countries and the integration levels of the stock markets during QE1 (QE3) significantly increase 
(decrease) for the All, DM, and EM countries with or without controls for the effect of bear markets 
on market integration.46 
We use the dynamic simple correlation as a measure of financial market integration when re-
estimating regressions (4.4) and (4.5). Online Table 4.A6 shows that the determinants of financial 
market integration using dynamic simple correlations are consistent with those using the 
integration measure of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) reported earlier in Table 4.7. The average 
level of integration for the bond market in comparison to the non-QE period is significantly higher 
during QE1 and QE2 for All and DM countries. It is also significantly higher during QE3 for All, 
DM and EM countries. The level of stock market integration compared to the non-QE period 
exhibits significantly higher average integration for the DM countries during QE1 and QE2, and 
for the All countries during QE2. In contrast, the level of stock market integration is significantly 
lower for the EM countries during QE1 and QE2 and for the All countries during QE1 and QE3.  
The estimated coefficients of the variables linked with the QE channels for these new 
estimations are generally consistent with those based on the integration measure of Pukthuanthong 
and Roll (2009) reported earlier in the essay. The results reported in Online Table 4.A7 is in line 
with the findings of Table 4.8 that the Fed holdings of Treasury bond securities and mortgage-
                                                 
45 The trend of bond or stock market integration during the three rounds of QE is plotted in the online appendix Figure 
4.1 for this essay.  
46 Please see online appendix Table 4.A5 for this essay. 
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backed securities significantly affect the integration of bond and stock markets during QE1 and 
QE3 (periods of Fed’s MBS purchases) but not during QE2 (period of Fed’s Treasury purchases), 
and that their directional effects during QE1 differ.  
4.6.2. Controlling for global financial crisis and the U.S. recession 
   Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) and Lehkonen (2015) find that during the global 
financial crisis equity market integration tends to decrease. We formulate the following regression 
to control for the financial crisis effect on bond and stock market integration:  
ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܳܧͳ ൅ ߚଶܳܧʹ ൅ ߚଷܳܧ͵ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽܰ݋݊ܳܧ ൅
ߚ଺ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽܳܧͳ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߳௧ (4.6) 
where ܫ݊ݐ݁݃ݎ௜ǡ௧  is the weekly integration level for each country based on the methodology of 
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009); ܳܧͳǡ ܳܧʹǡ ܽ݊݀ܳܧ͵are the dummy variables set to one in the 
period falling into each of three QE rounds and zero otherwise;  ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽܰ݋݊ܳܧ is equal to 
one for each global financial crisis week during the non-QE period and zero otherwise; and  
ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽܳܧͳ is equal to one for each global financial crisis week during QE1 and zero 
otherwise. Since the global financial crisis began on August 7, 2007 or September 15, 2008 
(Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl, 2014; Lehkonen, 2015) and finished in June 2009, we 
run the regression using the two different time periods.  
Based on the results reported in Panels A and B of Table 4.9, we observe that the results for the 
integration of bond and stock market integration are consistent with the results when controlling 
for bear markets reported in Table 4.4, which is consistent with our first hypothesis. We also find 
that bond and stock market integration is significantly lower during the CrisisGlobalNonQE period 
of 8/2007-6/2009 (panel A) and significantly higher during the crisisQE1 period. This may be 
consistent with the finding of Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) that “segmentation 
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(integration) increased (decreased) towards the end of 2008 but then returned to its pre-crisis levels 
in 2009”, which is summarized by Lehkonen (2015). 
[Please place Table 4.9 about here.] 
 Since the U.S. recession may affect bond and stock market integration, we also run regression 
(4.4) by adding dummy variables, ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋ܷ݊ܵܰ݋݊ܳܧ  and ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋ܷ݊ܵܳܧͳ . The U.S. 
recession is defined by NBER as being for the period of 12/2007-6/2009. The results reported in 
Table 4.10 are consistent with those obtained controlling for bear markets and the global financial 
crisis. In summary, bond market integration significantly decreases during QE2 (period of Fed’s 
Treasury purchases) while stock market integration significantly increases during QE1 but 
decreases during QE3 (periods of Fed’s MBS purchases with only QE1 containing a U.S. 
recession).  
[Please place Table 4.10 about here.] 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we investigate the effect of the three rounds of quantitative easing (QE) launched 
by the U.S. Federal Reserve on international financial market integration and investigate the 
possible channels for transmitting the effects of the QEs holdings of risk-free (Treasuries) and 
risky (MBS) assets on financial market integration in 31 countries (developed and emerging). We 
find that the average financial market integration in 31 countries changes significantly during the 
three U.S. QE periods, and that the QEs affect international financial market integration mainly 
through the inflation, liquidity, portfolio balance, and risk-taking channels. Additionally, the 
impact of QEs on financial market integration is intensified by the scale of securities purchased by 
the U.S. Fed during each QE period, and by whether the holdings of the Fed reflected purchases 
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of risk-free Treasuries (QE2) or risky MBS securities (QE3) or a mixture of both (QE1). 
Our essay to the best of our knowledge is the first empirical analysis providing evidence on the 
(especially channel) impacts of unconventional monetary policy on international market 
integration for both bond and stock markets in developed and emerging countries. Our findings 
complement previous studies on the determinants of international market integration on various 
economic and financial indicators and enrich the emerging literature on the impacts of quantitative 
easing on international economies. Our findings also shed light on the importance of the spillover 
impact of a domestic unconventional monetary policy on international market integration, and 
provide immediate implications for policy makers when evaluating the consequences of 






In the first essay, we investigate the cross-market correlations across 31 countries during the 
three QE periods in the U.S. We find that the means of the correlations between stocks (bonds) 
and forward contracts, and between forward contracts differ by QE period. These results suggest 
that cross-market correlations and their effects on international financial asset returns differ 
considerably between the conventional and unconventional monetary policy regimes and between 
various unconventional monetary policy regimes. Our findings have implications for portfolio 
managers making investment decisions overseas and regulators when considering the unintended 
consequences of the actions of the monetary authorities.  
    In the second essay, we examine the spillover effects on the international portfolios of bonds 
from the DM and EM countries from the perspective of U.S. investors or asset managers that 
includes a period of quantitative easing (QE) launched by the U.S. after the sub-prime financial 
crisis. We find that the excess returns and the variances of unhedged international bond portfolios 
are significantly reduced during the QE versus the pre-QE periods. The effect of the QEs on the 
hedging effectiveness and hedging performance of international bond portfolios depends on the 
choice of hedging strategy and the development level of the country in which a financial market 
is situated.  
    These findings have important implications for the currency-hedging decisions of U.S. asset 
managers who invest in foreign financial markets, especially during periods with unconventional 
monetary policy actions by the central monetary authorities. These findings also highlights the 
signaling role of the security holdings of the Fed since changes in holdings by security type during 
the QE have a significant effect on the returns, risk and return-to-risk profiles of hedged and 
unhedged portfolios of bonds from developed and emerging markets.   
69 
 
In the third essay, we investigate the effect of the three rounds of quantitative easing (QE) 
launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve on international financial market integration and investigate 
the possible channels for transmitting the effects of the Fed’s holdings of risk-free (Treasuries) 
and risky (MBS) assets during the QEs on financial market integration in 31 countries (developed 
and emerging). We find that the average financial market integration in 31 countries changes 
significantly during the three U.S. QE periods, and that the QEs affect international financial 
market integration mainly through the inflation, liquidity, portfolio balance, and risk-taking 
channels. Additionally, the impacts of the QEs on financial market integration are intensified by 
the scale of securities purchased by the U.S. Fed during each QE period, and by whether the 
holdings of the Fed reflected purchases of risk-free Treasuries (QE2) or risky MBS securities (QE3) 
or a mixture of both (QE1). Our findings complement previous studies on the determinants of 
international market integration on various economic and financial indicators and enrich the 
emerging literature on the impacts of quantitative easing on international economies. Our findings 
also shed light on the importance of the spillover impact of a domestic unconventional monetary 
policy on international market integration, and provide immediate implications for policy makers 
when evaluating the consequences of unconventional monetary policies on global financial 
markets given their growing importance in economic activity. 
In future work, we plan to examine the effect of the U.S. unconventional monetary policy on 
the firm-level exchange rate exposure in emerging markets through capital flow channel. This 
would extend the findings of Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2018) that the effects of the QE on 
global portfolios flows differed across capital flow receiving countries, types of flows, and QE 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the bond indexes, stock indexes and forward contracts 
This table reports summary statistics for the weekly returns in percentage of 31 bond and stock market indexes and 
for 20 currency forward contracts. The sample period is from September 2003 to November 2014. The 20 currency 
forward contracts are for: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand.  
The total number of observations is 583. 
    Bond     Stock     Forward   
Country   Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
DM          
Australia 0.18 0.26 1.79 0.30 0.65 3.63 0.07 0.17 1.90 
Eurozone          
    Austria 0.11 0.14 1.41 0.16 0.52 4.42 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Belgium 0.12 0.17 1.49 0.20 0.47 3.39 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Finland 0.15 0.13 1.68 0.18 0.48 4.00 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    France 0.11 0.13 1.38 0.19 0.48 3.43 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Germany 0.11 0.09 1.35 0.25 0.66 3.57 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Ireland 0.16 0.24 1.88 0.07 0.42 4.22 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Italy 0.13 0.17 1.58 0.13 0.38 3.81 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Netherlands 0.11 0.12 1.37 0.21 0.41 3.27 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Portugal 0.15 0.22 2.17 0.09 0.36 3.34 0.03 0.08 1.37 
    Spain 0.13 0.18 1.63 0.24 0.44 3.92 0.03 0.08 1.37 
Canada 0.12 0.20 1.33 0.25 0.49 3.34 0.04 0.13 1.37 
Denmark 0.10 0.07 1.37 0.32 0.66 3.34 0.03 0.08 1.36 
Japan 0.04 -0.04 1.48 0.12 0.13 2.60 0.01 -0.06 1.45 
New Zealand 0.17 0.33 1.92 0.23 0.50 3.03 0.07 0.28 1.96 
Singapore 0.11 0.12 0.82 0.27 0.41 3.00 0.05 0.07 0.72 
Sweden 0.11 0.14 1.65 0.31 0.58 3.92 0.03 0.08 1.72 
UK 0.10 0.08 1.33 0.19 0.50 3.04 0.01 0.06 1.37 
US 0.07 0.07 0.45 0.19 0.25 2.44    
EM          
Brazil 0.30 0.40 2.28 0.41 0.56 5.06 0.04 0.14 2.04 
Chile 0.09 0.17 1.74 0.27 0.38 3.46 0.04 0.13 1.68 
Colombia 0.27 0.42 1.99 0.55 0.61 3.81 0.06 0.14 1.64 
Czech Republic 0.15 0.29 1.81 0.33 0.43 3.94 0.06 0.20 1.77 
Greece -0.11 0.04 2.91 -0.04 0.14 5.08 0.03 0.08 1.37 
Hungary 0.19 0.26 2.88 0.22 0.55 5.36 0.01 0.10 2.18 
India 0.07 0.14 1.29 0.35 0.58 3.92 -0.05 0.01 0.99 
Mexico 0.15 0.29 2.12 0.36 0.61 3.97 -0.03 0.10 1.56 
Poland 0.18 0.36 2.32 0.28 0.50 4.60 0.05 0.25 2.10 
South Africa 0.09 0.24 2.54 0.33 0.55 4.11 -0.04 0.08 2.35 
South Korea 0.12 0.19 1.54 0.28 0.50 4.21 0.02 0.09 1.45 





Table 2.2.  Average correlation coefficients between bond indexes, stock indexes and 
forward contracts 
This table reports the average correlations (Corr.) between the indexes of bonds or stocks with forward contracts based 
on the DCC model with the largest negative Likelihood Ratio (LR) when the estimates of a plus b in equation (2.3) 
are less than 1. This was generally a GARCH(1,1) but was also a GJR/TARCH or EGARCH model in the first step 
and asymmetric DCC in the second step of the estimation. The correlations for each individual country are based on 
the weekly returns on its bond or stock market index with the corresponding returns on forward contracts with a 
maturity of one month for the 19 other markets. The sample period ranges from September 2003 to November 2014. 
The 20 currency forward contracts are for the following countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand.  The mean correlation for bonds (stocks) with forward contracts for All the 
countries is 0.459 (0.419). The total number of observations is 583. 









Australia 0.539 0.469 Brazil 0.526 0.446 
Eurozone   Chile 0.371 0.444 
    Austria 0.577 0.472 Colombia 0.323 0.332 
    Belgium 0.567 0.453 Czech Republic 0.790 0.437 
    Finland 0.508 0.287 Greece 0.493 0.372 
    France 0.566 0.475 Hungary 0.506 0.465 
    Germany 0.520 0.472 India 0.267 0.448 
    Ireland 0.514 0.363 Mexico 0.306 0.415 
    Italy 0.526 0.485 Poland 0.551 0.476 
    Netherlands 0.524 0.440 South Africa 0.453 0.519 
    Portugal 0.508 0.462 South Korea 0.367 0.351 
    Spain 0.520 0.457 Thailand 0.249 0.207 
Canada 0.450 0.431    
Denmark 0.551 0.479    
Japan 0.180 0.309    
New Zealand 0.491 0.372    
Singapore 0.492 0.423    
Sweden 0.524 0.465    
UK 0.447 0.462    
US 0.036 0.313    
      





Table 2.3. Average correlation coefficients between the forward contracts 
This table reports the average correlations (Corr.) between the 20 currency forward contracts with a maturity of one 
month. The DCC-GARCH correlation for each country is measured as the average correlations between the currency 
forward returns for a home country with the currency forward returns for each of the 19 other currencies at a weekly 
frequency. The sample period ranges from September 2003 to November 2014. The 20 currency forward contracts 
are for the following countries/zones: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Eurozone, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, 
South Korea, and Thailand. The means for the DM, EM and All countries are 0.448, 0.467 and 0.432, respectively. 
The total number of observations is 583. 
DM Country  DCC Corr. EM Country  DCC Corr. 
Australia 0.540 Brazil 0.416 
Canada 0.436 Chile 0.377 
Denmark 0.547 Colombia 0.291 
Eurozone 0.547 Czech Republic 0.525 
Japan 0.113 Hungary 0.547 
New Zealand 0.468 India 0.364 
Singapore 0.555 Mexico 0.372 
Sweden 0.534 Poland 0.562 
UK 0.464 South Africa 0.558 
  South Korea 0.401 
  Thailand 0.335 
    
Mean 0.467 Mean 0.432 
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Table 2.4. Regression results for various sets of correlations against the QE period dummy 
variables   
This table reports results for regressions of the correlations (Corr.) between bond or stock indexes or forward contracts 
with forward contracts against the QE dummies and various control variables in Panel A across All, DM, and EM 
countries over the period from September 2003 to November 2014. The time dummies (QE1, QE2, and QE3) represent 
the QEs launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve during QE1 (November 2008 to March 2010), QE2 (November 2010 
to June 2011), and QE3 (September 2012 to October 2014), respectively. The term spread and credit spread reflect 
information from the U.S. bond market. The Ex_Mkt, SMB, and HML are the Fama and French (1993) three factors 
and reflect the information in the U.S. stock market. The liquidity factor (LIQ) measures the level of aggregate 
liquidity of the U.S. stock market.  The residual VIX represents the U.S. commodity market obtained by regressing 
the VIXrate on the Ex_Mkt. Macro variables are inflation rate, M2, real GDP growth rate, and policy uncertainty 
index (PUI). Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six 
lags. Results for tests of the null hypothesis of no differences in correlations between two periods is reported in Panel 
B. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. The total number 
of observations is 583. 
Panel A: Correlations between portfolios of bonds or stocks or forward contracts with forward contracts 
 Bond & Forward Corr. Stock & Forward Corr. Forward & Forward Corr. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All DM EM All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 
-0.013 -0.013* -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.025** -0.026** -0.023 
(-1.50) (-1.79) (-0.76) (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-2.11) (-2.55) (-1.44) 
QE2 
0.037*** 0.025** 0.056*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.019 0.049*** 
(3.32) (2.29) (3.77) (2.68) (2.60) (2.73) (2.89) (1.42) (3.27) 
QE3 
0.000 -0.014* 0.024** -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.023** -0.008 -0.023** 0.003 
(0.05) (-1.69) (2.10) (-3.67) (-4.14) (-2.33) (-0.89) (-2.50) (0.31) 
Term 
0.280 0.140 0.501 0.489 0.408 0.617 0.691** 0.607** 0.761** 
(1.08) (0.54) (1.22) (1.26) (1.04) (1.50) (2.34) (2.03) (1.98) 
Credit 
1.252* 0.133 3.025*** 3.580*** 3.282*** 4.051*** 1.798** -0.080 3.334*** 
(1.93) (0.21) (2.64) (3.60) (3.37) (3.73) (2.19) (-0.10) (3.07) 
Ex_Mkt 
0.019 -0.057 0.139 0.087 0.064 0.124 0.046 -0.058 0.131 
(0.32) (-0.92) (1.43) (0.89) (0.64) (1.26) (0.60) (-0.75) (1.36) 
SMB 
0.028 0.159* -0.180 -0.168 -0.110 -0.261** -0.022 0.166 -0.176 
(0.33) (1.67) (-1.44) (-1.34) (-0.82) (-2.12) (-0.21) (1.41) (-1.40) 
HML 
0.052 0.192* -0.169 -0.069 -0.012 -0.160 0.008 0.239* -0.181 
(0.52) (1.70) (-1.14) (-0.43) (-0.07) (-1.01) (0.07) (1.76) (-1.23) 
LIQ 
0.013 0.008 0.022 0.032 0.040 0.019 0.022 0.028 0.017 
(0.46) (0.22) (0.45) (0.65) (0.84) (0.36) (0.60) (0.70) (0.34) 
VIXrate 
-0.011 -0.015 -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 
(-1.26) (-1.60) (-0.43) (-0.86) (-0.93) (-0.69) (-0.83) (-1.01) (-0.53) 
INF 
-0.298 -0.027 -0.726 -0.801 -0.673 -1.003 -0.312 0.123 -0.668 
(-0.46) (-0.05) (-0.71) (-0.81) (-0.69) (-0.96) (-0.35) (0.15) (-0.62) 
M2 
-0.323 -0.727 0.315 -0.002 -0.143 0.221 -0.274 -0.983* 0.307 
(-0.69) (-1.42) (0.43) (-0.00) (-0.21) (0.32) (-0.52) (-1.75) (0.46) 
GDP 
0.823* 0.714 0.996 1.751** 2.021* 1.325 1.216** 0.899* 1.476* 
(1.73) (1.57) (1.24) (2.11) (2.55) (1.43) (2.00) (1.69) (1.71) 
PUI 
0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.021 -0.022 -0.018 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
(0.00) (0.05) (-0.06) (-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.23) (-0.08) (0.12) (-0.20) 
Constant 
0.443*** 0.476*** 0.392*** 0.382*** 0.393*** 0.365*** 0.428*** 0.473*** 0.391*** 
(54.15) (55.38) (27.61) (29.19) (30.15) (26.17) (44.94) (47.00) (28.87) 




Panel B: Hypothesis Tests  
ܪ଴ Statistic 
Bond & Forward Corr. Stock & Forward Corr. Forward & Forward Corr. 
All DM EM All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 vs. 
QE2 
F(1, 533) 18.19*** 9.42*** 18.06*** 7.67*** 7.16*** 7.76*** 21.29*** 9.21*** 20.22*** 
Prob > F 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 
QE1 vs. 
QE3 
F(1, 533) 1.66 0.01 5.82** 7.44*** 10.77*** 2.21 1.87 0.08 3.48* 
Prob > F 0.198 0.919 0.016 0.007 0.001 0.138 0.173 0.783 0.063 
QE2 vs. 
QE3 
F(1, 533) 8.18*** 8.88** 5.72** 28.39*** 30.56*** 21.44*** 10.92*** 7.75*** 10.3*** 




Appendix 2.A. a The parameter estimates based on the DCC-GARCH models for the bond market indexes 
This table reports summary statistics for parameter estimates based on the chosen DCC-GARCH models for the correlations between the returns of the bond 
market index for each home country with the returns of the other 19 currency forward contracts. Australia and Brazil are the first DM and EM countries, 
respectively. Sign - and Sign + are the number of estimates out of 19 that are significant at the 10% level. 
  DCC Parameter a  DCC Parameter b  LR 
Country Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Max 
Australia -0.028 0.036 0.031 0.143 1 12 -0.441 0.666 0.863 0.975 0 14 -2242.1 -1464.2 
Eurozone               
    Austria -0.014 0.032 0.030 0.097 0 9 0.649 0.856 0.895 0.979 0 18 -2218.2 -1206.3 
    Belgium -0.031 0.029 0.029 0.097 1 9 0.677 0.844 0.864 0.985 0 19 -2240.2 -1265.6 
    Finland -0.005 0.071 0.052 0.175 1 17 -0.153 0.820 0.922 0.982 1 17 -2356.8 -1611.5 
    France -0.011 0.034 0.030 0.100 0 9 0.692 0.869 0.916 0.980 0 19 -2209.1 -1189.7 
    Germany -0.018 0.029 0.025 0.108 0 9 0.697 0.876 0.939 0.985 0 18 -2202.0 -1172.5 
    Ireland -0.040 0.037 0.035 0.107 2 11 0.408 0.835 0.877 0.979 0 18 -2300.1 -1407.5 
    Italy -0.033 0.027 0.020 0.144 1 10 0.421 0.800 0.845 0.984 0 18 -2279.3 -1388.8 
    Netherlands -0.012 0.029 0.030 0.093 0 9 0.650 0.859 0.899 0.986 0 18 -2204.2 -1179.3 
    Portugal -0.014 0.030 0.025 0.100 0 11 0.503 0.866 0.936 0.972 0 16 -2388.1 -1617.5 
    Spain -0.023 0.028 0.029 0.098 0 9 0.494 0.822 0.838 0.983 0 17 -2293.0 -1434.7 
Canada -0.015 0.033 0.028 0.125 0 12 -0.955 0.805 0.945 0.978 1 18 -2113.6 -1386.7 
Denmark -0.028 0.024 0.028 0.102 1 10 0.619 0.858 0.910 0.979 0 19 -2205.1 -1171.3 
Japan 0.029 0.095 0.093 0.183 0 17 0.584 0.833 0.853 0.940 0 18 -2317.6 -1556.4 
New Zealand -0.043 0.046 0.040 0.108 1 15 -0.190 0.786 0.911 0.988 0 16 -2347.1 -1590.7 
Singapore 0.008 0.042 0.032 0.113 0 15 0.131 0.865 0.932 0.984 0 17 -1871.0 -1253.2 
Sweden -0.010 0.038 0.027 0.165 0 14 0.551 0.884 0.931 0.979 0 18 -2289.2 -1525.7 
UK 0.012 0.043 0.035 0.093 0 7 -0.792 0.670 0.828 0.929 1 16 -2163.5 -1396.4 
US 0.009 0.063 0.041 0.136 0 15 0.581 0.832 0.832 0.968 0 19 -1611.4 -903.0 
Brazil 0.012 0.033 0.022 0.078 0 15 0.730 0.926 0.963 0.978 0 19 -2400.0 -1714.4 
Chile 0.011 0.042 0.039 0.100 0 9 -0.977 0.563 0.820 0.979 2 13 -2303.1 -1595.8 
Colombia 0.010 0.044 0.030 0.127 0 12 -0.621 0.790 0.852 0.988 1 18 -2421.0 -1582.2 
Czech Republic -0.031 0.009 0.013 0.057 3 6 0.147 0.760 0.911 0.981 0 13 -2344.1 -1576.0 
Greece -0.008 0.045 0.038 0.146 0 12 0.739 0.895 0.916 0.981 0 18 -2398.1 -1451.4 
Hungary -0.019 0.035 0.019 0.105 1 9 0.245 0.826 0.882 0.991 0 18 -2564.1 -1850.7 
India -0.013 0.043 0.040 0.088 0 18 0.664 0.908 0.939 0.955 0 18 -2151.9 -1440.1 
Mexico -0.015 0.039 0.030 0.096 1 12 -0.027 0.807 0.839 1.000 0 18 -2349.2 .-1655.1 
Poland -0.030 0.032 0.029 0.142 2 11 -0.198 0.740 0.846 0.984 0 15 -2443.1 -1703.2 
South Africa -0.048 0.023 0.018 0.062 1 14 0.158 0.848 0.913 0.980 0 16 -2448.7 -1817.0 
South Korea 0.009 0.034 0.029 0.088 0 11 0.795 0.909 0.927 0.987 0 19 -2156.7 -1399.7 
Thailand -0.023 0.071 0.072 0.146 1 14 0.617 0.804 0.809 0.951 0 19 -2120.0 -1382.2 
aWe chose the DCC model with the largest negative Likelihood Ratio (LR) when the estimates of a plus b in equation (2.3) are less than 1. For each country at least 85% of the 
correlations between the indexes of bonds or stocks and the currency forwards are measured using the DCC-GARCH (1, 1) model and the remainder is measured using the 
GJR/TARCH or EGARCH model in the first step and asymmetric DCC in the second step of the procedure discussed in section 3.
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Appendix 2.B. The parameter estimates based on the DCC-GARCH models for the stock market indexes  
This table reports summary statistics for parameter estimates based on the chosen DCC-GARCH models for the correlations between the returns of the stock 
market index for each home country with the returns of the other 19 currency forward contracts. Australia and Brazil are the first DM and EM countries, 
respectively. Sign - and Sign + are the number of estimates out of 19 that are significant at the 10% level. 
  DCC Parameter a  DCC Parameter b  LR 
Country Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Max 
Australia -0.033 0.029 0.031 0.089 1 11 0.573 0.870 0.899 0.976 0 18 -2649.4 -1938.6 
Eurozone               
    Austria 0.016 0.036 0.029 0.089 0 14 0.547 0.914 0.939 0.969 0 18 -2796.7 -2062.7 
    Belgium -0.033 0.024 0.036 0.059 3 11 -0.206 0.791 0.919 0.964 0 16 -2643.7 -1929.4 
    Finland -0.032 0.019 0.018 0.063 1 9 0.190 0.876 0.956 0.981 0 16 -2802.2 -2103.7 
    France -0.034 0.038 0.038 0.084 1 15 0.100 0.822 0.932 0.968 0 16 -2642.9 -1943.1 
    Germany -0.035 0.034 0.029 0.072 1 13 0.026 0.838 0.932 0.973 0 17 -2680.1 -1968.7 
    Ireland -0.032 0.021 0.028 0.051 3 10 0.363 0.857 0.927 0.980 0 18 -2809.0 -2100.3 
    Italy -0.037 0.031 0.028 0.101 2 15 0.019 0.845 0.940 0.979 0 17 -2705.9 -1995.4 
    Netherlands 0.016 0.040 0.033 0.107 0 18 0.721 0.914 0.942 0.969 0 19 -2655.1 -1946.3 
    Portugal 0.014 0.045 0.038 0.090 0 17 0.829 0.912 0.927 0.967 0 19 -2675.1 -1948.5 
    Spain -0.023 0.028 0.028 0.078 2 10 0.296 0.830 0.942 0.964 0 17 -2750.7 -2042.3 
Canada -0.017 0.027 0.028 0.065 0 10 -0.554 0.737 0.932 0.978 0 15 -2590.2 -1904.0 
Denmark -0.031 0.027 0.028 0.091 2 9 0.117 0.802 0.842 0.976 0 16 -2658.6 -1944.6 
Japan -0.018 0.027 0.028 0.061 1 11 0.063 0.865 0.921 1.001 0 17 -2628.2 -1898.5 
New Zealand -0.017 0.024 0.019 0.072 3 11 0.393 0.884 0.931 0.979 0 18 -2638.4 -1922.1 
Singapore 0.010 0.038 0.035 0.088 0 11 0.181 0.833 0.907 0.972 0 17 -2555.2 -1972.4 
Sweden -0.027 0.026 0.026 0.069 2 11 0.684 0.881 0.906 0.973 0 18 -2729.7 -1789.3 
UK -0.030 0.033 0.033 0.085 1 13 -0.096 0.844 0.945 0.973 0 17 -2540.7 -1846.4 
US -0.033 0.030 0.031 0.064 1 11 0.004 0.851 0.929 0.987 0 18 -2463.7 -1777.2 
Brazil 0.015 0.046 0.044 0.094 0 14 0.235 0.786 0.896 0.981 0 16 -2851.7 -2186.6 
Chile -0.060 0.013 0.017 0.052 2 5 0.386 0.889 0.917 1.009 0 18 -2683.3 -1981.8 
Colombia 0.016 0.047 0.048 0.097 0 16 0.650 0.883 0.905 0.978 0 19 -2788.6 -2099.2 
Czech Republic 0.007 0.028 0.024 0.052 0 14 0.820 0.927 0.927 0.982 0 19 -2764.6 -2052.4 
Greece -0.003 0.027 0.026 0.049 0 12 0.461 0.892 0.938 0.971 0 17 -2926.4 -2228.3 
Hungary -0.018 0.025 0.022 0.082 2 12 -0.609 0.769 0.934 0.977 0 17 -2940.0 -2231.9 
India 0.012 0.031 0.025 0.090 0 9 0.778 0.914 0.944 0.978 0 19 -2790.4 -2103.3 
Mexico -0.041 0.034 0.035 0.067 1 12 0.531 0.884 0.903 0.973 0 19 -2736.9 -1611.2 
Poland -0.038 0.029 0.026 0.104 1 12 0.298 0.881 0.898 0.981 0 17 -2844.2 -2142.2 
South Africa -0.048 0.026 0.026 0.116 2 15 0.086 0.851 0.927 0.982 0 18 -2692.8 -2047.9 
South Korea -0.007 0.045 0.042 0.115 1 15 0.750 0.878 0.893 1.001 0 19 -2783.3 -2079.7 





Appendix 2.C. The parameter estimates based on the DCC-GARCH models for the currency forward contracts 
This table reports summary statistics for parameter estimates based on the chosen DCC-GARCH models for the correlations between the returns of the currency 
forward contracts for each home country with the returns of the other 19 currency forward contracts. Australia and Brazil are the first DM and EM countries, 
respectively. Sign - and Sign + are the number of estimates out of 19 that are significant at the 10% level. 
  DCC Parameter a  DCC Parameter b  LR 
Country Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Mean Median Max Sign - Sign + Min Max 
Australia -0.032 0.026 0.023 0.102 2 10 -0.209 0.783 0.862 0.988 0 15 -2281.6 -1525.3 
Canada 0.005 0.032 0.023 0.112 0 11 0.678 0.906 0.953 0.980 0 19 -2135.8 -1420.3 
Denmark -0.033 0.018 0.014 0.083 3 7 -0.243 0.757 0.903 0.980 0 14 -2196.3 -1401.3 
Euro -0.034 0.018 0.014 0.084 3 7 -0.222 0.760 0.895 0.980 0 14 -2197.6 -1402.4 
Japan 0.034 0.089 0.083 0.186 0 18 0.729 0.847 0.872 0.943 0 19 -2306.8 -1543.9 
New Zealand -0.045 0.045 0.039 0.102 0 15 -0.101 0.764 0.873 0.966 0 15 -2304.4 -1630.6 
Singapore -0.019 0.033 0.022 0.186 1 11 0.514 0.906 0.941 0.992 0 18 -1764.2 -1159.2 
Sweden -0.010 0.038 0.026 0.165 0 14 0.527 0.882 0.929 0.981 0 18 -2302.8 -1539.9 
UK -0.019 0.040 0.023 0.102 1 8 -0.209 0.759 0.845 0.992 0 16 -2165.1 -1403.2 
Brazil 0.011 0.034 0.023 0.089 0 17 0.739 0.924 0.959 0.980 0 19 -2332.9 -1643.6 
Chile 0.011 0.043 0.041 0.100 0 9 -0.101 0.761 0.786 0.981 0 15 -2277.6 -1572.0 
Colombia 0.010 0.044 0.030 0.127 0 12 -0.621 0.790 0.852 0.988 1 18 -2421.0 -1582.2 
Czech Republic -0.028 0.021 0.018 0.091 1 11 0.514 0.899 0.961 0.979 0 18 -2333.8 -1561.7 
Greece -0.034 0.018 0.014 0.084 3 7 -0.222 0.760 0.895 0.980 0 14 -2197.6 -1402.4 
Hungary 0.008 0.034 0.020 0.097 0 8 0.390 0.847 0.897 0.986 0 17 -2397.8 -1665.9 
India 0.009 0.036 0.033 0.079 0 15 0.848 0.938 0.951 0.968 0 19 -1966.6 -1240.9 
Mexico -0.017 0.025 0.018 0.082 2 12 -0.243 0.797 0.923 0.988 0 17 -2172.0 -1483.7 
Poland -0.032 0.032 0.028 0.135 3 8 0.223 0.715 0.785 0.979 0 14 -2379.2 -1624.9 
South Africa -0.034 0.027 0.022 0.071 2 13 0.413 0.871 0.920 0.984 0 16 -2397.8 -1764.2 
South Korea 0.009 0.034 0.026 0.086 0 14 0.825 0.920 0.943 0.982 0 19 -2105.3 -1342.1 





Appendix 3.A. The Timeline and Main Events for the U.S. QEs 
Before QE: Sept. 5, 2003 – Nov. 19, 2008.  
2008 Financial Crisis. On Sept. 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers announced that it had filed for bankruptcy 
(Mamudi, 2008).  On Oct 29, 2008, the Fed reduced the interest rate to 1 percent. 
 
QE1: Nov. 25, 2008 - Mar. 31, 2010.  
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury announced $800 billion of new lending programs on Nov. 25, 2008, 
indicating that they would print as much money as required to stimulate the banking system (Andrews, 
2008). On Dec. 16, 2008, the Fed cut the interest rate to near zero. The Fed completed the purchases of 
$1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, $175 billion in agency debt and $300 billion in Treasury bonds 
(Rodnyansky and Darmouni, 2017) 
 
QE2: Nov. 3, 2010 - June 30, 2011.47 
After QE1, the U.S. economy recovered slowly, so on Nov. 3, 2010, the Federal Reserve, announced a 
second round of large purchases of Treasury bonds to stimulate economic growth (Chan and Sanger, 2010). 
The Fed initiated the purchase of $600 billion of long-term Treasury securities by the end of the second 
quarter of 2011 (Bernanke, 2010b; Fawley and Neely, 2013). 
 
QE3: Sept. 13, 2012 to Oct. 29, 2014. 
The central bank announced its intentions to buy an additional $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities 
monthly until the economy recovered.48 The Fed announced on Oct. 29, 2014 that it ended the bond-buying 
program, but would continue to keep short-term interest rates close to zero.49 
 
 






Appendix 3.B. Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition and Sources 
Portfolio Performance Measures 
 RelHdgEffect 
 
Difference in the variances (Var) for the optimally (fully) hedged portfolio and its 
unhedged counterpart, scaled by the variance of its unhedged counterpart. Data 
source: authors’ calculation.  
 DifHdgPerf Difference in the Sharpe ratios for the optimally (fully) hedged portfolio and its 
unhedged counterpart. Data source: authors’ calculation. 
Quantitative Easing Dummies 
QE and  The time dummy equal to one for periods during which the U.S. Fed implemented 
a QE (including the three QE rounds); zero otherwise. 
PostQE1not The time dummy equal to one for periods after the QE1 period but not during any 
of the three QE rounds; zero otherwise. 
The Fed’s Security Type Holdings (Data source: FRED) 
TREASF/TAF The Treasury securities holdings of the Fed scaled by the Fed’s total asset 
holdings. Suffix ‘F’ indicates holdings by the Fed. Data source: FRED. 
MBSF/TAF The mortgage-backed securities holdings of the Fed scaled by the Fed’s total asset 
holdings. Suffix ‘F’ indicates holdings by the Fed.  
TAF/$GDP The Fed’s total asset (TAF) holdings relative to the level of domestic dollar GDP. 
Suffix ‘F’ indicates holdings by the Fed.  
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ  The Fed holdings of Treasury bonds with maturities of over five (matur = 5) or 
over ten (matur = 10) years. 
ܯܤܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ ܶܣܨΤ  The Fed holdings of mortgage-backed securities with maturities of over five (matur 
= 5) or over ten (matur = 10) years. 
The Control Variables for the U.S. Markets 
ΔTWEXB Percentage change of the trade-weighted broad exchange rate index, which is a 
weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against the 
currencies of a broad group of major U.S. trading partners which include 26 
countries or regions. Data source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (U.S.). 
TERM Term spread. Difference between the yield of a 10-year and a three-month 
Treasury-bill. Data source: Datastream. 
CREDIT Credit spread. Difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and Aaa 
corporate bond yield. Data source: Datastream. 
PUI An index of economic policy uncertainty constructed from: 1) newspaper coverage 
of policy-related economic uncertainty; 2) the number of federal tax code 
provisions; and 3) disagreement among economic forecasts. Scaled by 0.01.  
Data source  available at: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_historical.html 
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Figure 3.1. The securities holdings by the Fed with respect to maturities for over five years 
or over ten years 
 
Note: The numbers of MBS5Y and MBS10Y are very close to each other, so the two lines are 
almost overlapping.  
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Figure 3.2. Exchange rates around and during the QEs 
This figure depicts the exchange rates of U.S. dollars to the currencies in some major developed (Panel A) 
and emerging countries (Panel B) for the period from September 2003 to October 2014 at a weekly 
frequency. The shaded areas indicate the QE periods designated by the Federal Reserve in the U.S.  
 
Panel A: Developed Countries 
 
Panel B: Emerging Countries 
 
U.S. Dollar/Australian Dollar

































































U.S. Dollar/South African rand









Figure 3.3. Sharpe Ratios for fully-hedged and unhedged portfolios for the full time period 
The Sharpe ratios of fully-hedged portfolios are plotted against the Sharpe ratios of unhedged portfolios 
from September 2003 to October 2014. The dashed line at a 45-degree angle through the origin indicates 
where the Sharpe ratios of the hedged and unhedged portfolios are equal. The 31 countries are the developed 
countries of Australia (AU), 11 developed markets from the Eurozone [Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and 
Spain (ES)], Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ), Singapore (SG), Sweden (SE), 
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), and the developing countries of Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), 
Colombia (CO), Czech Republic (CZ), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), India (IN), Mexico (MX), Poland 








Table 3.1. Summary statistics for various country indices  
This table reports the summary statistics (means and standard deviations) for the forward rates, foreign exchange rates 
and out-of-sample total returns for the unhedged, fully hedged, and optimally hedged portfolios of bonds for the 
various country indices. The sample period is September 2003 to October 2014. The weekly data are obtained on 
Friday from Datastream and Bloomberg. The forward contracts relative to the U.S. currency have a maturity of one 
month. All the results are in percentages. All 19 developed and 12 emerging countries are included.   
  Forward Hedging Strategy for Bonds 
  FX changes Payoffs  Not Fully Optimally 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
DM           
Australia 0.07 1.94 0.07 1.90 0.18 1.79 0.08 0.58 0.12 0.48 
Eurozone           
    Austria 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.11 1.41 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.40 
    Belgium 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.12 1.49 0.06 0.53 0.09 0.50 
    Finland 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.15 1.68 0.09 1.04 0.13 1.02 
    France 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.11 1.38 0.05 0.40 0.09 0.36 
    Germany 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.11 1.35 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.33 
    Ireland 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.16 1.88 0.10 1.15 0.14 1.11 
    Italy 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.13 1.58 0.07 0.63 0.10 0.60 
    Netherlands 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.11 1.37 0.05 0.38 0.09 0.34 
    Portugal 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.15 2.17 0.09 1.54 0.13 1.51 
    Spain 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 0.13 1.63 0.07 0.70 0.10 0.66 
Canada 0.04 1.37 0.04 1.37 0.12 1.33 0.05 0.37 0.08 0.32 
Denmark 0.03 1.36 0.03 1.36 0.10 1.37 0.04 0.38 0.08 0.34 
Japan 0.01 1.45 0.01 1.45 0.04 1.48 -0.01 0.18 0.02 0.17 
New Zealand 0.07 2.00 0.07 1.96 0.17 1.92 0.07 0.52 0.10 0.47 
Singapore 0.06 0.71 0.05 0.72 0.11 0.82 0.03 0.32 0.05 0.30 
Sweden 0.03 1.71 0.03 1.72 0.11 1.65 0.05 0.36 0.09 0.31 
U.K. 0.01 1.37 0.01 1.37 0.10 1.33 0.06 0.38 0.09 0.33 
U.S. - - - - 0.07 0.45 - - - - 
EM           
Brazil 0.04 2.04 0.04 2.04 0.30 2.28 0.22 0.58 0.26 0.52 
Chile 0.04 1.67 0.04 1.68 0.09 1.74 0.02 0.46 0.05 0.45 
Colombia 0.06 1.64 0.06 1.64 0.27 1.99 0.18 0.69 0.21 0.60 
Czech Republic 0.06 1.76 0.06 1.77 0.15 1.81 0.06 0.38 0.09 0.36 
Greece 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.37 -0.11 2.91 -0.17 2.35 -0.14 2.24 
Hungary 0.01 2.17 0.01 2.18 0.19 2.88 0.15 1.08 0.19 0.83 
India -0.05 1.00 -0.05 0.99 0.07 1.29 0.09 0.80 0.12 0.73 
Mexico -0.03 1.55 -0.03 1.56 0.15 2.12 0.15 0.91 0.18 0.77 
Poland 0.05 2.10 0.05 2.10 0.18 2.32 0.10 0.49 0.14 0.42 
S.Africa -0.04 2.35 -0.04 2.35 0.09 2.54 0.10 0.47 0.13 0.42 
S.Korea 0.02 1.46 0.02 1.45 0.12 1.54 0.07 0.44 0.10 0.42 




Table 3.2. Tests of the equality of the individual components of hedging effectiveness and performance between 
the QE and Pre-QE periods.  
This table reports initial tests of the mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon rank-sum or Wil. test) equalities 
between the QE and Pre-QE periods reported in the same column for an individual component of hedging 
effectiveness or performance for  international bond portfolios of developed market (DM) and emerging 
market (EM) countries from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The individual components are excess 
returns or  ExRtn in Panel A, variances or Var. in Panel B, and Sharpe ratios in Panel C. a, b, and c indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All the mean and median variances 
reported in panel B are scaled by 100 in order to facilitate comparisons. 
 Optimally Fully Not 
 DM EM DM EM DM EM 
Panel A: Differences in component excess returns during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.0080 0.0171 0.0057 0.0095 0.0056 0.0092 
Mean for Pre-QE period 0.0067 0.0189 0.0091 0.0186 0.0093 0.0188 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods 0.0013 a -0.0018 -0.0035 c -0.0091 a -0.0036 c -0.0096 a 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.0054 0.1056 0.0708 0.0064 0.0923 0.0081 
Median  for  QE period 0.0083 a 0.0164 0.0046 b 0.0125 a 0.0049 b 0.0119 a 
Median for Pre-QE period 0.0068 0.0167 0.0126 0.0254 0.0139 0.0265 
 Wil. test of above medians, p-value 0.0002 0.7978 0.0114 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 
Panel B: Differences in component Variances during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.0182 0.0625 0.6258 2.3985 0.7855 2.7495 
Mean for Pre-QE period 0.0288 0.0405 0.9053 2.6337 1.1312 3.0529 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods -0.0107 a 0.0221 a -0.2795 a -0.2352 -0.3457 a -0.3034 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.4065 0.0000 0.3531 
Median  for  QE period 0.0164 b 0.0299 b 0.5239 a 1.8182 a 0.6649 a 2.0831 a 
Median for Pre-QE period 0.0161  0.0241 0.6694 1.2842 0.8384 1.4895 
 Wil. test of above medians, p-value 0.0411 0.0112 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 
Panel C: Differences in component Sharpe ratios during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.7219 1.0383 0.0563 0.0783 0.0457 0.0690 
Mean for Pre-QE period 0.4344 1.0158 0.1394 0.2260 0.1320 0.2181 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods 0.2875 a 0.0225 -0.0830 a -0.1477 a -0.0863 a -0.1491 a 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.0000 0.7376 0.0007 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Median  for  QE period 0.6338 a 0.8319 0.0658 a 0.0837 a 0.0632 a  0.0767 a 
Median for Pre-QE period 0.4659  1.0866 0.1430  0.2203  0.1373  0.2150  




Table 3.3. Tests of the equality of hedging effectiveness and performance between the QE and Pre-QE periods.  
This table reports initial tests of the mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon rank-sum or Wil. test) equalities 
between the QE and Pre-QE periods reported in the same column for each metric of hedging effectiveness 
or performance for international bond portfolios of developed market (DM) and emerging market (EM) 
countries from the perspective of a U.S. investor. Each reported metric measures the effectiveness or 
performance of the hedged portfolio versus its corresponding unhedged portfolio. The metrics are 
differenced excess returns or DifHdgExRtn in Panel A, relative hedging effectiveness or RelHdgEffect [eq. 
(3.1)] in Panel B, and differenced hedging performance or DifHdgPerf [(eq. (3.2)] in Panel C. a, b, and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Optimally Fully 
 DM EM DM EM 
Panel A: Differences in DifHdgExRtn during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.0024 0.0079 0.0001 0.0003 
Mean for Pre-QE period -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods 0.0049 0.0078 0.0002 0.0005 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.0006 a 0.0000 a 0.0071 a 0.0000 a 
Median  for  QE period 0.00148 0.00584 0.00015 0.00027 
Median for Pre-QE period -0.0080 -0.0144 -0.0010 -0.0012 
 Wil. test of above medians, p-value 0.0006 a 0.0000 a 0.0071 a 0.0000 a 
Panel B: Differences in RelHdgEffect during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.9749 0.9793 0.2003 0.1305 
Mean for Pre-QE period 0.9753 0.9809 0.1973 0.1379 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods -0.0004 -0.0017 0.0030b -0.0073a 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.7160 0.1235 0.0176 0.0000 
Median  for  QE period 0.9777 0.9815 b 0.2020 b 0.1243 a 
Median for Pre-QE period 0.9789 0.9848 0.1990 0.1371 
 Wil. test of above medians, p-value 0.1556 0.0295 0.0209 0.0000 
Panel C: Differences in DifHdgPerf during QE period compared to Pre-QE period 
Mean for  QE period 0.6762 0.9693 0.0106 0.0093 
Mean for Pre-QE period 0.3024 0.7977 0.0074 0.0079 
 Mean for dif. of above two periods 0.3738 a 0.1716 b 0.0033 a 0.0015 b 
 T-test of above mean, p-value 0.0000 0.0116 0.0000 0.0179 
Median  for  QE period 0.5284 a 0.7866 0.0113 a 0.0076 
Median for Pre-QE period 0.2763 0.8256 0.0071 0.0070 
 Wil. test of above medians, p-value 0.0000 0.2388 0.0000 0.1554 
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Table 3.4. Time-series regression results for effects of Fed’s relative-to-$GDP and security-type holdings on 
relative hedging effectiveness 
This table reports summary statistics for the relations between the relative hedging effectiveness of international bond 
portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor and the total asset holdings relative to $GDP (i.e.,TAF/$GDP ) of the 
U.S. Fed based on eq. (3.4) and the security-type holdings based on eq. (3.5). The time dummies (QE and PostQE1not) 
represent the period of QE and the post QE1 period where the latter period excludes the QE period launched by the 
U.S. Fed. Information about each variable is provided in Appendix 3.B. The total number of observations is 558. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six lags. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Eq. (3.4) for hedging effectiveness Eq. (3.5) for hedging effectiveness 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE 0.024** -0.023*** 0.010 0.009 0.043** 0.006 0.037*** 0.007 
 (2.05) (-2.93) (1.22) (1.05) (2.35) (0.61) (3.20) (0.53) 
PostQE1not 0.065*** -0.021 -0.079*** -0.025 0.320*** -0.322*** 0.162 0.331* 
 (4.14) (-0.90) (-4.14) (-0.98) (4.34) (-2.84) (1.37) (1.68) 
TREASF/TAF     -0.033* -0.075*** -0.058*** 0.024 
     (-1.65) (-4.66) (-3.61) (1.44) 
TREASF/TAF *QE     -0.060*** 0.023 -0.073*** -0.033 
     (-3.00) (1.40) (-3.42) (-1.33) 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not     -0.328*** 0.348*** -0.108 -0.319 
     (-4.44) (2.94) (-0.90) (-1.54) 
MBSF/TAF *QE     -0.071* -0.101*** -0.047 0.021 
     (-1.95) (-3.54) (-1.49) (0.61) 
MBSF/TAF *PostQE1not     -0.442*** 0.374** -0.293* -0.464* 
     (-4.24) (2.45) (-1.78) (-1.73) 
TAF/$GDP 0.500** -0.414* -0.802*** 0.109     
 (2.03) (-1.90) (-4.37) (0.49)     
TAF/$GDP*QE -0.517** 0.449** 0.500*** -0.185     
 (-2.23) (2.37) (2.99) (-0.92)     
TAF/$GDP*PostQE1not -0.757*** 0.438* 1.194*** 0.108     
 (-2.99) (1.78) (6.07) (0.38)     
VIX 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (1.35) (0.41) (1.05) (-0.40) (0.10) (-0.86) (0.57) (0.19) 
ΔTWEXB 0.147* -0.006 0.006 -0.210*** 0.157** -0.047 -0.041 -0.194** 
 (1.78) (-0.08) (0.08) (-2.68) (1.99) (-0.64) (-0.61) (-2.51) 
Term 0.226** -0.379*** -0.013 -0.061 -0.012 -0.582*** -0.189 0.018 
 (2.36) (-3.11) (-0.10) (-0.51) (-0.08) (-3.99) (-1.36) (0.16) 
Credit -0.301 0.623* -1.232*** 0.649 -2.171*** -1.428** -1.508** 1.253* 
 (-1.15) (1.75) (-4.04) (1.58) (-2.62) (-2.55) (-2.18) (1.76) 
PUI -0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 
 (-0.59) (0.17) (1.41) (-0.66) (-1.16) (-0.20) (1.61) (-0.43) 
Constant 0.955*** 0.992*** 0.250*** 0.125*** 1.024*** 1.051*** 0.258*** 0.106*** 
 (68.38) (77.52) (25.07) (9.07) (47.30) (61.42) (13.79) (5.30) 
adj. R2 0.1153 0.1235 0.4585 0.3123 0.198 0.202 0.364 0.336 
Computed from above estimates: 
Constant + QE 0.980*** 0.969*** 0.261*** 0.134*** 1.067*** 1.057*** 0.295*** 0.113*** 
 (113.11) (75.65) (24.38) (11.00) (30.02) (42.43) (10.44) (3.76) 
Constant + PostQE1not 1.020*** 0.970*** 0.172*** 0.100*** 1.344*** 0.729*** 0.420*** 0.437** 
 (92.85) (42.51) (8.74) (4.20) (16.86) (6.26) (3.42) (2.18) 
TAF/$GDP +TAF/$GDP *QE 
 
-0.017 0.035 -0.303*** -0.076     
(-0.40) (0.68) (-6.46) (-1.63)     
TAF/$GDP + 
TAF/$GDP*PostQE1not 
-0.257*** 0.024 0.391*** 0.217     
(-3.24) (0.16) (3.06) (1.21)     
TREASF/TAF +TREASF/TAF 
*QE 
    -0.093*** -0.052** -0.131*** -0.009 
    (-2.92) (-2.00) (-4.31) (-0.27) 
TREASF/TAF + 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not 
    -0.475*** 0.300* -0.351** -0.440 




Table 3.5. Time-series regression results for effects of Fed’s longer-maturity security-type holdings on relative 
hedging effectiveness 
This table reports the effects of the security type holdings of the Fed with longer maturities on the relative hedging 
effectiveness of international bond portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The time dummies (QE and 
PostQE1not) represent the period of QE and the post QE1 period where the latter period does not include the QE 
period launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Information about each variable is provided in Appendix 3.B. The total 
number of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Eq. (3.6) (matur = 5 years) Panel B: Eq. (3.6) (matur = 10 years) 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE -0.023* -0.009 0.004 0.023** -0.018 -0.014 0.014 0.024*** 
 (-1.89) (-0.76) (0.34) (2.37) (-1.57) (-1.33) (1.23) (3.21) 
PostQE1not -0.047 0.011 -0.016 -0.151*** -0.052* 0.009 -0.008 -0.052** 
 (-1.16) (0.37) (-0.51) (-4.82) (-1.95) (0.38) (-0.32) (-2.55) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF -0.003*** -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.005** -0.001 -0.003 0.002*  (-2.94) (-0.54) (-1.20) (1.61) (-2.33) (-0.36) (-1.33) (1.76) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF * QE 0.002** 0.001 0.000 -0.001** 0.004** 0.002 -0.000 -0.003***  (2.52) (0.88) (0.37) (-2.16) (2.01) (1.24) (-0.19) (-2.61) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ /TAF * 
PostQE1not 
0.003** 0.000 0.002 0.002*** 0.005* -0.000 0.005* 0.005*** 
(2.26) (0.21) (1.61) (3.11) (1.76) (-0.08) (1.84) (2.93) 
MBSmatur/TAF * QE -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.14) (-0.59) (0.39) (-0.82) (-2.24) (-0.49) (-0.34) (-0.53) 
MBSmatur/TAF * 
PostQE1not 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000* 
(0.43) (-0.60) (-0.28) (4.82) (1.40) (-0.58) (-1.71) (1.89) 
VIXrate 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.33) (0.55) (1.63) (-0.27) (0.02) (0.53) (1.37) (-0.13) 
ΔTWEXB 0.116* 0.010 0.004 -0.193*** 0.102 -0.019 0.051 -0.189*** 
 (1.75) (0.14) (0.07) (-2.86) (1.42) (-0.27) (0.82) (-2.82) 
Term 0.041 -0.282** -0.047 -0.006 0.155 -0.257* -0.022 -0.007 
 (0.43) (-1.98) (-0.34) (-0.06) (1.52) (-1.86) (-0.17) (-0.06) 
Credit -1.087*** 0.588 0.016 0.410 -1.300*** 0.708 -0.430 0.565 
 (-3.64) (1.61) (0.04) (1.18) (-2.96) (1.63) (-0.89) (1.40) 
PUI 0.000 0.003 0.008* -0.006* -0.001 0.003 0.008** -0.006* 
 (0.03) (0.68) (1.93) (-1.84) (-0.33) (0.69) (2.01) (-1.72) 
Constant 1.038*** 0.979*** 0.218*** 0.119*** 1.037*** 0.977*** 0.229*** 0.113*** 
 (56.39) (62.21) (11.19) (9.72) (45.26) (52.89) (9.51) (7.66) 
adj. R2 0.267 0.102 0.387 0.447 0.157 0.141 0.484 0.445 
Computed from above estimates: 
Constant + QE 1.015*** 0.971*** 0.222*** 0.142*** 1.018*** 0.963*** 0.243*** 0.137*** 
 (92.44) (78.49) (16.34) (11.75) (65.22) (63.37) (14.50) (9.84) 
Constant + PostQE1not 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.202*** -0.032 0.985*** 0.985*** 0.221*** 0.062*** 
 (27.46) (39.14) (8.07) (-1.13) (52.31) (63.88) (15.83) (3.78) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF+
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF*QE 
-0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** 0.001** -0.003*** -0.001* 




-0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.003*** -0.000 -0.001 0.002* 0.007*** 
(-0.41) (-0.63) (1.43) (7.06) (-0.22) (-0.89) (1.95) (6.97) 
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Table 3.6. Time-series regression results for the effects of Fed’s security type holdings on the individual 
variances included in the relative hedging effectiveness measure 
This table reports the effects of the security type holdings of the U.S. Fed Reserve on the individual variances included 
in measuring relative hedging effectiveness of international bond portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. 
The dependent variables are the individual variances (Var) for the optimally hedged, fully hedged, and not hedged 
portfolios. The time dummies (QE and PostQE1not) represent the period of QE and the post QE1 period where the 
latter period excludes the QE period launched by the U.S. Fed. Information about each variable is provided in 
Appendix 3.B. Note that MBST/TA is not included since there are no pre-QE values for this variable. The elasticity 
at the mean is reported for TREASF and MBSF for the QE period. The total number of observations is 558. Robust t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Not hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE -0.001*** -0.001 -0.027*** -0.105*** -0.034*** -0.122*** 
 (-3.25) (-1.29) (-4.07) (-3.37) (-4.03) (-3.39) 
PostQE1not -0.007*** -0.002 -0.161*** -0.843** -0.203*** -0.954** 
 (-3.60) (-0.24) (-3.16) (-2.43) (-3.14) (-2.43) 
TREASF/TAF -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.062*** -0.386*** -0.079*** -0.446*** 
 (-6.44) (-4.11) (-8.73) (-10.26) (-8.80) (-10.29) 
TREASF/TAF * QE 0.002*** 0.000 0.038*** 0.145*** 0.048*** 0.168*** 
 (4.62) (0.02) (4.93) (3.52) (4.87) (3.58) 
TREASF/TAF * PostQE1not 0.007*** 0.003 0.167*** 0.947*** 0.210*** 1.073*** 
 (3.69) (0.30) (3.17) (2.61) (3.16) (2.62) 
MBSF/TAF * QE -0.001 -0.001 -0.049*** -0.273*** -0.063*** -0.316*** 
 (-1.58) (-0.56) (-3.76) (-4.34) (-3.86) (-4.38) 
MBSF/TAF * PostQE1not 0.007*** -0.000 0.158** 0.736 0.197** 0.822 
 (2.71) (-0.03) (2.26) (1.57) (2.23) (1.55) 
VIX -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.25) (0.86) (-0.21) (0.06) (-0.22) (0.04) 
ΔTWEXB -0.000 0.003 0.016 0.064 0.020 0.069 
 (-0.35) (1.01) (0.61) (0.49) (0.60) (0.45) 
Term 0.000 0.011*** 0.041 -0.383*** 0.048 -0.439*** 
 (0.22) (2.73) (1.15) (-2.77) (1.08) (-2.76) 
Credit -0.010 -0.053 -0.700*** -6.019*** -0.916*** -6.901*** 
 (-0.76) (-1.62) (-3.16) (-5.08) (-3.31) (-5.08) 
PUI 0.000** 0.000 0.003* 0.019** 0.004* 0.022** 
 (2.14) (1.19) (1.78) (2.47) (1.82) (2.48) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.068*** 0.404*** 0.087*** 0.465*** 
 (6.14) (3.89) (9.10) (9.90) (9.17) (9.95) 
adj. R2 0.665 0.333 0.774 0.734 0.776 0.740 
Computed from above estimates: 
Constant + QE 0.001 0.003** 0.041*** 0.298*** 0.053*** 0.343*** 
 -1.35 (2.19) (4.05) (5.66) (4.20) (5.68) 
Constant + PostQE1not -0.005** 0.002 -0.093* -0.439 -0.116* -0.488 
 (-2.54) (0.19) (-1.82) (-1.28) (-1.79) (-1.26) 
TREASF/TAF + TREASF/TAF * QE -0.000 -0.003* -0.023*** -0.242*** -0.031*** -0.278*** (-0.65) (-1.93) (-2.61) (-4.75) (-2.79) (-4.80) 
TREASF/TAF + TREASF/TAF * PostQE1not 0.005*** -0.000 0.105** 0.561 0.131** 0.628 (2.73) (-0.04) (2.00) (1.56) (1.98) (1.55) 
Elasticities at the mean: 
MBSF/TAF *QE -0.013 -0.009 -0.110 -0.349 -0.126 -0.376 





Table 3.7. Time-series regression results for effects of Fed’s relative-to-$GDP and security-type holdings on 
differenced hedging performance 
This table reports the effects of the relative-to-$GDP and security-type holdings of the U.S. Federal Reserve on the 
differenced hedging performance of international bond portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The time 
dummies (QE and PostQE1not) represent the period of the QE and the post QE1 period where the latter period 
excludes the QE period launched by the U.S. Fed. Information about each variable is provided in Appendix 3.B. The 
total number of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Eq (3.4) for differenced hedging performance Eq (3.5) for differenced hedging performance 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE -1.526** -2.586*** -0.005 -0.020** -0.307 -1.387*** -0.002 -0.004 
 (-2.44) (-3.77) (-0.56) (-2.43) (-0.94) (-3.09) (-0.55) (-0.69) 
PostQE1not -4.905*** -6.954*** -0.078*** -0.052** 12.759*** 17.093 0.275*** 0.295** 
 (-4.51) (-4.46) (-3.93) (-2.45) (3.01) (1.54) (4.76) (2.43) 
TREASF/TAF     -2.855*** -3.299*** -0.041*** -0.006 
     (-4.24) (-3.53) (-4.50) (-0.56) 
TREASF/TAF *QE     1.965*** 4.469*** -0.001 0.021** 
     (2.74) (4.92) (-0.08) (2.05) 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not     -10.920** -14.632 -0.252*** -0.277** 
     (-2.55) (-1.28) (-4.22) (-2.20) 
MBSF/TA *QE     -3.598*** -4.652*** -0.028* -0.022 
     (-3.35) (-2.75) (-1.78) (-1.17) 
MBSF/TAF *PostQE1not     -22.879*** -31.220** -0.455*** -0.444*** 
     (-3.84) (-2.04) (-5.69) (-2.67) 
TAF/$GDP 1.075 4.704 0.029 0.008     
 (0.39) (0.97) (0.63) (0.16)     
TAF/$GDP*QE 8.479* 11.466* 0.001 0.108     
 (1.84) (1.86) (0.02) (1.64)     
TAF/$GDP*PostQE1not 26.825*** 34.643*** 0.420*** 0.295**     
 (3.87) (3.20) (3.36) (2.07)     
VIX 0.004 -0.040 0.002 -0.001 -0.130 -0.183 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.05) (-0.25) (1.31) (-0.91) (-1.53) (-1.18) (0.23) (-1.10) 
ΔTWEXB -2.292 -2.819 -0.075* -0.028 -2.754 -3.687 -0.077* -0.006 
 (-1.03) (-0.56) (-1.77) (-0.63) (-1.21) (-0.78) (-1.89) (-0.15) 
Term 13.339*** 1.015 0.304*** 0.0 29 5.423 -3.450 0.138* 0.061 
 (3.12) (0.17) (3.72) (0.36) (1.26) (-0.55) (1.71) (0.73) 
Credit -18.277*** 17.145 -0.460*** 0.092 -105.661*** -81.472** -1.453*** -0.352 
 (-2.88) (1.34) (-3.59) (0.74) (-4.20) (-2.19) (-5.17) (-0.88) 
PUI 0.078 0.032 0.005** 0.000 0.011 -0.058 0.004** 0.001 
 (0.53) (0.13) (2.40) (0.18) (0.08) (-0.28) (2.03) (0.30) 
Constant 0.565** 0.344 0.013*** 0.007* 3.791*** 4.320*** 0.058*** 0.017 
 (2.52) (1.08) (3.35) (1.79) (4.94) (3.90) (6.00) (1.44) 
adj. R2 0.443 0.349 0.281 0.179 0.417 0.308 0.374 0.159 
Computed from above estimates:         
Constant + QE -0.961* -2.241*** 0.009 -0.013** 3.484*** 2.933** 0.056*** 0.013 
 (-1.86) (-4.35) (1.25) (-2.17) (3.58) (2.20) (5.01) (0.84) 
Constant + PostQE1not -4.340*** -6.610*** -0.065*** -0.045** 16.550*** 21.414* 0.333*** 0.311** 
 (-4.29) (-4.54) (-3.46) (-2.29) (3.77) (1.91) (5.58) (2.55) 
TREASF/TAF + 
TREASF/TAF *QE 
    -0.890 1.170 -0.042*** 0.015 
    (-0.94) (1.02) (-3.70) (1.09) 
TREASF/TAF + 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not 
    -13.775*** -17.931 -0.293*** -0.283** 
    (-3.16) (-1.56) (-4.83) (-2.24) 
TAF/$GDP + TAF/$GDP 
*QE 
9.554*** 16.171*** 0.030 0.116***     
(3.53) (7.10) (1.01) (4.06)     
TAF/$GDP + 
TAF/$GDP*PostQE1not 
27.900*** 39.348*** 0.449*** 0.303**     
(4.81) (4.40) (4.17) (2.42)     
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Table 3.8. Time-series regression results for effects of Fed’s longer-maturity security-type holdingV on 
differenced hedging performance 
This table reports the effects of security type holdings of the Fed with longer maturities on the differenced hedging 
performance of international bond portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The time dummies (QE and 
PostQE1not) represent the QE period and the post QE1 period where the latter period does not include the QE period 
launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Information about each variable is provided in Appendix 3.B. The total number 
of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Eq. (3.6) (matur = 5 years) Panel B: Eq. (3.6) (matur = 10 years) 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE 0.132 -1.436*** 0.015 -0.010** -0.588 -1.894*** -0.001 -0.013** 
 (0.24) (-2.66) (1.15) (-2.07) (-1.62) (-3.39) (-0.12) (-2.40) 
PostQE1not 0.879 -6.381*** 0.062*** -0.101*** 0.897 -2.469* 0.034** -0.046*** 
 (0.90) (-3.24) (3.12) (-5.22) (1.20) (-1.82) (2.45) (-3.56) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF 0.009 -0.046 0.001* -0.001* -0.010 -0.074 0.000 -0.001  (0.27) (-1.04) (1.88) (-1.95) (-0.17) (-0.81) (0.38) (-1.37) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF *QE 0.000 0.079* -0.001** 0.001** 0.071 0.209** -0.001 0.002**  (0.01) (1.87) (-2.09) (2.43) (1.19) (2.47) (-0.73) (2.54) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥ /TAF * 
PostQE1not 
0.002 0.171*** -0.001** 0.003*** 0.037 0.342*** -0.001 0.005*** 
(0.06) (3.17) (-2.42) (5.49) (0.55) (2.96) (-1.06) (4.96) 
MBSFmatur/TAF *QE -0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.000** 
 (-0.20) (-0.75) (1.25) (-1.86) (-0.05) (-0.74) (1.53) (-2.06) 
MBSFmatur/TAF * 
PostQE1not 
-0.034** 0.044 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.041*** -0.031** -0.001*** 0.000 
(-2.38) (1.54) (-3.34) (3.57) (-4.34) (-2.13) (-3.88) (0.10) 
VIXrate 0.026 -0.002 0.003* -0.001 0.017 -0.021 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.29) (-0.02) (1.69) (-0.92) (0.19) (-0.15) (1.60) (-1.14) 
ΔTWEXB 0.019 -1.103 -0.025 -0.012 -2.079 -3.772 -0.044 -0.035 
 (0.01) (-0.24) (-0.63) (-0.30) (-0.91) (-0.86) (-1.11) (-0.91) 
Term 15.839*** 12.403* 0.258*** 0.121* 17.530*** 14.345** 0.265*** 0.154** 
 (3.75) (1.75) (3.19) (1.68) (4.08) (2.16) (3.33) (2.14) 
Credit -38.886** -15.389 -0.420 -0.389** -29.470** -7.885 -0.334 -0.351* 
 (-2.48) (-0.78) (-1.56) (-2.01) (-2.10) (-0.36) (-1.44) (-1.71) 
PUI 0.071 0.061 0.004* 0.001 0.101 0.059 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.44) (0.24) (1.74) (0.36) (0.64) (0.24) (2.31) (0.27) 
Constant 0.713 1.885** -0.003 0.026*** 0.886 1.750* 0.010 0.024*** 
 (1.22) (2.22) (-0.33) (3.53) (1.32) (1.71) (0.92) (2.60) 
adj. R2 0.322 0.294 0.333 0.266 0.372 0.375 0.292 0.319 
Computed from above estimates: 
Constant + QE 0.845* 0.449 0.013 0.015** 0.298 -0.144 0.009 0.011* 
 (1.67) (0.70) (1.37) (2.57) (0.64) (-0.20) (1.14) (1.68) 
Constant + PostQE1not 1.592** -4.497** 0.059*** -0.076*** 1.783*** -0.719 0.044*** -0.022** 
 (2.01) (-2.56) (3.37) (-4.22) (3.93) (-0.74) (4.39) (-2.23) 
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF+
ܴܶܧܣܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥/TAF*QE 
0.009 0.033*** -0.000* 0.000 0.061** 0.135*** -0.000 0.001*** 




0.011 0.125*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.027 0.268*** -0.001 0.004*** 





Table 3.9. Time-series regression results for the effects of security type holdingV of the Fed on the individual 
Sharpe ratios included in the measure of differenced hedging performance 
This table reports the effects using regression (3.4) of the security type holdings of the Fed on the individual Sharpe 
ratios included in computing the differenced hedging performance of international bond portfolios from the 
perspective of a U.S. investor. These are the Sharpe ratios for the optimally hedged, fully hedged, and unhedged 
portfolios. The time dummies (QE and PostQE1not) represent the QE period and the post QE1 period where the latter 
period excludes the QE period launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Information about each variable is provided in 
Appendix 3.B. The total number of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses based on 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Not Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE 0.366 -0.728 0.671*** 0.656*** 0.673*** 0.659*** 
 (1.10) (-1.30) (2.90) (2.75) (2.91) (2.81) 
PostQE1not 14.312*** 18.871 1.827 2.072 1.552 1.777 
 (2.80) (1.41) (0.95) (0.70) (0.83) (0.62) 
TREASF/TAF -1.017* -0.989 1.797*** 2.304*** 1.838*** 2.309*** 
 (-1.73) (-0.97) (5.50) (6.40) (5.59) (6.48) 
TREASF/TAF *QE 0.234 
2.890**
* -1.731*** -1.558*** -1.730*** -1.579*** 
 (0.37) (2.84) (-4.94) (-5.00) (-4.93) (-5.13) 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not -13.322** -17.304 -2.653 -2.949 -2.402 -2.672 
 (-2.57) (-1.26) (-1.36) (-0.97) (-1.26) (-0.91) 
MBSF/TAF *QE -1.794* -2.833 1.776*** 1.798*** 1.804*** 1.819*** 
 (-1.91) (-1.58) (3.31) (3.63) (3.35) (3.70) 
MBSF/TAF *PostQE1not 
-
22.547*** -31.047* -0.123 -0.271 0.332 0.173 
 (-3.17) (-1.68) (-0.05) (-0.07) (0.13) (0.04) 
VIX -0.004 -0.081 0.127*** 0.101** 0.126*** 0.102** 
 (-0.05) (-0.49) (2.60) (2.05) (2.61) (2.10) 
ΔTWEXB -0.766 -1.055 1.911 2.626* 1.988 2.632* 
 (-0.36) (-0.21) (1.26) (1.80) (1.31) (1.83) 
Term 7.970* 1.017 2.685 4.529 2.547 4.468 












 (-2.75) (-0.72) (4.48) (5.85) (4.62) (5.98) 
PUI 0.048 -0.101 0.042 -0.043 0.038 -0.043 
 (0.40) (-0.45) (0.64) (-0.73) (0.58) (-0.75) 
Constant 1.958*** 2.134* -1.775*** -2.170*** -1.832*** -2.187*** 
 (3.08) (1.82) (-5.25) (-6.33) (-5.39) (-6.44) 
adj. R2 0.281 0.192 0.352 0.419 0.363 0.429 
Computed from above estimates:        
Constant + QE 2.324*** 1.405 -1.104** -1.514*** -1.159*** -1.527*** 
 (2.71) (0.98) (-2.49) (-3.55) (-2.61) (-3.63) 
Constant + PostQE1not 16.270*** 21.004 0.053 -0.098 -0.280 -0.409 
 (3.11) (1.56) (0.03) (-0.03) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
TREASF/TAF +TREASF/TAF *QE -0.782 1.900 0.066 0.746* 0.108 0.730* 
 (-0.94) (1.46) (0.14) (1.70) (0.23) (1.69) 
TREASF/TAF + TREASF/TAF 
*PostQE1not 
-
14.339*** -18.294 -0.857 -0.646 -0.564 -0.363 




Table 3.10. Time-series regression results for the effects of security type holdingV of the Fed on the excess return 
of the individual Sharpe ratios 
This table reports the effects of the security type holdings of the Fed on the excess returns of international bond 
portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The excess returns are for the optimally hedged, fully hedged, and 
not hedged portfolios. The time dummies (QE and PostQE1not) represent the QE period and the post QE1 period 
where the latter period excludes the QE period launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Information about each variable 
is provided in Appendix 3.B. The total number of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Optimally Hedged Fully Hedged Not hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE -0.006* -0.053*** 0.065*** 0.120** 0.075*** 0.133** 
 (-1.65) (-5.33) (2.68) (2.41) (2.73) (2.46) 
PostQE1not 0.076 0.422* 0.181 0.775* 0.190 0.777* 
 (1.42) (1.94) (1.34) (1.81) (1.27) (1.73) 
TREASF/TAF -0.039*** -0.072*** 0.181*** 0.385*** 0.211*** 0.423*** 
 (-4.93) (-3.20) (5.92) (6.53) (6.07) (6.65) 
TREASF/TAF *QE 0.013** 0.081*** -0.139*** -0.245*** -0.157*** -0.269*** 
 (2.11) (5.55) (-4.64) (-4.50) (-4.65) (-4.55) 
TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not -0.059 -0.389* -0.263* -0.940** -0.286* -0.957** 
 (-1.10) (-1.73) (-1.91) (-2.14) (-1.87) (-2.07) 
MBSF/TAF *QE -0.040*** -0.050* 0.142*** 0.280*** 0.163*** 0.307*** 
 (-3.87) (-1.76) (3.13) (3.16) (3.19) (3.21) 
MBSF/TAF *PostQE1not -0.170** -0.743** -0.008 -0.605 0.019 -0.559 
 (-2.28) (-2.48) (-0.05) (-1.04) (0.09) (-0.92) 
VIX -0.000 -0.000 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 
 (-0.16) (-0.14) (2.87) (2.61) (2.88) (2.65) 
ΔTWEXB -0.024 0.007 0.218* 0.583*** 0.252* 0.625*** 
 (-0.86) (0.08) (1.78) (2.90) (1.84) (2.88) 
Term 0.071 0.244* 0.484** 1.032*** 0.531** 1.106*** 
 (1.44) (1.80) (2.40) (2.85) (2.36) (2.87) 
Credit -0.967*** -0.700 4.157*** 8.716*** 4.834*** 9.528*** 
 (-3.95) (-1.14) (4.99) (5.17) (5.13) (5.27) 
PUI 0.002* 0.002 0.001 -0.015 0.001 -0.016 
 (1.77) (0.67) (0.23) (-1.54) (0.12) (-1.59) 
Constant 0.050*** 0.089*** -0.178*** -0.377*** -0.209*** -0.415*** 
 (5.93) (3.78) (-5.82) (-6.31) (-6.01) (-6.45) 
adj. R2 0.401 0.473 0.463 0.554 0.478 0.563 
Computed from above estimates:        
Constant + QE 0.044*** 0.036 -0.113*** -0.257*** -0.133*** -0.283*** 
 (4.45) (1.46) (-2.98) (-3.46) (-3.11) (-3.53) 
Constant + PostQE1not 0.125** 0.510** 0.003 0.399 -0.018 0.362 
 (2.28) (2.33) -0.02 -0.94 (-0.12) (0.82) 
TREASF/TAF +TREASF/TAF *QE -0.027*** 0.009 0.043 0.140** 0.054 0.154** 
 (-2.84) (0.39) -1.18 -2.23 (1.31) (2.29) 
TREASF/TAF + TREASF/TAF *PostQE1not -0.098* -0.462** -0.082 -0.555 -0.075 -0.534 





Table 3.11. Time-series regression results for the effects of security types holdings by the Fed on 
relative hedging effectiveness (differential hedging performance) with non-U.S. QE 
implementers excluded 
This table reports the effects of the security type holdings by the Fed on the relative hedging effectiveness or 
differential hedging performance of international bond portfolios from the perspective of a U.S. investor. The 
regressions using forwards contracts and portfolio formation and evaluation rolling windows each consisting 
of 24 weeks are for a sample that excludes the non-U.S. QE implementers of Japan, U.K. and 11 euro zone 
members. The time dummies (QE and PostQE1not) represent the period of QE and the post QE1 period 
where the latter period excludes the QE period launched by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Information about each 
variable is provided in Appendix 3.B. The total number of observations is 558. Robust t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with six lags. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
    Hedging Effectiveness [eq. (3.4)]   Hedging Performance [eq. (3.5)] 
 Optimal Hedged Fully Hedged Optimal Hedged Fully Hedged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM 
QE 0.045 0.018*** 0.081*** 0.021** -0.267 -0.603 -0.002 -0.003 
 (1.39) (2.82) (3.26) (1.97) (-1.29) (-1.50) (-0.30) (-0.55) 
PostQE1not -0.284 -0.283** -0.101 0.098 6.554** 2.067 0.418*** 0.249** 
 (-1.37) (-2.53) (-0.45) (0.78) (2.21) (0.47) (3.41) (2.06) 
TREASF/TA -0.109** -0.095*** -0.085*** -0.041** -3.404*** -3.404*** -0.064*** -0.006 
 (-2.46) (-4.65) (-2.75) (-2.49) (-6.45) (-4.44) (-3.85) (-0.54) 
TREASF/TA *QE -0.054 -0.055*** -0.169*** -0.075*** 1.364*** 0.411 -0.008 0.012 
 (-1.25) (-4.31) (-3.56) (-3.90) (2.75) (0.40) (-0.46) (1.01) 
TREASF/TA *PostQE1not 0.278 0.300*** 0.212 -0.044 -5.417* 1.042 -0.387*** -0.222* 
 (1.29) (2.61) (0.93) (-0.34) (-1.75) (0.23) (-3.08) (-1.79) 
MBSF/TA *QE -0.169** -0.012 -0.039 0.017 -3.621*** -0.203 -0.031 -0.003 
 (-2.09) (-0.54) (-0.63) (0.60) (-4.33) (-0.14) (-1.03) (-0.13) 
MBSF/TA *PostQE1not 0.362 0.356** 0.036 -0.198 -13.541*** -9.210 -0.685*** -0.384** 
 (1.26) (2.30) (0.12) (-1.13) (-3.30) (-1.48) (-4.06) (-2.30) 
VIX 0.003 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.097 -0.089 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.47) (-0.05) (1.11) (-0.20) (-1.25) (-0.61) (0.40) (-0.93) 
ΔTWEXB 0.487*** 0.012 -0.147 -0.186*** -1.430 -1.732 -0.121 -0.013 
 (2.87) (0.18) (-1.11) (-2.69) (-0.71) (-0.47) (-1.48) (-0.26) 
Term -0.351 -0.832*** -0.408 -0.165 1.055 -3.712 0.185 0.060 
 (-0.90) (-3.13) (-1.64) (-1.20) (0.32) (-0.55) (1.26) (0.57) 
Credit -4.005** -1.839*** -1.740 -0.260 -106.683*** -87.714*** -2.315*** -0.283 
 (-2.35) (-4.41) (-1.24) (-0.44) (-6.17) (-3.29) (-4.47) (-0.64) 
PUI 0.002 0.002 0.015** 0.001 0.125 -0.030 0.009** 0.001 
 (0.27) (0.48) (1.98) (0.37) (1.23) (-0.17) (2.03) (0.25) 
Constant 1.076*** 1.066*** 0.365*** 0.193*** 4.078*** 4.330*** 0.091*** 0.018 
 (22.98) (64.16) (9.68) (10.68) (6.98) (5.11) (5.26) (1.34) 
adj. R2 0.129 0.3829 0.434 0.467 0.444 0.363 0.316 0.168 
Computed from above estimates: 
Constant + QE 1.121*** 1.084*** 0.446*** 0.214*** 3.811*** 3.726*** 0.089*** 0.014 
 (15.74) (52.31) (7.62) (8.82) (5.89) (3.42) (4.24) (0.85) 
Constant + PostQE1not 0.792*** 0.783*** 0.264 0.291** 10.631*** 6.397 0.509*** 0.267** 
 (3.68) (6.95) (1.13) (2.25) (3.44) (1.39) (4.05) (2.18) 
TREASF/TA +TREASF/TA *QE -0.163** -0.150*** -0.255*** -0.116*** -2.040*** -2.992** -0.072*** 0.005 
 (-2.45) (-6.11) (-3.83) (-4.31) (-3.50) (-2.36) (-3.26) (0.34) 
TREASF/TA + TREASF/TA 
*PostQE1not 
0.169 0.205* 0.127 -0.085 -8.821*** -2.362 -0.451*** -0.229* 







Appendix 4.A. Country categories  
The countries or regions categories are based on the IMF or World Bank. 50  
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Appendix 4.B. Variable descriptions 
This appendix provides the definitions and the data sources for the time dummy variables, various macro-
variables, and control variables. The differential value for a macro-variable is equal to it value for the US 
minus its value for a non-U.S. country or weighted-average for a group of countries.  
 
Time Dummies 
QE1, QE2, and QE3 – Correspond to the three rounds of U.S. QEs to control for the different effects of the 
three QEs. Each dummy variable takes the value of one for the time period during which the Fed undertook 
QE1 (or QE2 or QE3) and zero otherwise The QE1, QE2, and QE3 are from Nov. 25, 2008 - Mar. 31, 2010, 
Nov. 3, 2010 - June 30, 2011, and Sept. 13, 2012 to Oct. 29, 2014, respectively.  
࡮ࢋࢇ࢘ࡺ࢕࢔ࡽࡱ – Equal to 1 for each bear market week during the non-QE period and 0 otherwise. The time 
periods for bear markets is based on Gold-Eagle. http://www.gold-eagle.com/article/history-us-bear-bull-
markets-1929. The U.S. bear markets are Oct. 9, 2007 to Nov 20, 2008 and Jan. 6, 2009 to Mar. 9, 2009 in our 
sample period. Alternative bear market period based on NBC News is from Oct. 2007 to Mar. 2009. 
࡮ࢋࢇ࢘ࡽࡱ૚ – Equal to 1 for each bear market week during QE1 and 0 otherwise. 
࡯࢘࢏࢙࢏࢙ࡳ࢒࢕࢈ࢇ࢒ࡺ࢕࢔ࡽࡱ – Equal to 1 for a global financial crisis week during the non-QE period and 0 otherwise 
based on Lehkonen (2015). Since the starting date of the global financial crisis may differ, we have two global 
financial crisis periods of 8/2007-6/2009 and 9/2008-6/2009. 
࡯࢘࢏࢙࢏࢙ࡳ࢒࢕࢈ࢇ࢒ࡽࡱ૚ – Equal to 1 for a global financial crisis week during QE1 and 0 otherwise 
ࡾࢋࢉࢋ࢙࢙࢏࢕࢔ࢁࡿࡺ࢕࢔ࡽࡱ – Equal to 1 for a U.S. recession week during the non-QE period and 0 otherwise. The 
U.S. recession period is based on NBER of 12/2007-6/2009. 
ࡾࢋࢉࢋ࢙࢙࢏࢕࢔ࢁࡿࡽࡱ૚– Equal to 1 for a U.S. recession week during QE1 and 0 otherwise.  
Macro-variables 
Credit or default spread  – Difference between the average bond yield on Moody’s Baa and the average bond 
 yield on Moody’s Aaa. Data source: Datastream. 
Cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities – Cross-border bank-to-bank debt liabilities as percentage of GDP of the 
recipient economy. Data source: BIS locational banking statistics. Frequency: Quarter 
Cross-border banking flows – The log difference of cross-border loans of BIS-reporting banks on banking sector 
counterparties, as measured by the difference between total borrowers and non-bank borrowers from the BIS 
Locational Banking Statistics. Data source: BIS Locational banking statistics. Frequency: Quarter 
Cumulative net purchase of securities – Cumulative net purchase of securities through permanent open market 
operations or the size of U.S. Treasury securities, agency securities, and mortgage-backed securities holdings on 
the Fed's balance sheet. Data source: FRED 
Differential inflation rate – Absolute difference in inflation rates between local and U.S. changes in consumer 
prices. Data source: IFS. Frequency: quarterly. 
Differential growth potential – Absolute difference in local and U.S. real GDP growth rate. Data source: IFS.  
Frequency: Quarterly. 
Differential interest rate – Absolute difference in local and U.S. real interest rates. Data source: IFS.  
Frequency: Quarterly. 
Fluctuations in expectations of the world business cycle - World market dividend yield in excess of the 30-day 
Eurodollar rate.  Data source: Datastream and FRED. 
Money supply – The U.S. broad money supply (M2) growth rate. Data source: FRED. 
Portfolio flows (bond or equity) – Cross-border bond or equity flows (%GDP). Data source: IFS. Frequency: 
 Quarterly. 
Term structure spread – Average yield of 10-year government bonds minus average yield of 3-month 
government T-bills. Data source: FRED. 
Three-month treasury bill – Rate of the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill. Data source: FRED. 
VIX index – VIX option volatility index. Available from: Chicago Board Option Exchange, www.cboe.com or  
Datastream. 
Control variables 
Market capitalization of listed companies to GDP – Equity market capitalization divided by gross domestic  
product. Annual frequency from: World Bank Development Indicators and FRED. 
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Market openness – Country’s foreign equity assets & liabilities and foreign direct investment assets &liabilities 
as a share of GDP. Data available in: External Wealth of Nations Mark II database.  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=18942.0 
Total value of stock traded to GDP – Equity market value traded divided by gross domestic product.  Data 
source: World Bank Development Indicators. Available at:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.GD.ZS Frequency: Annual. 
Trade openness – Exports plus imports over GDP for each country. Data source: World Bank Development.  
Index of Economic Freedom – measures the impact of liberty and free markets around the globe. Available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
Legal rights – the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and 
thus facilitate lending. The old index ranges from 0 to 10 but the new index ranges from 0 to 12 with higher 
scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. Data for 2003-
2009 are available at  
https://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=8abb6dc44b924c66a077db2823ec3ac3  
Data for 2010-2012 are available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Custom-Query  or  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/data%20revisions  
Data for 2013-2014 are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.LGL.CRED.XQ 
Private credit to GDP – This variable is not only a well-documented measure of financial development (King  
& Levine, 1993; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2010; Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Djankov, McLiesh, & 
Shleifer, 2007) but it also increases with the power of creditors (Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007). Data 
source: World bank. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS   Frequency:  
Annual. 
Business cycle variation – World market dividend yield in excess of the 30-day Eurodollar rate.  Data source:  





Figure 4.1. Weekly level of international market integration for country-level bond 
and stock indexes 
Panels A and B depict the weekly level of market integration before QE1 (September 2003 to October 2008), 
QE1 (November 2008 to March 2010), QE2 (November 2010 to June 2011), and QE3 (September 2012 to 
October 2014) for the 31 countries (and the 19 DM and 12 EM countries) for bond indexes in the upper panel 
and stock indexes in the lower panel. The adjusted R-square is obtained from equation (4.1), which measures 
market integration.  
 
 
Panel A: Bond integration levels 
 



























































































Table 4.1. Annual level of bond integration  
This table presents the adjusted R-square values for the international bond country-level indexes annually for each country. The 31 countries are the developed 
countries of Australia (AU), 11 developed markets from Eurozone [Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES)], Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ), Singapore (SG), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States (US), and the developing countries of Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Czech Republic (CZ), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), 
India (IN), Mexico (MX), Poland (PL), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (SR), and Thailand (TH).  
Year Australia Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Canada Denmark Japan New Zealand Singapore 
2005 0.75 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.34 0.99 0.43 0.57 0.57 
2006 0.63 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.39 0.99 0.73 0.18 0.63 
2007 0.76 0.93 0.93 0.15 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.17 0.93 0.69 0.54 0.24 
2008 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.71 0.98 0.63 0.83 0.60 
2009 0.68 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.45 0.96 0.22 0.66 0.60 
2010 0.80 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.94 0.86 0.79 0.96 0.67 0.86 0.40 0.56 0.79 
2011 0.77 0.95 0.87 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.61 0.88 0.96 0.62 0.86 0.70 0.89 0.20 0.56 0.80 
2012 0.59 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.79 0.84 0.94 0.25 0.80 0.44 0.92 0.13 0.52 0.72 
2013 0.67 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.83 0.98 0.47 0.86 0.59 0.96 0.32 0.60 0.54 
2014 0.60 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.56 0.89 0.44 0.94 0.39 0.55 0.75 
 
Year Sweden United Kingdom 
United 
States Brazil Chile Colombia 
Czech 





2005 0.86 0.63 0.06 0.36 0.44 0.25 0.83 0.99 0.65 0.13 0.29 0.54 0.55 0.37 0.43 
2006 0.86 0.83 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.47 0.83 0.99 0.68 0.16 0.37 0.82 0.39 0.35 0.21 
2007 0.77 0.47 0.54 0.63 0.37 0.67 0.65 0.93 0.82 0.42 0.52 0.78 0.48 0.46 -0.04 
2008 0.73 0.62 0.14 0.76 0.62 0.41 0.77 0.96 0.80 0.16 0.82 0.84 0.63 0.53 0.00 
2009 0.68 0.33 0.24 0.56 0.01 0.26 0.78 0.90 0.69 0.21 0.33 0.62 0.42 0.29 0.49 
2010 0.80 0.41 0.42 0.60 0.31 0.54 0.82 0.44 0.84 0.71 0.59 0.93 0.77 0.56 0.15 
2011 0.70 0.43 0.34 0.77 0.64 0.30 0.76 0.48 0.72 0.60 0.74 0.80 0.69 0.69 0.46 
2012 0.53 0.53 0.30 0.26 0.63 0.32 0.84 0.42 0.70 0.22 0.55 0.89 0.41 0.32 0.40 
2013 0.73 0.61 0.38 0.69 0.53 0.77 0.70 0.94 0.67 0.33 0.77 0.81 0.58 0.22 0.35 





Table 4.2. Annual level of stock integration 
This table presents the adjusted R-square values for the international stock country-level indexes annually for each country. The 31 countries are the developed 
countries of Australia (AU), 11 developed markets from Eurozone [Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES)], Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ), Singapore (SG), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States (US), and the developing countries of Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Czech Republic (CZ), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), 
India (IN), Mexico (MX), Poland (PL), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (SR), and Thailand (TH).  
Year Australia Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Canada Denmark Japan New Zealand Singapore 
2005 0.40 0.66 0.72 0.45 0.86 0.70 0.34 0.76 0.70 0.51 0.69 0.57 0.49 0.23 0.32 0.10 
2006 0.56 0.84 0.86 0.61 0.86 0.86 0.73 0.85 0.78 0.57 0.80 0.53 0.74 0.60 0.06 0.63 
2007 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.64 0.91 0.88 0.59 0.80 0.81 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.76 0.45 0.64 0.66 
2008 0.88 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.92 0.95 0.52 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.62 0.79 0.82 
2009 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.95 0.91 0.48 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.91 0.85 0.75 0.40 0.60 0.64 
2010 0.84 0.79 0.88 0.73 0.95 0.92 0.60 0.90 0.92 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.49 0.69 0.72 
2011 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.97 0.89 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.84 0.89 0.86 0.74 0.40 0.49 0.84 
2012 0.61 0.87 0.74 0.75 0.95 0.90 0.61 0.92 0.86 0.53 0.77 0.77 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.69 
2013 0.58 0.71 0.67 0.53 0.91 0.79 0.52 0.79 0.86 0.65 0.76 0.59 0.46 0.18 0.34 0.61 
2014 0.30 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.87 0.77 0.59 0.80 0.75 0.61 0.76 0.70 0.56 0.20 0.10 0.27 
 
Year Sweden United Kingdom 
United 
States Brazil Chile Colombia 
Czech 





2005 0.77 0.73 0.66 0.60 0.32 0.11 0.51 0.60 0.50 0.30 0.66 0.58 0.68 0.46 -0.01 
2006 0.80 0.84 0.66 0.74 0.70 0.47 0.69 0.51 0.76 0.29 0.69 0.79 0.58 0.49 0.38 
2007 0.75 0.91 0.65 0.84 0.49 0.48 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.44 0.73 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.26 
2008 0.87 0.92 0.76 0.88 0.52 0.63 0.87 0.74 0.78 0.50 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.62 0.45 
2009 0.80 0.87 0.82 0.70 0.49 0.49 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.55 0.74 0.61 0.85 0.53 0.48 
2010 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.60 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.75 0.82 0.18 
2011 0.92 0.91 0.75 0.90 0.73 0.49 0.70 0.55 0.72 0.70 0.86 0.87 0.79 0.77 0.65 
2012 0.82 0.89 0.81 0.69 0.66 0.26 0.58 0.30 0.64 0.37 0.63 0.83 0.44 0.51 0.44 
2013 0.76 0.80 0.53 0.64 0.46 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.18 0.37 0.50 0.41 0.64 0.22 0.49 
2014 0.56 0.74 0.60 0.34 0.53 0.61 0.09 0.60 0.18 0.45 0.48 0.40 0.62 0.42 0.21 
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Table 4.3. Time trend and summary statistics for market integration 
This table reports the coefficient of the time trend in a regression of the adjusted R-square values on a 
constant and a time trend (Panel A) assuming no structural breaks and summary statistics for the equal- and 
GDP-weighted averages of the country-level integration estimates for bond and stock markets across All, 
DM and EM countries (Panel B). The sample consists of 537 observations. The coefficients (Coeff) are 
multiplied by 10,000 in Panel A. 
Panel A: Time trend of market integration 
DM 
Countries 
Bond Markets  Stock Markets   Bond Markets  Stock Markets 
Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat  EM Countries Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat 
Australia -0.57 -2.16  -0.54 -1.43  Brazil 4.61 10.30  0.17 0.57 
Eurozone       Chile 4.53 10.40  0.86 2.55 
Austria -0.89 -27.32  0.98 4.22  Colombia 5.12 12.98  0.92 2.21 
Belgium -1.59 -17.85  -1.88 -8.88  Czech Republic -0.30 -1.82  -3.02 -6.92 
Finland 1.79 3.19  4.58 16.74  Greece -5.18 -13.51  0.22 0.66 
France -0.86 -33.67  1.22 11.71  Hungary 2.72 10.41  -3.55 -8.48 
Germany -1.32 -25.83  0.15 0.96  India 6.66 15.01  3.41 8.65 
Ireland -3.52 -18.00  2.07 5.39  Mexico 6.73 16.64  -2.13 -5.85 
Italy -3.45 -41.55  1.26 6.10  Poland 2.88 13.39  -1.39 -3.94 
Netherlands -0.94 -30.26  1.72 10.60  South Africa 2.10 7.42  -0.43 -1.18 
Portugal -11.30 -37.53  3.16 9.81  South Korea 0.91 1.97  -1.40 -3.38 
Spain -3.76 -35.50  0.28 1.33  Thailand -0.04 -0.08  1.09 2.78 
Canada 4.88 10.60  2.08 5.94        
Denmark -1.37 -21.58  -1.26 -3.73        
Japan -7.99 -20.56  -4.00 -10.90        
New Zealand -0.24 -0.65  2.27 4.19        
Singapore 3.55 10.11  3.13 9.01        
Sweden -5.66 -26.08  0.74 3.21        
UK -3.99 -11.68  1.10 5.78        
US 2.87 6.09  -0.05 -0.18        
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for market integration 
 Equal-weighted GDP-weighted 
 Bond Markets Stock Markets Bond Markets Stock Markets 
Summary 
Statistics All DM EM All DM EM All DM EM All DM EM 
Mean 0.70 0.79 0.57 0.69 0.74 0.62 0.57 0.48 0.08 0.72 0.61 0.10 
Median 0.70 0.80 0.56 0.70 0.74 0.64 0.56 0.49 0.09 0.73 0.62 0.10 
Std. dev. 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.02 
25th Pctl. 0.68 0.76 0.50 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.52 0.43 0.06 0.65 0.57 0.09 
75th Pctl. 0.72 0.82 0.64 0.76 0.81 0.69 0.62 0.53 0.10 0.79 0.66 0.12 
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Table 4.4. Market integration during the three QE periods without/with controlling for bear 
markets   
This table reports the relationship between the bond or stock market integration level and the three rounds 
of QE periods without/with controlling for the U.S. bear market. The bear market is defined to be from Oct. 
9, 2007 to Nov 20, 2008, and Jan. 6, 2009 to Mar. 9, 2009. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
Panel A: Integration without controls for U.S. bear and bull markets 
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 0.013** 0.015** 0.004 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.056*** 
 (2.08) (2.21) (0.40) (10.85) (8.17) (7.13) 
QE2 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.077*** 0.001 0.004 -0.003 
 (11.20) (8.68) (9.05) (0.36) (1.05) (-0.46) 
QE3 0.006 0.011* 0.004 -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.030*** 
 (1.05) (1.77) (0.42) (-6.51) (-5.24) (-4.25) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.79) (-7.58) (10.20) (3.73) (3.67) (1.92) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.56) (5.91) (7.00) (4.12) (0.25) (-5.39) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.56) (0.03) (8.41) (-4.03) (-4.56) (4.05) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.40) (-24.43) (-0.76) (-10.21) (-3.71) (-5.09) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.97) (0.51) (-5.33) (-14.44) (-10.75) (-2.97) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.34) (4.15) (12.36) (-2.26) (-4.26) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.33) (-17.22) (-13.86) (-0.93) (-0.63) (4.86) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.012*** -0.003 -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.036*** 
 (-5.54) (-1.11) (-7.17) (-17.77) (-11.83) (-13.07) 
Constant 0.607*** 1.109*** 0.813*** 1.281*** 1.315*** 0.728*** 
 (10.45) (14.40) (8.34) (31.03) (22.76) (9.62) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 




Panel B: Integration with controls for U.S. bear markets  
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 -0.003 0.000 -0.016 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 
 (-0.51) (0.00) (-1.43) (6.09) (4.45) (4.05) 
QE2 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.075*** -0.001 0.003 -0.005 
 (10.92) (8.39) (8.89) (-0.16) (0.61) (-0.80) 
QE3 0.005 0.010* 0.002 -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.031*** 
 (0.84) (1.69) (0.19) (-6.62) (-5.30) (-4.33) 
bearNonQE -0.000 -0.022*** 0.025** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 (-0.05) (-2.95) (2.24) (-6.27) (-5.76) (-3.91) 
bearQE1 0.039*** 0.018** 0.070*** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.021** 
 (5.24) (2.19) (5.68) (3.22) (1.96) (2.17) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.80) (-7.59) (10.23) (3.74) (3.67) (1.92) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.56) (5.92) (7.02) (4.13) (0.26) (-5.40) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.56) (0.03) (8.43) (-4.04) (-4.57) (4.07) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.41) (-24.46) (-0.76) (-10.23) (-3.72) (-5.10) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.97) (0.52) (-5.35) (-14.46) (-10.77) (-2.97) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.35) (4.15) (12.40) (-2.27) (-4.27) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.34) (-17.24) (-13.89) (-0.93) (-0.63) (4.87) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.008*** -0.001 -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.034*** 
 (-3.34) (-0.37) (-4.64) (-15.69) (-10.57) (-11.59) 
Constant 0.603*** 1.107*** 0.806*** 1.279*** 1.314*** 0.727*** 
 (10.39) (14.39) (8.29) (31.06) (22.79) (9.62) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 
Adj. R2 0.756 0.778 0.721 0.726 0.735 0.647 
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Table 4.5. QE Channel Classifications and Other Control Variables 
This table lists the macro-variables along with their QE channel classifications and control variables that 
affect market integration. The macro-variables linked with the QE channels are arranged alphabetically 
within the alphabetically arranged QE channels. They have been used in the literature as channels though 
with variables (such as the effects of unconventional monetary policy) may be transmitted to financial 
securities and markets. QE channel classifications are generally from the cited sources. The control 
variables are classified based on Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad and Siegel (2011).  
 
Panel A: QE Channel Classifications 
Macro-variable QE Channel Classification and Usage 
VIX index Confidence channel (Panchenko & Wu, 2009; Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; 
Carrieri, Chaieb, & Errunza, 2013). 
Credit or default spread Default risk channel (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Bekaert, 
Harvey, & Lundblad,  2011; Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Carrieri, Chaieb & 
Errunza, 2013; Frijns, Tourani, & RadIndriawan, 2012; Panchenko & Wu, 
2009). 
Differential inflation rate Inflation channel (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Alotaibi & 
Mishra, 2017; Panchenko & Wu, 2009; Volosovych, 2011, 2013). 
Cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities Liquidity channel (Bruno & Shin, 2015). 
Money supply (M2) Liquidity channel (Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundlad & 
Siegel, 2011). 
Three-month treasury bill Liquidity channel (Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; Panchenko & Wu, 2009).  
Differential growth potential  Portfolio balance channel (Lim & Mohapatra, 2016). 
Differential interest rate  Portfolio balance channel (Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; Frankel, 1992; Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundlad & Siegel; 2011). 
Portfolio flows Portfolio balance channel (Fratzscher, Lo Duca, & Straub, 2016; Panchenko 
& Wu, 2009). 
Term structure spread Portfolio balance channel (Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; Frijns, Tourani, & 
RadIndriawan, 2012; Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Carrieri, Chaieb & Errunza, 
2013). 
Cross-border banking capital flows Risk-taking channel (Bruno & Shin, 2015). 
 
Panel B: Other Control Variables 
Control Variable Description 
Market capitalization to GDP Financial market openness and development (Panchenko & Wu, 2009; 
Carrieri, Chaieb & Errunza, 2013). 
Market openness Financial market openness and development (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; 
Umutlu, Akdeniz & Altay-Salih, 2010). 
Total value of stock traded to GDP Financial market openness and development (Panchenko & Wu, 2009; 
Carrieri, Chaieb & Errunza, 2013; Alotaibi & Mishra, 2017). 
Trade openness  Financial market openness and development (Panchenko & Wu, 2009; 
Volosovych, 2011; Carrieri, Chaieb, & Errunza, 2013; Alotaibi & Mishra, 
2017). 
Index of Economic Freedom  Political risk and institutions (Lucey & Zhang, 2011; Panchenko & Wu, 
2009). 
Legal rights Political risk and institutions (Lerner & Schoar, 2005;  Djankov, McLiesh & 
Shleifer, 2007; Qi, Roth & Wald, 2016). 
Private credit to GDP Political risk and institutions (Bekaert, Harvey & Lundblad,  2011; Bekaert, 
Harvey, Lundlad & Siegel; 2011; Carrieri, Chaieb & Errunza, 2013). 
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Business cycle variation Business Cycles (Bekaert, 1995; Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Carrieri, Chaieb & 






Table 4.6. Summary statistics for variables linked with the QE channels 
This table presents summary statistics for key variables linked with the QE channels. The sample consists of 31-country observations from September 2003 until 
October 2014. The mean, median and standard deviation are provided for the non-QE, QE1, QE2, and QE3 periods. Summary statistics for the differences in the 
independent variables during QE1, QE2, and QE3 compared to the values in their corresponding non-QE periods are reported. Mean differences are denoted by 
***, **, and * if significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. M2 is multiplied by 1000 and PortfolioFlow is multiplied by 10 for presentation purposes.    
    non-QE       QE1       QE2       QE3   
  mean median std. dev   mean median std. dev   mean median std. dev   mean median std. dev 
VIX 0.013* 0.000 0.141  -0.025 -0.023 0.118  -0.008 -0.002 0.134  -0.008 0.001 0.114 
CreditSpread 1.050*** 0.940 0.336  0.873*** 1.590 0.903  -0.118 0.910 0.116  -0.129** 0.910 0.138 
difINFL 1.345*** 0.939 1.373  1.143*** 1.666 2.532  0.002 1.084 1.390  -0.042 0.750 1.814 
BankLiabGDP 0.015*** 0.002 0.033  0.012*** 0.007 0.047  0.014*** 0.004 0.051  0.017*** 0.008 0.058 
M2 1.112*** 0.001 0.002  -0.217 0.001 0.002  0.433 0.001 0.002  0.084 0.001 0.002 
US3MTbill 2.228*** 1.825 1.810  -2.095*** 0.135 0.069  -2.127*** 0.120 0.047  -2.162*** 0.070 0.028 
difGDP 2.130*** 1.658 1.982  0.463*** 1.958 2.547  0.138** 1.573 2.542  -0.191*** 1.484 1.919 
difINT 1.878*** 0.930 2.664  -0.166*** 1.073 1.828  0.270*** 0.993 2.618  0.135** 1.195 2.398 
BondFlow -0.055* -0.233 3.430  -0.624*** -0.548 2.821  -0.726*** -0.560 3.863  0.067 -0.377 2.710 
EquityFlow -0.100*** 0.051 2.296  0.097* -0.064 1.253  -0.273*** -0.033 2.675  0.052 0.054 1.573 
TermSpread 1.626*** 1.810 1.188  1.533*** 3.310 0.458  1.509*** 3.220 0.280  0.504*** 1.935 0.469 




Table 4.7. Financial market integration determinants based on QE time events for All, DM 
and EM countries 
This table reports the coefficients for regression (4.2) which reflect the effects of the potential channels for the 
transmission of the effects of unconventional monetary policy based on weekly data. The dependent variables are the 
level of integration for international bond or equity markets. The independent variables are the proxies for the potential 
channels for transmitting the effects of unconventional monetary policy defined in Table 4.5. Data are not available 
for Singapore and India for bond flows and for Singapore, Colombia, and Mexico for equity flows. The coefficients 
of the regressions are consistent with those for the regressions including the countries without the flows (bond or 
equity). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable 
definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix 4.A. The estimated coefficients of M2 and PortfolioFlow are 
multiplied by 1000 and 10, respectively.    
    Bond Integration   Equity Integration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 0.153*** 0.387*** 0.085 -0.142*** 0.390*** -0.322*** 
 (2.67) (5.63) (0.92) (-3.24) (7.35) (-3.92) 
QE2 0.527*** 0.554*** -0.558*** 0.177*** 0.361*** -0.208* 
 (6.44) (5.73) (-3.83) (2.82) (4.85) (-1.68) 
QE3 0.438*** 0.398*** 0.314*** -0.271*** 0.027 0.020 
 (8.76) (6.64) (3.48) (-7.12) (0.59) (0.28) 
VIXrate 0.020** 0.011 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (2.40) (1.18) (2.95) (3.74) (3.16) (2.66) 
VIXrate*QE1 -0.003 0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.12) (0.08) (-0.35) (0.01) (-0.17) (-0.02) 
VIXrate*QE2 -0.024 -0.015 -0.035 -0.028 -0.021 -0.034 
 (-0.79) (-0.44) (-0.75) (-1.20) (-0.83) (-0.93) 
VIXrate*QE3 -0.018 -0.022 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (-0.71) (-0.77) (-0.18) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) 
CreditSpread -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.016** 
 (-0.71) (-0.08) (-0.30) (-0.84) (0.66) (-2.17) 
CreditSpread*QE1 -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.065*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.037*** 
 (-4.48) (-2.93) (-4.79) (-5.18) (-4.19) (-3.57) 
CreditSpread*QE2 -0.032 -0.043 -0.101 0.007 -0.019 0.013 
 (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.88) (0.13) (-0.31) (0.15) 
CreditSpread*QE3 0.019 -0.012 0.112** 0.027 -0.004 0.071* 
 (0.64) (-0.36) (2.37) (1.22) (-0.16) (1.95) 
difINFL 0.000 0.033*** -0.016*** 0.008*** 0.020*** 0.006*** 
 (0.35) (16.81) (-10.55) (9.29) (13.28) (5.98) 
difINFL*QE1 -0.021*** -0.053*** 0.001 0.000 -0.027*** 0.006*** 
 (-9.48) (-14.74) (0.38) (0.30) (-9.67) (3.27) 
difINFL*QE2 -0.011** -0.073*** 0.037*** 0.010*** -0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (-2.43) (-13.52) (4.73) (3.99) (-4.80) (5.37) 
difINFL*QE3 -0.007** -0.077*** 0.010** 0.006*** -0.006 0.025*** 
 (-2.15) (-12.20) (2.32) (3.99) (-1.30) (13.85) 
BankLiabGDP -0.417*** 0.039 16.760*** -0.247*** -0.647*** 5.438*** 
 (-6.72) (0.62) (12.75) (-5.41) (-13.53) (5.61) 
BankLiabGDP*QE1 0.304*** -0.042 -15.785*** -0.134** 0.301*** -6.971*** 
 (3.94) (-0.54) (-4.85) (-2.32) (4.94) (-2.98) 
BankLiabGDP*QE2 -0.426*** -0.001 65.770*** 0.109 0.320*** 17.431*** 
 (-4.78) (-0.02) (10.71) (1.43) (4.42) (3.59) 
BankLiabGDP*QE3 0.451*** 0.163** -1.864 0.396*** 0.444*** 21.714*** 
 (6.55) (2.52) (-0.82) (7.77) (8.92) (11.82) 
M2 -0.000 -0.297 0.394 0.000 0.390 -0.199 
 (-0.20) (-0.48) (0.45) (0.56) (0.81) (-0.29) 
M2*QE1 0.001 0.938 0.081 -0.000 0.752 -1.417 
 (0.48) (0.52) (0.03) (-0.28) (0.55) (-0.72) 
M2*QE2 0.001 1.640 -0.946 -0.000 0.080 -1.026 
 (0.28) (0.73) (-0.30) (-0.31) (0.05) (-0.41) 
M2*QE3 0.000 0.166 0.218 -0.001 -2.143* 0.407 
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 (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (-1.24) (-1.72) (0.23) 
US3MTbill -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.051*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.028*** 
 (-5.83) (-3.15) (-6.85) (-6.85) (-6.21) (-4.85) 
US3MTbill*QE1 0.113** 0.057 0.110 0.084** 0.060 0.123** 
 (2.47) (1.14) (1.55) (2.46) (1.55) (2.23) 
US3MTbill*QE2 0.123 0.144 0.134 -0.175 -0.100 -0.211 
 (0.71) (0.76) (0.49) (-1.36) (-0.69) (-1.00) 
US3MTbill*QE3 -0.093 0.080 -0.417** 0.278*** 0.396*** -0.203 
 (-0.71) (0.55) (-2.06) (2.85) (3.57) (-1.29) 
difGDP 0.008*** 0.002 0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** 
 (8.41) (1.60) (5.58) (-1.15) (-0.98) (-2.42) 
difGDP*QE1 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.006*** 
 (-4.55) (-3.06) (-2.23) (1.50) (-5.06) (3.43) 
difGDP*QE2 -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.035*** 0.001 0.003 -0.005** 
 (-9.25) (-3.30) (-10.55) (0.37) (0.89) (-2.38) 
difGDP*QE3 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.004* 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 
 (-5.98) (1.15) (-1.74) (17.26) (11.10) (6.52) 
difINT -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.000 0.013*** -0.001** 
 (-16.01) (-9.37) (-14.33) (-0.05) (12.57) (-2.18) 
difINT*QE1 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.004** -0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (6.10) (2.71) (7.11) (2.24) (-2.88) (5.57) 
difINT*QE2 -0.002 -0.028*** 0.009*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.002 
 (-0.81) (-9.54) (2.63) (-5.13) (-4.45) (-0.88) 
difINT*QE3 0.008*** -0.052*** 0.017*** -0.004*** -0.022*** 0.007*** 
 (4.56) (-14.85) (6.30) (-3.27) (-8.24) (4.83) 
PortfolioFlow -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.002*** -0.010*** 
 (-2.98) (-6.00) (5.35) (1.38) (3.96) (-4.30) 
PortfolioFlow*QE1 0.000 0.001 -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.000 
 (0.32) (0.85) (-4.08) (-4.15) (-2.21) (-0.04) 
PortfolioFlow*QE2 -0.000 0.002* -0.006 -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.017* 
 (-0.16) (1.76) (-0.89) (-8.97) (-5.89) (1.66) 
PortfolioFlow*QE3 0.000 0.004*** -0.007** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.022*** 
 (0.23) (3.17) (-2.19) (7.15) (4.54) (2.63) 
Term -0.012*** -0.001 -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.031*** 
 (-2.71) (-0.29) (-5.49) (-6.14) (-3.92) (-5.74) 
Term*QE1 0.001 -0.016 0.037* -0.003 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.05) (-1.19) (1.90) (-0.34) (-0.77) (0.18) 
Term*QE2 0.036** 0.031* 0.074*** 0.037*** 0.035** 0.052*** 
 (2.23) (1.76) (2.89) (3.03) (2.54) (2.66) 
Term*QE3 -0.080*** -0.071*** -0.085*** -0.003 0.019** -0.056*** 
 (-8.52) (-6.77) (-5.76) (-0.37) (2.38) (-4.88) 
BankingFlow 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 
 (28.89) (18.01) (6.90) (9.34) (9.18) (9.18) 
BankingFlow*QE1 -0.005** -0.017*** -0.011** 0.018*** -0.020*** 0.029*** 
 (-2.02) (-5.64) (-2.12) (9.78) (-8.70) (5.37) 
BankingFlow*QE2 -0.047*** -0.042*** 0.042*** -0.019*** -0.030*** 0.010 
 (-16.51) (-10.83) (4.68) (-8.24) (-10.06) (1.22) 
BankingFlow*QE3 -0.021*** -0.008*** -0.026*** 0.010*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (-9.30) (-2.71) (-4.47) (5.70) (-6.19) (-3.48) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (8.92) (-0.74) (6.15) (4.11) (4.22) (3.23) 
MktOpen -0.001 0.006** 0.022*** 0.004*** -0.007*** -0.035*** 
 (-0.38) (2.24) (4.34) (2.76) (-3.74) (-9.02) 
TotalValueGDP 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000** 
 (8.62) (3.42) (8.65) (-4.75) (-7.45) (2.47) 
TradeOpenGDP 0.001*** -0.001** 0.001** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.000* 
 (5.13) (-2.52) (2.07) (-9.21) (3.36) (-1.73) 
EconFree -0.007*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.003*** 
 (-10.68) (-1.33) (-5.87) (-12.69) (-10.76) (2.59) 
LegalRights 0.009*** 0.001 0.024*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.009*** 
 (5.83) (0.60) (7.51) (-0.47) (-3.15) (-3.27) 
PrivateCredit -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
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 (-15.41) (-18.44) (-10.25) (-5.01) (-4.75) (-0.45) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.008*** -0.004 -0.011** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
 (-2.68) (-1.24) (-2.55) (-8.31) (-6.83) (-5.80) 
Constant 0.093 0.024 0.727*** 1.087*** 0.904*** 0.175** 
 (1.31) (0.23) (8.42) (19.24) (11.58) (2.31) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15061 9308 5753 14485 9308 5177 
Adj. R2 0.793 0.823 0.765 0.745 0.771 0.733 
 
Computed from above estimates:       
VIX + VIX*QE1 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.024 0.019 0.026 
 (0.78) (0.53) (0.74) (1.41) (1.00) (0.98) 
VIX + VIX*QE2 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 
 (-0.13) (-0.12) (0.06) (-0.18) (0.04) (-0.21) 
VIX + VIX*QE3 0.002 -0.011 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.031 
 (0.09) (-0.41) (0.84) (1.36) (1.18) (1.09) 
CreditSpread + CreditSpread*QE1 -0.042*** -0.028*** -0.067*** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.052*** 
 (-6.32) (-3.78) (-6.31) (-7.34) (-4.72) (-6.48) 
CreditSpread + CreditSpread*QE2 -0.036 -0.043 -0.104 0.004 -0.016 -0.002 
 (-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.91) (0.06) (-0.26) (-0.03) 
CreditSpread + CreditSpread*QE3 0.015 -0.012 0.109** 0.024 -0.001 0.055 
 (0.51) (-0.39) (2.36) (1.08) (-0.03) (1.55) 
difINFL + difINFL*QE1 -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.015*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.012*** 
 (-10.73) (-6.63) (-5.73) (6.78) (-2.95) (7.48) 
difINFL + difINFL*QE2 -0.010** -0.040*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.000 0.023*** 
 (-2.39) (-7.70) (2.70) (7.25) (0.00) (7.21) 
difINFL + difINFL*QE3 -0.007** -0.044*** -0.006 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.031*** 
 (-2.11) (-7.04) (-1.44) (9.61) (2.92) (17.91) 
BankLiabGDP + BankLiabGDP*QE1 -0.113 -0.003 0.975 -0.381*** -0.346*** -1.533 
 (-1.40) (-0.04) (0.30) (-6.36) (-5.32) (-0.65) 
BankLiabGDP + BankLiabGDP*QE2 -0.843*** 0.038 82.531*** -0.138* -0.327*** 22.869*** 
 (-9.15) (0.41) (13.33) (-1.78) (-4.30) (4.65) 
BankLiabGDP + BankLiabGDP*QE3 0.034 0.202*** 14.897*** 0.148*** -0.203*** 27.153*** 
 (0.47) (2.91) (6.78) (2.76) (-3.75) (14.60) 
M2 + M2*QE1 0.001 0.641 0.475 -0.000 1.143 -1.616 
 (0.44) (0.38) (0.20) (-0.09) (0.88) (-0.88) 
M2 + M2*QE2 0.000 1.344 -0.552 -0.000 0.470 -1.226 
 (0.23) (0.62) (-0.18) (-0.16) (0.28) (-0.51) 
M2 + M2*QE3 0.000 -0.131 0.612 -0.001 -1.753 0.207 
 (0.07) (-0.09) (0.29) (-1.11) (-1.52) (0.13) 
US3MTbill + US3MTbill*QE1 0.085* 0.040 0.059 0.059* 0.035 0.095* 
 (1.90) (0.82) (0.85) (1.77) (0.92) (1.76) 
US3MTbill + US3MTbill*QE2 0.095 0.127 0.083 -0.200 -0.126 -0.239 
 (0.55) (0.67) (0.30) (-1.55) (-0.86) (-1.14) 
US3MTbill + US3MTbill*QE3 -0.121 0.063 -0.468** 0.253*** 0.370*** -0.231 
 (-0.93) (0.44) (-2.31) (2.60) (3.34) (-1.47) 
difGDP + difGDP*QE1 -0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 0.001 -0.011*** 0.003** 
 (-0.39) (-2.58) (0.67) (0.99) (-6.52) (2.37) 
difGDP + difGDP*QE2 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.028*** -0.000 0.002 -0.007*** 
 (-6.11) (-2.88) (-8.96) (-0.12) (0.59) (-3.58) 
difGDP + difGDP*QE3 -0.003* 0.006* 0.003 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.009*** 
 (-1.93) (1.89) (1.59) (18.31) (11.29) (6.00) 
difINT + difINT*QE1 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.004** 0.002 0.010*** 
 (0.65) (0.21) (2.01) (2.16) (0.44) (4.74) 
difINT + difINT*QE2 -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.005 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.004 
 (-7.17) (-14.94) (-1.58) (-5.13) (0.77) (-1.47) 
difINT + difINT*QE3 -0.003** -0.065*** 0.002 -0.004*** -0.009*** 0.006*** 
 (-1.98) (-18.67) (0.84) (-3.33) (-3.26) (3.89) 
PortfolioFlow + PortfolioFlow*QE1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.010*** 
 (-0.87) (-1.51) (-2.37) (-3.89) (-1.39) (-2.90) 
PortfolioFlow + PortfolioFlow*QE2 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.012*** -0.007*** 0.007 
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 (-1.34) (-0.49) (0.18) (-8.70) (-4.81) (0.72) 
PortfolioFlow + PortfolioFlow*QE3 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.012 
 (-0.71) (1.48) (0.09) (7.77) (5.95) (1.49) 
TermSpread + TermSpread*QE1 -0.011 -0.018 -0.001 -0.024*** -0.023** -0.028** 
 (-0.97) (-1.37) (-0.04) (-2.69) (-2.30) (-1.98) 
TermSpread + TermSpread*QE2 0.024 0.030* 0.036 0.016 0.020 0.021 
 (1.63) (1.85) (1.53) (1.47) (1.60) (1.19) 
TermSpread + TermSpread*QE3 -0.092*** -0.072*** -0.122*** -0.023*** 0.004 -0.087*** 
 (-11.11) (-7.82) (-9.45) (-3.71) (0.60) (-8.54) 
BankingFlow + BankingFlow*QE1 0.110*** 0.084*** 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 
 (25.46) (13.18) (4.64) (13.22) (3.91) (12.47) 
BankingFlow + BankingFlow*QE2 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.010** 0.010* 0.059*** 
 (13.66) (8.53) (8.05) (2.57) (1.82) (6.14) 
BankingFlow + BankingFlow*QE3 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.016** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 






Table 4.8. The Effect of the U.S. Fed purchases on financial market integration  
This table reports the effects of the security type holdings of the U.S. Federal Reserve on financial market 
integration. The dependent variables are the level of integration for international bond or equity markets. 
The independent variables which proxy for the Fed security type holdings are TREASF/TAF and MBSF/TAF. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 0.039* -0.002 0.125*** -0.002 0.020 -0.028 
 (1.82) (-0.06) (3.54) (-0.12) (1.10) (-1.02) 
QE2 -0.368 -0.370 -0.273 -0.154 -0.219 -0.165 
 (-0.43) (-0.38) (-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.31) (-0.15) 
QE3 -1.397*** -1.080*** -1.149*** 1.047*** 1.358*** 0.536 
 (-5.44) (-3.75) (-2.71) (5.77) (6.33) (1.63) 
TREASF/TAF 0.027 -0.024 0.136*** -0.097*** -0.082*** -0.119*** 
 (0.87) (-0.69) (2.70) (-4.49) (-3.20) (-3.04) 
TREASF/TAF*QE1 0.042 0.063** -0.021 0.140*** 0.097*** 0.206*** 
 (1.54) (2.06) (-0.47) (7.28) (4.27) (5.87) 
TREASF/TAF*QE2 0.980 0.797 0.995 0.969 1.005 1.156 
 (0.51) (0.37) (0.31) (0.71) (0.62) (0.47) 
TREASF/TAF*QE3 1.752*** 1.546*** 1.198** -1.456*** -1.717*** -1.008** 
 (4.89) (3.85) (2.03) (-5.76) (-5.74) (-2.20) 
MBSF/TAF 0.203*** 0.087* 0.446*** 0.044 0.069* 0.031 
 (4.54) (1.74) (6.06) (1.39) (1.86) (0.55) 
MBSF/TAF*QE1 -0.707*** -0.168 -1.650*** -0.604*** -0.674*** -0.552*** 
 (-4.85) (-1.03) (-6.87) (-5.86) (-5.53) (-2.96) 
MBSF/TAF*QE2 0.175 0.322 -0.042 -0.428 -0.298 -0.563 
 (0.38) (0.62) (-0.06) (-1.31) (-0.77) (-0.95) 
MBSF/TAF*QE3 1.270*** 0.653*** 1.497*** -0.733*** -1.236*** 0.053 
 (5.74) (2.63) (4.10) (-4.69) (-6.68) (0.19) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.83) (-7.60) (10.32) (3.75) (3.68) (1.93) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.022*** 
 (-2.56) (5.93) (7.13) (4.18) (0.27) (-5.45) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.59) (0.04) (8.57) (-4.07) (-4.61) (4.12) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.47) (-24.48) (-0.84) (-10.35) (-3.78) (-5.18) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.98) (0.52) (-5.44) (-14.58) (-10.85) (-3.02) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.38) (4.15) (12.54) (-2.29) (-4.30) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.37) (-17.25) (-14.10) (-0.94) (-0.63) (4.91) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.005** 0.001 -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.027*** 
 (-2.11) (0.31) (-3.33) (-12.63) (-8.85) (-8.81) 
Constant 0.578*** 1.126*** 0.688*** 1.360*** 1.383*** 0.825*** 
 (9.05) (13.63) (6.51) (30.15) (22.48) (10.03) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 
Adj. R2 0.757 0.778 0.727 0.730 0.739 0.655 
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Computed from above estimates: 
TREASF/TAF+TREASF/TAF*QE1 0.069*** 0.039** 0.115*** 0.043*** 0.016 0.086*** 
 (4.02) (2.04) (4.07) (3.58) (1.09) (3.93) 
TREASF/TAF+TREASF/TAF*QE2 1.007 0.773 1.131 0.872 0.923 1.037 
 (0.52) (0.36) (0.35) (0.64) (0.57) (0.42) 
TREASF/TAF+TREASF/TAF*QE3 1.779*** 1.523*** 1.334** -1.553*** -1.799*** -1.128** 
 (5.01) (3.82) (2.28) (-6.19) (-6.06) (-2.48) 
MBSF/TAF+MBSF/TAF*QE1 -0.504*** -0.081 -1.204*** -0.560*** -0.605*** -0.521*** 
 (-3.57) (-0.51) (-5.17) (-5.60) (-5.12) (-2.87) 
MBSF/TAF+MBSF/TAF*QE2 0.378 0.409 0.404 -0.384 -0.229 -0.531 
 (0.80) (0.77) (0.52) (-1.15) (-0.58) (-0.88) 
MBSF/TAF+MBSF/TAF*QE3 1.473*** 0.740*** 1.943*** -0.690*** -1.167*** 0.085 
  (6.74) (3.02) (5.40) (-4.47) (-6.40) (0.30) 
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Table 4.9. Market integration during the three QE periods controlling for the global financial 
crisis  
This table reports the relationship between the bond or stock market integration level and the three rounds 
of U.S. QE periods while controlling for the global financial crisis. The global financial crisis is defined to 
be from Oct. 9, 2007 to Nov 20, 2008, and Jan. 6, 2009 to Mar. 9, 2009. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 Panel A: The time period of the global financial crisis is August 7, 2007- June, 2009 
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 -0.002 -0.000 -0.012 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 
 (-0.27) (-0.04) (-1.07) (6.18) (4.79) (3.71) 
QE2 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.076*** -0.001 0.003 -0.006 
 (10.94) (8.36) (8.92) (-0.15) (0.66) (-0.84) 
QE3 0.005 0.011* 0.002 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 
 (0.89) (1.74) (0.24) (-6.66) (-5.31) (-4.38) 
CrisisGlobalNonQE -0.008 -0.031*** 0.013 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 
 (-1.39) (-4.63) (1.31) (-5.81) (-5.06) (-4.08) 
CrisisGlobalQE1 0.028*** 0.012* 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.032*** 
 (4.42) (1.70) (4.64) (4.92) (2.83) (3.93) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.80) (-7.59) (10.22) (3.74) (3.67) (1.93) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.56) (5.92) (7.01) (4.13) (0.26) (-5.41) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.56) (0.04) (8.42) (-4.04) (-4.57) (4.07) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.41) (-24.47) (-0.76) (-10.24) (-3.72) (-5.11) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.97) (0.52) (-5.34) (-14.47) (-10.77) (-2.98) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.35) (4.15) (12.38) (-2.27) (-4.27) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.34) (-17.25) (-13.88) (-0.93) (-0.63) (4.88) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.008*** -0.002 -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.032*** 
 (-3.77) (-0.76) (-5.06) (-15.33) (-10.44) (-11.17) 
Constant 0.604*** 1.108*** 0.807*** 1.279*** 1.314*** 0.726*** 
 (10.41) (14.41) (8.30) (31.05) (22.78) (9.62) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 




Panel B: The time period of the global financial crisis is September 15, 2008 – June 2009 
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 0.002 0.010 -0.016 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 
 (0.29) (1.40) (-1.47) (7.49) (6.09) (4.48) 
QE2 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.075*** 0.000 0.004 -0.004 
 (11.04) (8.63) (8.86) (0.11) (0.90) (-0.68) 
QE3 0.005 0.010* 0.002 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.032*** 
 (0.89) (1.70) (0.25) (-6.75) (-5.38) (-4.45) 
CrisisGlobalNonQE 0.022*** 0.046*** -0.016 0.003 0.014** -0.012 
 (2.83) (5.20) (-1.20) (0.52) (2.15) (-1.16) 
CrisisGlobalQE1 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.044*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.039*** 
 (5.05) (3.17) (4.39) (6.57) (4.30) (5.04) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.80) (-7.59) (10.22) (3.74) (3.67) (1.92) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.56) (5.92) (7.01) (4.13) (0.26) (-5.40) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.56) (0.03) (8.42) (-4.04) (-4.57) (4.06) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.41) (-24.47) (-0.76) (-10.22) (-3.71) (-5.10) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.97) (0.52) (-5.34) (-14.45) (-10.76) (-2.97) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.35) (4.15) (12.38) (-2.27) (-4.26) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.34) (-17.25) (-13.88) (-0.93) (-0.63) (4.87) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.008*** -0.001 -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.031*** 
 (-3.77) (-0.39) (-5.22) (-14.63) (-9.90) (-10.59) 
Constant 0.604*** 1.107*** 0.808*** 1.278*** 1.313*** 0.724*** 
 (10.41) (14.40) (8.30) (30.99) (22.74) (9.58) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 




Table 4.10. Market integration during the three QE periods while controlling for the U.S. 
recession  
This table reports the relationship between the bond or stock market integration level and the three rounds 
of QE periods when controlling for the U.S. recession. The U.S. recession is defined to be from 12/2007-
6/2009. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
    Bond Markets   Stock Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All DM EM All DM EM 
QE1 -0.008 -0.001 -0.024** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.020** 
 (-1.14) (-0.19) (-2.08) (3.73) (2.91) (2.18) 
QE2 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.074*** -0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (10.77) (8.35) (8.71) (-0.53) (0.37) (-1.08) 
QE3 0.005 0.010* 0.003 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 
 (0.90) (1.69) (0.28) (-6.68) (-5.33) (-4.39) 
RecessionUSNonQE -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.037** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.077*** 
 (-3.42) (-3.10) (-2.41) (-9.96) (-8.00) (-6.50) 
RecessionUSQE1 0.022*** 0.013* 0.036*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.022*** 
 (3.52) (1.75) (3.41) (2.93) (1.36) (2.69) 
MktCap_GDP 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (12.80) (-7.59) (10.22) (3.75) (3.68) (1.93) 
MktOpen -0.005** 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.56) (5.92) (7.02) (4.14) (0.26) (-5.42) 
TotalValueGDP 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.56) (0.03) (8.43) (-4.05) (-4.58) (4.08) 
TradeOpenGDP -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.41) (-24.46) (-0.77) (-10.26) (-3.73) (-5.12) 
EconFree 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 (0.97) (0.52) (-5.34) (-14.50) (-10.79) (-2.99) 
LegalRights 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.038*** -0.003** -0.005*** 0.001 
 (8.35) (4.15) (12.39) (-2.27) (-4.27) (0.49) 
PrivateCredit -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-8.34) (-17.24) (-13.89) (-0.93) (-0.63) (4.89) 
BusinessCycleVariation -0.009*** -0.001 -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.032*** 
 (-3.89) (-0.35) (-5.50) (-15.49) (-10.49) (-11.25) 
Constant 0.604*** 1.107*** 0.809*** 1.279*** 1.314*** 0.726*** 
 (10.41) (14.39) (8.32) (31.12) (22.82) (9.64) 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16213 9937 5753 16213 9937 5753 
Adj. R2 0.756 0.778 0.721 0.727 0.736 0.650 
 
 
